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ABSTRACT 
 
A multi-method cross-cultural study was conducted to examine how cultural, 
organizational, and individual differences shape whistleblowing behavior in the United States 
and Japan.  In the first essay, a qualitative method was used to examine the influence of 
ecological and historical factors, which are antecedents of culture, on shaping whistleblowing 
behavior.  Historical factors such as the development of laws promoting whistleblowing and 
protecting whistleblowers were examined.  Reports on whistleblowing activities in the popular 
culture, academic research on the topic of whistleblowing, and films made on whistleblowers 
were also examined in both the United States and Japan.  It was found that in the United States 
there is a long history of promoting whistleblowing through legislation, whereas in Japan, 
suggestion box has been used since 1721 to provide voice, and whistleblowing legislation has 
only started in the last ten years. 
Scenarios are effective tools for measuring people‘s response to specific behaviors, and 
therefore, in the second essay, eight scenarios depicting situations such as taking items from the 
office, appropriating office resources for personal gain, sexual harassment, and environmental 
pollution were developed.  Some scenarios consisted of two to four situations that increased in 
moral intensity giving a total of twenty one scenarios.  Data were collected from the United 
States and Japan to compare the response of people to these workplace situations.  Findings from 
this study show that people are sensitive to moral intensity, and there are cultural differences in 
how we respond to various workplace situations. Counter to the common belief that in 
collectivist cultures people do not blow the whistle, it was found that in certain situations 
Japanese people are as prone to take action as are people in United States. 
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The third essay examined how cultural, organizational and individual level variables 
shape whistleblowing.  Multiple cultural theories (i.e., Tightness and Looseness, Individualism 
and Collectivism, and Social Axiom), organizational variables (i.e., Organizational Policy 
towards Whistleblowing, Perception of Organizational Support, Perception of Retaliation, and 
Perception of Politics in Organization), and personality factors (i.e., Allocentrism, Idiocentrism 
and the Big 5 Personality Factors) were employed to examine which variable is more effective in 
predicting whistleblowing behavior.  A multilevel model of whistleblowing behavior was 
developed using these variables.  Results from hierarchical regression show that Collectivism 
and Social Axiom (i.e. Reward for Application and Social Complexity), and Tightness and 
Looseness predict whistleblowing behavior in that order.  Organizational Policy towards 
Whistleblowing and one of the Big 5 Personality factors, Conscientiousness, also predict 
whistleblowing behavior.  Findings also show that whistleblowing intention mediates 
whistleblowing attitude and whistleblowing behavior. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Any construct has a history.  It exits in the world of practice and then it enters the world 
of research.  To pursue a meaningful inquiry into any construct, it is important to trace its 
historical roots both in the world of practice and research.  It is particularly important for 
negative constructs like sexual harassment, racism, sexism, discrimination, violence and so forth 
as well as for positive constructs like resilience, hope, forgiveness, nonviolence, and so forth that 
have emerged from the world of practice, what is often referred to as the real world.  
Whistleblowing is such a construct that has grown from its original meaning to encompass other 
constructs.  
Near and Micelli (1995) define whistleblowing as ―the disclosure by organization 
member (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their 
employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect actions.‖  Some of the largest 
scandals have happened at US corporations. Many of these scandals came to light because 
employees in those companies believed that wrongdoing by corporations should be corrected. 
However, little has been reported about whistleblowing by employees in non-western cultures, 
and much less is reported in terms of comparative analyses between two cultures.  Although the 
effect of national culture on an employee‘s willingness to report wrongdoing is starting to appear 
in the business literature (e.g., Keenan, 2002; King, 2000; Sims & Keenan, 1999; Tavakoli, 
Keenan & Crnjak-Karanovic, 2003), previous whistleblowing studies have focused little on 
cultural factors (Barnett, 1992; Barnett, Cochran & Taylor, 1993; Callahan & Collins, 1992; 
Larmer, 1998; Loeb & Cory, 1998). This study fills these lacunae. 
Culture has influence on ethical attitudes and behaviors (Ahmed, Chung & Eichenseher, 
2003; Christie, Kwon, Stoeberl & Baumhart, 2003; Su, 2006). Culture also explains individual 
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ethical attitude preferences (Su, 2006), and is closely linked to ethical decision making through 
its influence on values, reasoning and attitudes (Chen,  Meindl & Hunt, 1997; Leung, Bond & 
Schwartz, 1995; Lu, Rose &  Blodgett, 1999).  Past research has also suggested that culture may 
impact ethical perceptions and behaviors differently across countries (Buller, Kohls, & 
Anderson, 1991; Cohen, Pant & Sharp, 1992).   
A multi-method approach was used in this project to examine how culture shapes 
whistleblowing behavior.  In essay one, a qualitative historical analysis of whistleblowing in the 
United States and Japan was conducted.  An analysis of whistleblowing was carried out by 
tracing the legal histories of whistleblowing in the two nations.  The reports on whistleblowing 
published in the popular press in English media were also examined for both the United States 
and Japan.  Further, a case analysis of how multinational companies handle whistleblowing in 
each nation was carried out.  Essay one allowed to examine how culture shapes whistleblowing 
behavior in these two countries at various levels, allowing for some generalizations beyond these 
two countries.    
In essay two, the whistleblowing space was mapped by developing scenarios that 
captured how people interact with each other in an organization, how they use organizational 
resources, and how their actions in an organization impacts the environment.  These contexts, 
individual-individual, individual-organization, and organization-environment have been 
identified in essay one as relevant for whistleblowing.  Twenty one scenarios with varying 
degree of moral intensity were developed in which a target person takes items from the office, 
appropriates office resources for personal gain, sexually harasses another individual, and pollutes 
the environment.  Essay two showed  how people act in different cultures when facing the same 
ethical situations. 
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In essay three, a multilevel model was developed using three cultural theories, four 
organizational factors, and three individual level variables to examine which variable is more 
effective in predicting whistleblowing behavior.  In the literature, individualism and collectivism 
has been employed to study whistleblowing behavior, and so it was considered important to 
examine how this theory competes with two other cultural theories, namely, tightness and 
looseness and social axiom theory.  It was also considered important to test if culture shapes 
whistleblowing behavior beyond organizational and individual level variables.  Besides using 
existing instruments, two new scales, the Collectivism and Whistleblowing Scale (CWS) to 
capture the tension between collectivistic value of conforming to one‘s group and individualistic 
value of blowing the whistle, and the Propensity to Blow the Whistle (PBW) were developed for 
this study.  A mediation analysis was also carried out to examine how whistleblowing intention 
mediates whistleblowing attitudes and whistleblowing behavior. 
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I. Introduction 
This comparative study of whistleblowing between the United States and Japan explores 
how the phenomenon is viewed in both the microworld and lifeworld (Hwang, 2006).  An 
analysis of whistleblowing in the lifeworld includes tracing the legal history of whistleblowing in 
the two nations, media produced on the topic of whistleblowing, and a case study of how 
corporations handle whistleblowers in each nation.  An analysis of microworld includes a 
comparison of the scholarly research on whistleblowing in both countries.  This essay does not 
have a literature review section because the historical analysis necessarily merges the review of 
the literature and the results into an integrated section. 
II. Methodology  
Hwang (2006) presented a framework to formalize the worlds of practice and research. 
He called them lifeworlds and microworlds respectively.  Lifeworld, or the primordial world, 
represents the real world, whereas microworld represents the world of scientific constructions. 
Lifeworlds are cultural constructions that support means of coping in the given ecology or 
environment.  People construct their lifeworlds using language and knowledge from the same 
cultural background in the course of historical development, and so lifeworlds are sustained by 
cultural heritage.  According to Triandis (1994, 2002) culture is transmitted through language 
and the modeling of behavior when conditions permit humans to communicate through shared 
language, by living in the same historic period, and when they are sufficiently close to influence 
each other.  Triandis also points out that ecology shapes culture, which in turn shapes the 
socialization patterns, which shape personality, which influences our behavior as moderated by a 
context. 
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Ecology is also linked to the maintenance system (subsistence and settlement patterns, 
social structures, means of production) and to subjective culture (Triandis, 1994, 2002). Thus, 
cultures that emerge in different parts of the world often reflect the availability of resources 
based on ecological factors, as well as historical factors, such as migrations, wars, revolutions, 
and inventions (Triandis, 1994, 2002).   Or, each lifeworld is unique as each lifeworld has its 
own particular culture.  Therefore, understanding the notion of lifeworld will result in different 
conception of cultural differences, and differences can be observed based on ecology and history. 
For humans to understand and explain their experience in the lifeworld, they rely on 
microworlds, or scientific constructions, which are theoretical interpretations of a social 
phenomenon from a particular perspective (Hwang, 2006). Microworld is the sum of scientific 
constructs that humankind has elaborated at a specific point in history, akin to Kuhn‘s (1962) 
paradigms.  Microworld is also a scientific proposition system that fulfills tasks usually 
formulated in forecasts.  Thus, a microworld captures relations between specific events that are 
artificially abstracted entities.  In other words, a microworld can be a theoretical model built on 
the basis of realism, or a theoretical interpretation of a social phenomenon provided by a social 
scientist from a particular perspective.   
To study a construct from a cultural perspective, therefore, it is necessary to examine the 
construct in both the lifeworld and microworld. In this essay, the historical roots of 
whistleblowing was examined to document the evolution of this construct. Since all cultural 
practices are moored in lifeworld, it is important to carry out a historical analysis.  For example, 
people in different domains of life have blown the whistle over the years, and to understand the 
construct we need to understand the context in which whistle blowing has occurred in the past.   
7 
 
The second reason for doing historical analysis is to avoid the trap of pseudo-etic 
research.  If whistleblowing is a western concept (in lifeworld) and construct (in microworld), 
then we need to understand its origin. Since the origin of culture lies in ecology and history, it is 
necessary to look into ecological and historical antecedents of whistleblowing in at least two 
cultures. Hence, in this study whistleblowing was examined in the United States and Japan in 
their respective ecological and historical contexts. 
III. Historical Development of Whistleblowing in the United States 
The first whistleblower protection law in the United State was enacted on July 30, 1778,  
two years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence.  Stephen M. Kohn, Executive 
Director of the National Whistleblower Center, first discovered the resolution in the 1990s, while 
conducting research for an amicus brief filed by the National Whistleblowers Center supporting 
the constitutionality of the False Claims Act (Kohn, 2011).  Until this time, it was believed that 
the first United States law adopted specifically to protect whistleblowers was the 1863 United 
States False Claims Act (revised in 1986), which was enacted to combat fraud by suppliers of the 
United States government during the Civil War (Lahman, 2005).  Kohn discovered a resolution 
passed by the Continental Congress that was enacted on July 30, 1778, which is now considered 
to be the world‘s first whistleblower law (Kohn, 2011). 
In the year 1777, a few months after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, 10 
sailors met on board of the warship Warren in Rhode Island to discuss their concerns towards 
their commander of the Continental Navy, Commodore Esek Hopkins (Kohn, 2011). They were 
concerned about how Hopkins tortured captured British sailors.  They wrote a petition to the 
Continental Congress about Hopkins‘ treatment of the captured British sailors.  Hopkins 
retaliated by filing a criminal libel suit against the whistleblowers.  Two of the sailors, Samuel 
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Shaw and Richard Marven, who happened to be in Rhode Island, were arrested.  They pleaded to 
the Continental Congress that they did nothing wrong.  Later that month, Continental Congress 
enacted America‘s first whistleblower protection law and authorized payment for the legal fees 
of Marven and Shaw.  Not only did the Congress authorize the full release of all records related 
to the removal of Hopkins, but also provided $1, 418 to cover costs associated with the whistle-
blowers‘ defense on May 22, 1779 (Kohn, 2011).  
This resolution was followed by The False Claims Acts of 1863.  The purpose of the Act 
was to encourage whistleblowers who were not affiliated with the government to report fraud on 
behalf of the government, a qui tam, against government contractors.  In exchange for reporting 
fraud, the government guaranteed a percentage of the money recovered from wrongful dismissal.  
The Act originally meant to protect those who were involved in dealing with horses in poor 
health, expired rations, and defective weapons that would harm the soldiers during the Civil War.  
The False Claims Act soon after went through a number of revisions, which redefined ―claims‖ 
as well as expanded the scope of possible liability and added extra protection measures for qui 
tam plaintiffs beyond employees to include contractors and agents (Lahman, 2005).   The False 
Claims Act started as a means of protecting the government from fraudulent suppliers during the 
Civil War and evolved to cover other types of fraud. It covered the disclosure of illegal and 
unethical activities by both government and corporations in various industries.  As a result, 
patchwork of whistleblowing protection laws that followed the False Claims Act was passed to 
protect whistleblowers legally in various domains. 
Next, the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912 was passed.  This Act served to protect civil 
servants from retaliation when disclosing public interest information.  The Act was created by 
Congress in response to the issuance of executive orders by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and 
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William H. Taft who prohibited federal employees from making disclosures to Congress without 
the permission of their supervisors (Fisher, 2005).  Federal employees were removed from their 
position if they disobeyed orders.  The Act provided protection from retaliation against federal 
employees who exercised their First Amendment rights to criticize the agency that employed 
them. 
No nonretaliation provisions or fraud protection act was enacted until 1943 or 31 years 
after the Lloyd-La Follette Act.  In 1943, the False Claims Act amended the qui tam provision, 
which reduced the reward for blowing the whistle, thus reducing the incentive to report fraud.  
Laws that protect human rights such as the Fourteenth Amendment, which addressed citizenship 
rights and equal protection of the laws, and the Civil Rights Act immediately followed the 
amended False Claims Act.   In 1947, the National Labor Relations Act was enacted that 
included a nonretaliation provision to promote fair labor practice.  In 1949, a nonretaliation 
provision was added to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1947, or the Equal Pay Act, which 
prescribed the standards for the basic minimum wage and overtime pay.   
Shift in environmental policy during the 1970s led to the enactment of a variety of 
environmental protection laws that fell under the False Claims Act umbrella.  Prior to the 1970s, 
protection of air and water supplies was the responsibility of each state.  In 1970, responsibility 
shifted to the federal government where President Richard Nixon signed the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which monitored the environmental impact of federal actions.  
In that same year, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was created to enforce federal 
regulations and consolidate environmental programs from other agencies into a single entity. 
This shift in environmental policy from Congressional reform led to the development of 
comprehensive regulations to protect the health and safety of Americans.  The new policy also 
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promoted research on pollution and the enforcement of violations of environmental laws.  From 
1970, Congress has passed legislation to control pollution such as the Clean Air Act of 1970, the 
Pesticide Control Act of 1972, the Ocean Dumping Act of 1972, the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, the Clean Air Act of 1974, the Safe Drinking Water Act of 
1974, and the Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976.  To promote conservation, nonretaliation 
provisions were included in these Acts to protect employees from adverse actions when 
disclosing a violation of any environmental regulations. Finally, the Civil Service Reform Act 
(CSRA) was passed in 1978.  This Act was intended to increase bureaucratic accountability to 
the executive branch while outlining explicit protection for employees reporting government 
wrongdoing. 
Whistleblowing protection laws continued to expand into the 1980s and 1990s in 
response to government and corporate scandals.  In 1986, the False Claims Act was amended to 
increase rewards for whistleblowers as well as combat against fraud from defense contractors.  
The Military Whistleblowing Protection Act of 1988 (MWPA) was enacted to protect members 
of the Armed Forces who disclose wrongdoing to Members of Congress or an Inspector General 
from retaliation by other military members. Members of the Armed Forces do not have the same 
First Amendment rights as civilians do.   Their voice may conflict with national security, thus 
strict regulations are placed to limit their rights of expression. Thus, the MWPA was the first step 
in providing protection to military personnel who report illegal activities by other military 
personnel without fear of reprisal.  
 In 1989, the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) was enacted to protect federal 
employees from retaliation for disclosing illegal activities occurring at government organizations.  
Whistleblowing protection for federal employees was originally addressed in the CSRA by 
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Congress.  The WPA strengthened and improved these rights to promote reporting of fraud and 
abuse in the government without fear of retaliation. In addition, nonretaliation provisions from 
environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act of 1972, Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 
and Substances Control Act of 1976 all played a role in the development of the WPA.  In 2009, 
Senator Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii) introduced the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act 
(WPEA) to strengthen the WPA. Not only did the WPEA provide further protection to federal 
employees disclosing government wrongdoing, it also closed many administrative loopholes and 
jurisdiction is expanded to any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction for two years from the 
effective date of the legislation (rather than exclusively in the Federal Circuit).  President Obama 
signed the WPEA into law on November 2012.   
In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as a reaction to a number of 
corporate accounting scandals such as Enron, Worldcom and HealthSouth.  In, 2001, Sharon 
Watkins alerted then-Enron CEO Kenneth Lay of accounting irregularities in financial reports.  
Enron, an energy trading company, misrepresented its earnings reports to shareholders and 
employees while encouraging its employees to invest in Enron stock. As a result, earnings were 
reported as positive to investors.  Also, Enron officials embezzled money from the firm while 
reporting fraudulent earnings to investors.  
In 2002, Cynthia Cooper, an internal auditor, unearthed $3.8 billion in accounting fraud 
at Worldcom.  Worldcom, with the aid from its auditor Arthur Andersen, improperly shifted its 
cost between different accounts that had the effect of inflating its earnings.   
In 2003, finance chief Winston Smith blew the whistle on HealthSouth, a healthcare 
company, for accounting fraud.  Richard Scrushy, CEO of HealthSouth, instructed employees to 
inflate revenues and overstate HealthSouth's net income.  The fraud included $2.5 billion in 
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fraudulent accounting entries from 1996 to 2002, $500 million in incorrect accounting for 
goodwill and other items involved in acquisitions from 1994 to 1999, and $800 million to $1.6 
billion in ''aggressive accounting'' from 1992 to March 2003 (Freudenheim, 2004).   
As a result, the enactment of SOX provided protection to employees of publicly traded 
companies who reported violations of Securities and Exchange Commission regulations or any 
provision of federal law relating to fraud against the shareholders.  In Tables 1 through 7, 
whistleblower protection acts are presented in 13 categories -- Constitutional Protection, 
Corporate/Financial/Manufacturing, Environmental, Nuclear, Transportation, Workplace Safety 
and Health, Retaliation, Fraud, Federal Contractor, Federal Employee, Labor, IRS Informant, 
Adjunction, and Taxation, compiled from the U.S. Code and the Code of Federal Regulations. 
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Table 1. Categorized List of Federal Whistleblower Protections Statutes from 1791 to 1966 
Year Laws Categories 
1791 Bill of Rights Constitutional Protection Statutes 
1863 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3732 Federal Contractor Fraud 
1868 Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Constitutional Protection Statutes 
1871 Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.§ 1985 (2) and (3) Constitutional Protection Statutes 
1871 Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) Federal Employee  Statutes 
1947 
Fair Labor Standards Act/Equal Pay Act, Penalties and Damages, 29 U.S.C. § 
216 
Labor  Statutes 
1947 
National Labor Relations Act, Nonretaliation Provision, Unfair Labor 
Practices, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) 
Labor  Statutes 
1949 
Fair Labor Standards Act/Equal Pay Act, Nonretaliation Provision, 29 U.S.C. § 
215(a)(3) 
Labor  Statutes 
1962 Civil Rights Tax Relief 26 U.S.C. § 62 (a) (20) and (e) Taxation  Statutes 
1966 
Fair Labor Standards Act/Equal Pay Act, Statute of Limitations 29 U.S.C. § 
255 
Labor  Statutes 
1966 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 Taxation  Statutes 
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Table 2. Categorized List of Federal Whistleblower Protections Statutes from 1970 - 1979 
Year Laws Categories 
1970 Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § § 1961, 1962 and 1964 
Criminal Prohibition Against 
Retaliation  Statutes 
1972 Water Pollution Control Act, Employee Protection Provision 33 U.S.C. § 1367 Environmental Statutes 
1972 Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,  33 U.S.C. § 948a Labor  Statutes 
1973 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Discrimination Against 
Employees Exercising Rights Under the Williams Steiger Occupational Safety 
and Health, Act of 1970 29 CFR § 1977 
Workplace Health and Safety  Statutes 
1974 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Employee Protection, 10 CFR § 2.206 Nuclear  Statutes 
1974 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act Interference with protected rights, 
29 U.S.C. § 1140 
Labor  Statutes 
1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and (c) Constitutional Protection Statutes 
1977 Clean Air Act, Employee Protection Provision 42 U.S.C. § 7622 Environmental Statutes 
1977 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1293 Environmental Statutes 
1977 
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Department of the 
Interior, Protection of Employees, 30 CFR § 865 
Environmental Statutes 
1977 Mine Health and Safety Act, Nonretaliation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) Workplace Health and Safety  Statutes 
1978 
Judicial review of decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board 5 U.S.C. 
§7703 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
1978 Lloyd -LaFollette Act, Employees' Right to Petition Congress, 5 U.S.C. § 7211 Federal Employee  Statutes 
1978 Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. Appendix 1 Federal Employee  Statutes 
1978 
Workplace Discrimination and Civil Rights Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, Nonretaliation Provision, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
1979 Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Constitutional Protection Statutes 
1979 Federal Court Jurisdictions Over "Mixed Cases" 5 U.S.C. §7702 Federal Employee  Statutes 
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Table 3. Categorized List of Federal Whistleblower Protections Statutes from 1980 to 1989 
Year Laws Categories 
1980 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("Superfund"), 
Employee Protection Provision 42 U.S.C. § 9610 
Environmental Statutes 
1980 Solid Waste Disposal Act,42 U.S.C. § 6971 Environmental Statutes 
1980 
Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control, Employee Protection Provision, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 3608 
Workplace Health and 
Safety  Statutes 
1982 Obstruction of Justice, Retaliation Against Informants, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) 
Criminal Prohibition 
Against Retaliation  
Statutes 
1982 
Obstruction of Justice, Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant 18 U.S.C. § 1512 
(b)(c)(d) and € 
Criminal Prohibition 
Against Retaliation  
Statutes 
1983 
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act, Nonretaliation Provision, 29 
U.S.C. § 1855 
Labor  Statutes 
1983 
Department of Labor, Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings before 
the Office of Administrative Law Judges, 29 CFR Part 18 
Adjunction Statutes 
1984 Safe Drinking Water Act, Employee Protection Provision 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(I) Environmental Statutes 
1984 Toxic Substances Control Act, Employee Protection Provision 15 U.S.C. § 2622 Environmental Statutes 
1984 Asbestos School Hazard Abatement, Employee Protection Provision, 20 U.S.C. § 4018 
Workplace Health and 
Safety  Statutes 
1984 Occupational Safety and Health Act, Nonretaliation Provision, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) 
Workplace Health and 
Safety  Statutes 
1986 
Department of Health and Human Services Examination and treatment for emergency 
medical conditions 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(I) 
Federal Contractor Fraud 
1986 
Military Law-Procurement/ Contractor Employees: Protection from Reprisal for Disclosure 
of Certain Information, 10 U.S.C. § 2409 
Labor  Statutes 
1988 Employee Polygraph Protection, Employee Protection Provision 29 U.S.C. § 2002 Labor  Statutes 
1988 Military Whistleblower Protection Labor  Statutes 
1988 
Military Law-Armed Forces/Prohibition of Retaliatory Personnel Actions, 10 U.S.C. § 
1034 
Labor  Statutes 
1989 Major Frauds Act, 18 U.S.C. 1031 Federal Contractor Fraud 
1989 Civil Service Reform Act, Prohibited Personnel Practices, 5 U.S.C. §  2302 Federal Employee  Statutes 
1989 
Civil Service Reform Act, Whistleblower Protection Act 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1215, 1218-
1219,1221-1222 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
1989 Whistleblower Protection Act Coverage for FBI Employees 5 U.S.C.A. § 2303 Federal Employee  Statutes 
1989 
Office of Special Counsel Part 1810 Investigate Authority of the Special Counsel, 5 CFR § 
1810 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
1989 Merit Systems Protection Board Part 1201 Practices and Procedures, 5 CFR Part 1201 Adjunction Statutes 
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Table 4. Categorized List of Federal Whistleblower Protections Statutes from 1990 to 1996 
Year Laws Categories 
1990 
Executive Order 12731 of October 17, 1990 Principles of Ethical Conduct for 
Government Officers and Employees, 55 FR 42547 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
1990 
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203Civil Rights Act 1964, Title VII, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
1990 
Merit Systems Protection Board Part 1209 Practices and Procedures for Appeal and 
Stay Requests of Personnel Actions Allegedly Based on Whistleblowing, 5 CFR Part 
1209 
Adjunction Statutes 
1990 
Merit Systems Protection Board Rules and Regulations 5 CFR Part 1209 Practices and 
Procedures for Appeals and Stay Requests of Personnel Actions Allegedly Based on 
Whistleblowing 65 Federal Register 67607 
Adjunction Statutes 
1991 Credit Union, Employee Protection Provision, 12 U.S.C. § 1790b 
Corporate/Financial/Manufa
cturing Statutes 
1991 FDIC, Employee Protection Provision, 12 U.S.C. § 1831j 
Corporate/Financial/Manufa
cturing Statutes 
1991 
Coast Guard Rules and Regulations Department of Transportation, Coast Guard 
Whistleblower Protection, Agency: Officer of the Secretary, Action, Final Rule, 33 
CFR part 53, 56 FR13404 (April 2, 1991) 
Transportation  Statutes 
1992 Atomic Energy Act/Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 Nuclear  Statutes 
1992 
Office of Government Ethics Part 2635 Standards of Ethical conduct for Employees of 
the Executive Branch, 5 CFR. § 2635.101 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
1992 Job Training and Partnership Act, Nonretaliation Provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1574(g) x Labor  Statutes 
1993 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Employee Protection 10 CFR § 50.7 Nuclear  Statutes 
1993 
Department of Energy, Whistleblower Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 820 App. A 
(XIII) 
Nuclear  Statutes 
1993 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, Complaints of Discharge, 
Discrimination and Interference, 29 CFR § 2700 Subpart D & E 
Workplace Health and 
Safety  Statutes 
1993 
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Research Integrity, 42 U.S.C. § 
289B 
Federal Contractor Fraud 
1993 
Office of Government Ethics Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the 
Executive Branch, Final Rule, 57 FR 35006 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
1993 Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a) & (b), & 2617 Federal Employee  Statutes 
1994 
Public Contracts- Procurement Provisions, Contractor Employees: Protection from 
Reprisal for Disclosure of Certain Information 41 U.S.C. §4705 
Federal Contractor Fraud 
1995 Federal Acquisition Regulations, Whistleblower Rules 48 CFR Subpart 3.9 Federal Contractor Fraud 
1996 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Statement of Policy, Freedom of employees to raise 
safety concerns without fear of retaliation, (May 14, 1996) 
Nuclear  Statutes 
1996 Retaliation for Exercise of Civil Rights,18 U.S.C. § 241 
Criminal Prohibition 
Against Retaliation  Statutes 
1996 IRS Payment for Detection of Fraud 26 U.S.C.A. § 7263 
IRS Whistleblower 
Informant  Statutes 
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Table 5. Categorized List of Federal Whistleblower Protections Statutes from 1997 to 2002 
Year Laws Categories 
1997 
Whistleblower Protection Act Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning FBI 
Employees Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 Memorandum of the 
President of the United States 62 Federal Register 23123 (April 28, 1997) 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
1998 
NRC and DOL Memorandum of Understanding, (Employee Protection), 
(October 21, 1998) 
Nuclear  Statutes 
1998 
Inspector General Act Amendment of 1998 Congressional Findings Pub.L. 
105-277, Title VII, § 701(b), Oct. 20, 1998, 112 Stat. 2413 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
1999 
Department of Energy, Defense Activities Whistleblower Protection Program, 
42 U.S.C. § 7239 
Nuclear  Statutes 
1999 
Department of Energy, Contractor Employee Protection Program 10 CFR § 
708 
Nuclear  Statutes 
1999 Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 Transportation  Statutes 
1999 
Justice Department Part Office of Inspector General Whistleblower Protection 
for Federal Bureau of Investigation Employees, 28 CFR § 27 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
1999 
Title VII Whistleblower Protection for Intelligence Community Employees 
Reporting Urgent Concerns to Congress 5 U.S.C.A. App. § 3 § 8H Note 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
2000 
Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation; Rewrite of Regulations 
Governing Management and Operating Contracts, Department of Energy 
Action Final Rule 65 Federal Register 80994 (December 22, 2000) 
Nuclear  Statutes 
2000 
Office of Special Counsel, Rules and Regulations, 5 CFR Part 1800 RIN 3255-
ZA00 Filing Complaints of Prohibited Personnel Practice or Other Prohibited 
Activity; Filing Disclosures of Information 65 FR 64881 (October 31, 2000) 
Final Rule 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
2001 
Monetary Transactions, Whistleblower  Protection Provision (amended 
version) 31 U.S.C. § 5328 
Corporate/Financial/Manufacturing 
Statutes 
2002 
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act, Sec. 806, Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 
Corporate/Financial/Manufacturing 
Statutes 
2002 Sec. 3(b)(1) of Sarbanes-Oxley Enforcement 15 U.S.C. 7202(b)(1) 
Corporate/Financial/Manufacturing 
Statutes 
2002 
Corporate Responsibility Sec. 307, Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 Rules of 
Professional Responsibility for Attorneys 15 U.S.C. § 7245 
Corporate/Financial/Manufacturing 
Statutes 
2002 Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60129 Environmental Statutes 
2002 
Coast Guard Whistleblower Protection Provision of Seamen against 
discrimination 46 U.S.C. § 2114 
Transportation  Statutes 
2002 FAA and OSHA Memorandum of Understanding, 67 FR 55883 Transportation  Statutes 
2002 Homeland Security Act of 2002 Sec. 883, 6 U.S.C. § 463 Federal Employee  Statutes 
2002 
Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 
2002, Pub.L. 107-174 (May 15, 2002), [5 U.S.C. § 2301 Note] 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
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Table 6. Categorized List of Federal Whistleblower Protections Statutes from 2003 to 2006 
Year Laws Categories 
2003 
Standards Relating To Listed Audit Committees Securities And Exchange 
Commission Final Rule 68 Federal Register 18788-01 
Corporate/Financial/Manufacturing 
Statutes 
2003 
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Securities and Exchange 
Commission 17 C.F.R. Part 205 
Corporate/Financial/Manufacturing 
Statutes 
2003 
Securities And Exchange Commission Audit Committee Rules/Complaint 
Process Final Rule 17 CFR 240.10A-3(b)(iv)(F)(3) 
Corporate/Financial/Manufacturing 
Statutes 
2003 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Procedures for Handling of 
Discrimination Complaints Aviation Investment and Reform Act 68 Federal 
Register 14099 29 CFR § 1979 
Transportation  Statutes 
2003 
Coast Guard Board For Correction of Military Records, Procedural 
Regulations 69 Federal Register 34532 March 3, 2003 Final Rule 
Transportation  Statutes 
2003 
Office of Special Counsel Part 1800 Filing Complaints and Allegations, 5 CFR 
§§ 1800Whistleblower Laws and Regulations 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
2003 
Office of Special Counsel 5 CFR Part 1800 Revision of Regulations to 
Describe Filing Requirements and Options, Including Electronic Filing 68 
Federal Register 66695-01 (November 28, 2003) Final rule 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
2004 
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act Sec. 806, Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 Final Rule 29 CFR Part 1980 U.S. Department of Labor Vol. 69 
Federal Register 52104 (August 24, 2004) 
Corporate/Financial/Manufacturing 
Statutes 
2004 
Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 
Minimum Training Requirements 49 CFR Part 380 (May 21, 2004) 
Transportation  Statutes 
2004 
United States Sentencing Commission, Guideline Manual Section 8B2.1 
(Nov.1, 2004) 
Criminal Prohibition Against 
Retaliation  Statutes 
2004 
Rewards for Information Relating to Violation of Internal Revenue Laws 26 
CFR 301.7263-1 
IRS Whistleblower Informant  Statutes 
2005 
Pipeline Safety DOL Rules and Procedures Final Rule 69 Federal Register 67 
175889-17898 
Environmental Statutes 
2005 Limitation on Legal Fee Reimbursement 42 USCS § 5853 Nuclear  Statutes 
2005 
Federal Non-disclosure Agreement Public Law 109-115 Appropriations Act of 
2006 Budget Resolution (November 30, 2005) 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
2006 
Safe Containers for International Cargo Act, Employee Protection Provision, 
46 U.S.C.§ 80507 
Transportation  Statutes 
2006 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 Employee Education about False Claims Act 
Recovery Public Law 109-171 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(68) 
Federal Contractor Fraud 
2006 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 Encouraging the Enactment of State False 
Claims Acts Public Law 109-171, Section 6031 42 U.S.C. § 1396h 
Federal Contractor Fraud 
2006 
Department of Homeland Security Office of the Secretary Procedures for 
Handling Critical Infrastructure Information 69 FR 8074 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
2006 
Office of Personnel Management Implementation of Title II of the Notification 
and Federal Employee Anti-discrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 5 CFR 
PART 724 (July 20, 2006) Final rule 
Federal Employee  Statutes 
2006 Award Claim Under Section 7623 (a) or (b);  Form 211 IRS Whistleblower Informant  Statutes 
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Source: Shimabukuro, & Whitaker, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Categorized List of Federal Whistleblower Protections Statutes from 2007 to 2012 
Year Laws Categories 
2007 
Railway Safety Labor Act: Employee Protection, 49 
U.S.C. § 20109 
Transportation  Statutes 
2007 
Public Transportation Employee Protections National 
Transit Systems Security Act of 2007 (August 3, 2007) 
6 U.S.C. § 1142 
Transportation  Statutes 
2007 
Railroad Employee Protections Amending the Federal 
Rail Safety Act, (August 3, 2007) 49 U.S.C. § 20109 
Transportation  Statutes 
2007 
Motor Carrier Employee Protections Amending the 
Surface Transportation Assistance Act (August 3, 
2007) 49 U.S.C. § 31105 
Transportation  Statutes 
2007 
Military Whistleblower Protection Department of 
Defense Directive Number 7050.6 (July 23, 2007) 
Labor  Statutes 
2007 
OSHA Policy on Settlement Agreements Containing 
Future Employment Waiver Clauses 7/23/2007 
Adjunction Statutes 
2008 
Consumer Product Safety Act of 2008 Whistleblower 
Protection 
H.R. 4040 Section 219 15 U.S.C. § __  
Corporate/Financial/Manufacturing 
Statutes 
2008 
Federal Acquisition Regulations; Contractor Business 
Ethics Compliance Program & Disclosure 
Requirements 73 FR 67064 
Federal Contractor Fraud 
2010 
Corporate Responsibility Sec. 301, Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 Audit Committee, 15 U.S.C. § 78j -1-4 
Corporate/Financial/Manufacturing 
Statutes 
2011 
Office of the Secretary of Labor Part 24-Procedures 
for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints under 
Federal Employee Protection Laws 29 CFR Part 24 
Environmental Statutes 
2011 
Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Under 
Federal Employee Protection Statutes 29 CFR Part 24 
Interim Final Rule (Public comment due on October 9, 
2007) 
Adjunction Statutes 
2011 
Appendix A to part 24 Your Rights Under the Energy 
Reorganization Act 
Adjunction Statutes 
2012 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Rules 
for Implementing Section 405 of the Surface 
Transportation Assistance Act, 29 CFR § 1978 
Transportation  Statutes 
2012 
Department of Labor Adjudicatory Procedures for 
Corporate, Environmental, Nuclear, Airline and 
Transportation Whistleblower Claims 
Adjunction Statutes 
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Since the False Claims Act of 1863, there are currently over 137 federal statutes that offer 
protection to whistleblowers in areas such as workplace safety (29 CFR § 1978, etc.), aviation 
(49 U.S.C. § 42121, etc.), maritime (46 U.S.C. § 2114, etc.), public transportation (6 U.S.C. § 
1142), motor vehicle safety (49 U.S.C. § 31105, etc.), environment (42 U.S.C. § 7622, etc.), 
pipeline (49 U.S.C. § 60129, etc.), nuclear (42 U.S.C. § 5851, etc.), fraud (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-
3732, etc.), racketeer (18 U.S.C. § 1513(e), etc.), discrimination (5 U.S.C. § 2301 Note, etc.), 
civil service (5 U.S.C. §  2302, etc.), military (10 U.S.C. § 1034, etc.), adjunction (5 CFR Part 
1201, etc.), taxation (26 U.S.C.A. § 7263, etc.), consumer safety (H.R. 4040 Section 219 15 
U.S.C. § __ ), corporate (15 U.S.C. § 78j -1-4, etc.), securities (17 CFR 240.10A-3(b)(iv)(F)(3), 
etc.), and banking (31 U.S.C. § 5328, etc.) (Tables 1 - 7).  These laws allow protection to those 
who are disclosing public interest information on behalf of the federal government regarding, for 
example, environmental hazards, discrimination, abuse, public safety, and employment.   
In addition to the federal statutes, there are 18 Anti-Retaliation provisions (Table 8) that 
prevent employers from discharging or retaliating against the employee who has filed a 
complaint or otherwise exercised any rights provided to them by laws. There are several 
differences between whistleblowing claims and retaliation claims.  First, whistleblowing claims 
generally focuses on conducts that are prohibited by law that may cause harm to the public or 
waste US tax dollars.  Retaliation claims are geared towards individual work rights that are 
guaranteed in a workplace.  Rights such as freedom from discrimination, minimum wage rights, 
overtime wage rights, rights to join a union and so forth are protected by the law.  If any of these 
rights are violated an individual can bring a retaliation claim against the employer.  
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Table 8.  List of Anti-Retaliation Statutes     
Name Legal Citation Statute of Limitations Intake Agency or Judicial Forum 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA)  
29 U.S.C. § 623(d)  180-300 days  
EEOC/state employment 
discrimination agency; private cause 
of action in federal court 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)  42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) 180-300 days  
EEOC/state employment 
discrimination agency; private cause 
of action in federal court 
 
29 C.F.R. Part 1640  
  
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (―Title VII‖)  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)  180-300 days  
EEOC/state employment 
discrimination agency; private cause 
of action in federal court 
Clayton Act (antitrust)  15 U.S.C. § 15(a)  4 yrs-see 15 
Federal District Court, generally no 
standing recognized for employees 
  
USC § 15(b)  
 
Clean Air Act  42 U.S.C. § 7622 30 days  DOL/OSHA 
 
29 C.F.R. Part 24  
  
Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (―Super Fund‖)  
42 U.S.C. § 9610 30 days  DOL/OSHA 
 
29 C.F.R. Part 24  
  
Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA)  
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), 1140  
Earlier of 6 years after (a) the date of 
the last action which constituted a part 
of the breach or violation or (b) in the 
case of an omission, the latest date on 
which the fiduciary duty could have 
cured the breach or violation or 3 years 
after the earliest date on which the 
plaintiff had actual knowledge of the 
breach or violation 
Federal District Court 
Energy Reorganization Act 42 U.S.C. § 5851 180 days  DOL/OSHA 
 
29 C.F.R. Part 24  
  
Equal Pay Act  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)  2 yrs; 3 yrs if willful violation DOL or Federal District Court 
Fair Labor Standards Act (wage & 
hour, child labor, minimum wage, 
overtime)  
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) 2 yrs; 3 yrs if willful violation  
DOL, Federal District Court, or state 
court 
 
29 C.F.R. Part 783  
  
False Claims Act  31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)  
See most applicable state law for statute 
of limitations  
Federal District Court 
Family and Medical Leave Act 
[―FMLA"]  
29 U.S.C. § 2615  2 yrs; 3 yrs if willful violation  
DOL, Federal District Court, or state 
court 
National Labor Relations Act  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)  6 months  NLRB 
Occupational Safety and Health Act  29 U.S.C. § 660(c) 30 days  
DOL/OSHA-no private cause of 
action 
 
29 C.F.R. Part 1977 
  
 
(―Part 11(c)‖)  
  
Safe Drinking Water Act  42 U.S.C. § 300j-9  30 days  DOL/OSHA 
Sarbanes Oxley Act  18 U.S.C. § 1514A  180 days  DOL/OSHA 
Solid Waste Disposal Act  42 U.S.C. § 6971 30 days  DOL/OSHA 
 
29 C.F.R. Part 24  
  
Control Act  15 U.S.C. § 2622 30 days  DOL/OSHA 
  29 C.F.R. Part 24      
Source: http://www.whistleblowerlaws.com/whistleblower-protections-act/ 
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Second, depending on the whistleblowing or anti-retaliation statutes the individual is 
seeking protection under, each law requires certain procedures that are unique.  For example, an 
anti-retaliation statute such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, gives victims of retaliation direct 
access to courts to enforce their rights to reinstatement, back pay and other remedies 
(Shimabukuro, Whitaker & Roberts, 2013). Other laws, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, require victims to file first with an agency, but then allow access to 
the courts if the agency does not resolve the complaint within six months (Shimabukuro, 
Whitaker & Roberts, 2013).  Also, some of the retaliation statues require that complaints be filed 
within a certain number of days after the alleged retaliation.   
There are also whistleblowing protection laws that are unique for each state (Table 9 and 
10).  Currently, there are 38 state-specific whistleblowing laws that offer a unique protection 
against retaliation based on the type of employment (i.e. state employment, public, private, etc.) 
and industry (i.e. healthcare, environmental, public official, labor, etc.).  There are 12 states that 
do not offer any state–specific whistleblowing laws, namely, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin 
and Wyoming.  In order to receive protection under the federal whistleblowing statutes against 
retaliation from the employer, an employee must complain either to the employer or to a federal 
agency about the violation.  In order to receive protection under state whistleblowing laws 
against retaliation from employers, an employee must complain either to the employer or to an 
outside agency about the violation.  Employees are generally protected by the federal 
whistleblowing laws but may also receive protection in most states through state level statutes, or 
common law, which prohibit discrimination or retaliation against whistleblowers.   
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Table 9.  State Whistleblowing Laws   
State Citation Covers 
Alabama §13A-12-1 state employees 
Alaska §39.90.110, et seq. public employees 
Arizona none none 
Arkansas none none 
California Govt. Code §§53296 et seq. all employers 
Colorado §24-50.5-101 et seq. state employees and health care workers 
Connecticut §§31-51m & 4-61dd public and private employers 
Delaware Title 29, §5115 public employees 
Florida §448.102 public and private employers 
Georgia Act No. 220 (2007) health workers 
Hawaii §378-61 et seq. private and public employers 
Idaho none none 
Illinois 20 ILCS 415/19c.1 public employees 
Indiana §4-15-10-4 state employees 
Iowa §§19A.19 & 70A.29 state employees 
Kansas §75-2973 state employees 
Kentucky §61.102 et seq. state employees 
Louisiana §§30:1074.1 & 23:964 all employers 
Maine Title 5 §4572 public or private employers 
Maryland SPP 5-301, et seq public 
Massachusetts Ch. 149 §185 any employer 
Michigan §15.361 et seq. and case law all employers 
Minnesota §181-931 et seq. public and private employers 
Mississippi none none 
Missouri §105.055 state employees 
Montana none none 
Nebraska §§48-1102 & 48-1114 
private employers, state employees and 
unions 
Nevada none none 
New Hampshire §359-B4 public and private employers 
New Jersey §34:19-3 et seq. and case law public and private employers 
New Mexico none none 
New York Labor Law §740 & Civil Service Law §75-b public and private employers 
North Carolina none none 
North Dakota §34-06-20 private employers 
Ohio §4113.52(A)(1) et seq. and §124.341 private and public employers 
Oklahoma Title 74 §840-2.5 state employees 
Oregon §659.505 private and public employees 
Pennsylvania §1421 et seq. public employers 
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However, filing a claim against an employer may cause complications for whistleblowers 
due to different paperwork requirements needed to file a claim as well as access to different 
agencies based on the law that will be used to file the claim itself.  Some laws may overlap with 
each other depending on the type of discrimination or retaliation that produced the violation.  
With over 137 whistleblowing statutes, 18 anti-retaliation statutes, and 38 state whistleblowing 
laws available, it may confuse employees to figure out which laws protect them from retaliation 
from their employers.    
IV. Historical Development of Whistleblowing in Japan 
Starting in 645, Japan was governed by the legal system known as the ritsuryo (律令) 
(Titsingh, 1834).  The ritsuryo was a law system based on the philosophy of Confucianism and 
the governmental system of China's Tang Dynasty (AD 618-907; 289 years; 6
th
 longest dynasty) 
(Ferris, 1998).  The ritsuryo did not set legal rights but instead operated only to educate and 
encourage morality and good behavior based on Confucian values (Berat, 1992).  Punishable 
crimes under the system were acts that went against filial piety (i.e., hitting the husband), the 
Table 10.  State Whistleblowing Laws   
State Citation Covers 
Rhode Island §28-50-4 public and private employers 
South Carolina §8-27-10 et seq. government employers 
South Dakota none none 
Tennessee Public Chapter No. 161,  2009 public and private employees 
Texas none none 
Utah §67-21-1 et seq. public employees 
Vermont 21 VSA §§ 507 et seq. health care employees 
Virginia Chapter No. 340, 2009 public employees 
Washington §§ 42.40.020, 42.40.030 and 42.40.050 state employees 
West Virginia §6C-1-3 et seq. state employers 
Wisconsin none none 
Wyoming none none 
Source:  http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/state-whistleblower-laws.aspx 
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hierarchical political structure (i.e., committing treason against a superior) and the ruler (i.e., 
plotting a rebellion or damaging royal property) (Williams, 2003).  Criminals were assigned to 
one of the five levels of punishment (五刑 gokei) depending on the severity of the crime: caning, 
public caning, forced labor, exile, or death (Williams, 2003)   
The act of disclosing injustice to the government can be traced back to 1721 in a form of 
a petition box (訴状箱 (sojoubako),目安箱 (meyasubako)).  Tokugawa Yoshimune was the first 
shogun to implement the petition box in 1721 and the success of these boxes led to other 
domains to institute petition boxes until 1873.  These boxes allowed any member of the society 
to have their concerns heard by the lord or the domain lord himself.   
Regardless of status, any Japanese citizen could submit letters into a petition box that 
would be appealed directly to the lord or the domain lord.  These boxes were one of the legal 
channels to encourage citizens to file a complaint after they had exhausted all possible legal 
avenues.  Prior to this, people often petitioned to the government through petitions known 
as osso (direct appeals to high officials) and sutebumi (anonymous petitions left at the gates of 
the castle) (Roberts, 1998).  These boxes served as a channel of communication for citizens to 
offer suggestions for improving government, voice concern towards current affairs or policies, 
and request an appeal to the lord concerning a judicial case the petitioner felt was unfairly dealt 
with (Roberts, 1998).    Petitioners could sign their name, use pseudonyms or remain anonymous 
when submitting their complaint as retribution or punishment from the government was rare.   
The boxes were simple in design where citizens dropped a letter in a slit in the top of a 
wooden box.  Once a month, these locked boxes were opened by a chief inspector and the letters 
were delivered to the lord or the domain lord.  The petitions were also copied and circulated 
among officials, inviting political discussion.   Domain lords also used these letters to remain 
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informed about the current situation in their domain.  They also used the letters as a part of their 
training in politics. 
The Constitution of the Empire of Japan (大日本帝国憲法 Dai-Nippon Teikoku Kenpō), 
otherwise known as the Meiji Constitution (明治憲法 Meiji Kenpō), was the law that governed 
Japan from November 29, 1890 to May 2, 1947.  Much like the U.S. Constitution, the Meiji 
Constitution gave Japanese citizens the right to vote (men only until December 17, 1945) and 
granted them freedom of religion, free speech, and freedom of assembly. However, according to 
Matsui (2010), those rights were granted by the benevolence of the Emperor only to his 
‗subjects‘.  Under the Meiji Constitution, voting rights were granted to adult male citizens who 
had sufficient wealth, freedom of expression severely restricted and banned insults against the 
Emperor and freedom of religion was protected as long the obligation of subjects to the Emperor 
was met, and Shinto was the de facto state religion (Matsui, 2010).  
Regulatory provisions on fraud in Japan were established in 1907.  The Penal Code of 
1907 (刑法 Keihō) prohibited individuals from engaging in corrupt or fraudulent practices 
against another person or a company.  However, under the code, fraud and bribery applied only 
to individuals and punishment was set to ten years of imprisonment (P.C., Art. 246).  
After World War II, the Constitution of Japan (日本国憲法 Nihon-Koku Kenpō) was 
enacted on May 3, 1947, and rights were constitutionally protected.  The Constitution guaranteed 
the Japanese people equal protection under the law, universal adult suffrage, freedom of thought 
and conscience, freedom of assembly and association, and academic freedom (Berat, 1992).  The 
Constitution also guaranteed access to the courts as a human right.  Thus, the Constitution made 
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it possible to litigate to protect public interest especially if rights were violated under the new 
law.   
The Whistleblower Protection Act (Law No. 122 of 2004) was passed on June 18, 2004.  
Much like the United States Whistleblower Protection Act, whistleblowers who uncover criminal 
and other unlawful information at their place of employment were protected from retribution 
such as dismissals, demotions, pay cuts, or termination.  According to Wolf (2004), the Act has 
several flaws that seemed to deter whistleblowers from exposing any corporate or government 
misconducts:  
- The Act does not protect business partners or customers who may have suffered 
adverse consequences by exposing improper conduct.   
- The Act requires whistleblowers to have evidence of the misconduct before reporting 
to the authorities or to the media.   
- The Act imposes no penalties on corporations or government officials for failing to 
properly investigate complaints of misconduct.  
- The Act does not cover infractions of tax, public elections, and political funds 
regulations. 
- The Act does not apply to cases where the behavior was inappropriate as opposed to 
illegal in Japan.   
   On December 6, 2013, the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (特定秘
密の保護に関する法) Act No. 108 of 2013 was passed by the National Diet.  The law was 
designed to protect state secrets with harsh penalties for violators if they were to leak classified 
information to the public.  The law in question takes a step back in civil liberties as it clouds 
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government transparency by possibly concealing government misdeeds from journalistic 
freedom, making it harder to blow the whistle against government misconducts. 
V. Discussion 
Laws have been introduced and amended in the United States to protect individuals from 
retribution by their employers in different types industries since 1778.  In comparison, laws have 
been introduced in Japan to protect individuals from fraud and retaliation only since 1907.  Also 
individual rights were not established for the Japanese until the end of World War II.  The United 
States had rights established since the introduction of the United States Constitution.  As a result, 
the United States has a much richer whistleblowing protection and robust legal framework to 
enforce individual rights.  As for Japan, up until the 20
th
 century, laws were established to 
enforce ranks/status and moral behavior was only encouraged but not enforced.  Thus, voices of 
concern were limited to certain channels that were established by the government   Because of 
this one-sided system, it seemed to discourage Japanese to blow the whistle.  With a much more 
decentralized government after the Meiji Period and individuals rights were guaranteed, Japanese 
have more access to different branches of the government allowing to be heard.  The new 
constitution seemed to welcome voices or criticisms from its citizens.  This right to speak under 
the postwar constitution may be equated to whistleblowing or reporting of unethical behavior.  
Thus, Japanese are slowly opening up to voice their concerns about unethical behaviors.  Sixty 
years after enacting human rights provision, Japan‘s first Whistleblowing Protection Act was 
passed.   If the new constitution was not drafted, the Whistleblowing Protection Act might not 
have been introduced in Japan. 
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Table 11. USA and Japan Timeline of Enacted Laws from 645 to 1979 
      
 
USA Japan 
  
  
    645 Ritsuryo 
 
  
    1721 Meyasubako 
 
Whistleblowing Resolution by Continental Congress 1778   
    
Bill of Rights 1791   
    
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3732 1863   
    
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 1868   
    
Civil Rights Act of 1871 1871   
    
Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 1871     1890 Meiji Constitution 
 
1910-1920 
  
  1907 Penal Code 
 
Lloyd -LaFollette Act 1912   
    
1940~1950 
  
  
   
Fair Labor Standards Act/Equal Pay Act, Penalties and Damages, 29 U.S.C. § 216 1947     1947 
The Constitution 
of Japan  
National Labor Relations Act, Nonretaliation Provision, Unfair Labor Practices, 29 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(4) 
1947     1947 
Labor Standard 
Law   
Fair Labor Standards Act/Equal Pay Act, Nonretaliation Provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) 1949     
   
1960~1969 
  
  
   
Civil Rights Tax Relief 26 U.S.C. § 62 (a) (20) and (e) 1962     
   
Fair Labor Standards Act/Equal Pay Act, Statute of Limitations 29 U.S.C. § 255 1966     
   
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 1966     
   
1970~1979 
  
  
   
Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § § 1961, 1962 and 1964 1970     
   
Water Pollution Control Act, Employee Protection Provision 33 U.S.C. § 1367 1972   
    
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,  33 U.S.C. § 948a 1972   
    
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Discrimination Against Employees 
Exercising Rights Under the Williams Steiger Occupational Safety and Health, Act of 1970 
29 CFR § 1977 
1973   
    
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Employee Protection, 10 CFR § 2.206 1974   
    
Employee Retirement Income Security Act Interference with protected rights, 29 U.S.C. § 
1140 
1974   
    
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a 1974   
    
Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and (c) 1976   
    
Clean Air Act, Employee Protection Provision 42 U.S.C. § 7622 1977   
    
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1293 1977   
    
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Department of the Interior, 
Protection of Employees, 30 CFR § 865 
1977   
    
Mine Health and Safety Act, Nonretaliation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) 1977   
    
Judicial review of decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board 5 U.S.C. §7703 1978   
    
Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. Appendix 1 1978   
    
Workplace Discrimination and Civil Rights Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
Nonretaliation Provision, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) 
1978   
    
Federal Court Jurisdictions Over "Mixed Cases" 5 U.S.C. §7702 1979   
    
30 
 
Table12. USA and Japan Timeline of Enacted Laws from 1980 to 1989 
  
1980~1989 USA Japan 
 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
("Superfund"), Employee Protection Provision 42 U.S.C. § 9610 
1980   
   
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 1980   
   
Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control, Employee Protection Provision, 
20 U.S.C. § 3608 
1980   
   
Obstruction of Justice, Retaliation Against Informants, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) 1982   
   
Obstruction of Justice, Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant 18 
U.S.C. § 1512 (b)(c)(d) and € 
1982   
   
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act, Nonretaliation 
Provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1855 
1983   
   
Department of Labor, Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings 
before the Office of Administrative Law Judges, 29 CFR Part 18 
1983   
   
Safe Drinking Water Act, Employee Protection Provision 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(I) 1984   
   
Toxic Substances Control Act, Employee Protection Provision 15 U.S.C. § 2622 1984   
   
Asbestos School Hazard Abatement, Employee Protection Provision, 20 U.S.C. § 
4018 
1984   
   
Occupational Safety and Health Act, Nonretaliation Provision, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) 1984   
   
Department of Health and Human Services Examination and treatment for 
emergency medical conditions 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(I) 
1986     1986 
 Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law 
Military Law-Procurement/ Contractor Employees: Protection from Reprisal for 
Disclosure of Certain Information, 10 U.S.C. § 2409 
1986 
 
  
  
Employee Polygraph Protection, Employee Protection Provision 29 U.S.C. § 2002 1988   
   
Military Whistleblower Protection 1988   
   
Military Law-Armed Forces/Prohibition of Retaliatory Personnel Actions, 10 
U.S.C. § 1034 
1988   
   
Major Frauds Act, 18 U.S.C. 1031 1989   
   
Civil Service Reform Act, Prohibited Personnel Practices, 5 U.S.C. §  2302 1989   
   
Civil Service Reform Act, Whistleblower Protection Act 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1215, 
1218-1219,1221-1222 
1989   
   
Whistleblower Protection Act Coverage for FBI Employees 5 U.S.C.A. § 2303 1989   
   
Office of Special Counsel Part 1810 Investigate Authority of the Special Counsel, 
5 CFR § 1810 
1989   
   
Merit Systems Protection Board Part 1201 Practices and Procedures, 5 CFR Part 
1201 
1989   
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Table13. USA and Japan Timeline of Enacted Laws from 1990 to 1999 
  
1990~1999 USA Japan 
 
Executive Order 12731 of October 17, 1990 Principles of Ethical Conduct for Government 
Officers and Employees, 55 FR 42547 
1990   
   
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203Civil Rights Act 1964, Title VII, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
1990   
   
Merit Systems Protection Board Part 1209 Practices and Procedures for Appeal and Stay 
Requests of Personnel Actions Allegedly Based on Whistleblowing, 5 CFR Part 1209 
1990   
   
Merit Systems Protection Board Rules and Regulations 5 CFR Part 1209 Practices and 
Procedures for Appeals and Stay Requests of Personnel Actions Allegedly Based on 
Whistleblowing 65 Federal Register 67607 
1990   
   
Credit Union, Employee Protection Provision, 12 U.S.C. § 1790b 1991   
   
FDIC, Employee Protection Provision, 12 U.S.C. § 1831j 1991   
   
Coast Guard Rules and Regulations Department of Transportation, Coast Guard 
Whistleblower Protection, Agency: Officer of the Secretary, Action, Final Rule, 33 CFR part 
53, 56 FR13404 (April 2, 1991) 
1991   
   
Atomic Energy Act/Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 1992   
   
Office of Government Ethics Part 2635 Standards of Ethical conduct for Employees of the 
Executive Branch, 5 CFR. § 2635.101 
1992   
   
Job Training and Partnership Act, Nonretaliation Provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1574(g) x 1992   
   
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Employee Protection 10 CFR § 50.7 1993     1993 
Unfair 
Competition 
Prevention Act  
Department of Energy, Whistleblower Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 820 App. A (XIII) 1993   
   
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, Complaints of Discharge, 
Discrimination and Interference, 29 CFR § 2700 Subpart D & E 
1993   
   
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Research Integrity, 42 U.S.C. § 289B 1993   
   
Office of Government Ethics Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive 
Branch, Final Rule, 57 FR 35006 
1993   
   
Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a) & (b), & 2617 1993   
   
Public Contracts- Procurement Provisions, Contractor Employees: Protection from Reprisal 
for Disclosure of Certain Information 41 U.S.C. §4705 
1994   
   
Federal Acquisition Regulations, Whistleblower Rules 48 CFR Subpart 3.9 1995   
   
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Statement of Policy, Freedom of employees to raise safety 
concerns without fear of retaliation, (May 14, 1996) 
1996   
   
Retaliation for Exercise of Civil Rights,18 U.S.C. § 241 1996   
   
IRS Payment for Detection of Fraud 26 U.S.C.A. § 7263 1996   
   
Whistleblower Protection Act Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning FBI Employees 
Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 Memorandum of the President of the United 
States 62 Federal Register 23123 (April 28, 1997) 
1997   
   
NRC and DOL Memorandum of Understanding, (Employee Protection), (October 21, 1998) 1998   
   
Inspector General Act Amendment of 1998 Congressional Findings Pub.L. 105-277, Title 
VII, § 701(b), Oct. 20, 1998, 112 Stat. 2413 
1998   
   
Department of Energy, Defense Activities Whistleblower Protection Program, 42 U.S.C. § 
7239 
1999     1999 
National Public 
Service Ethics 
Act  
Department of Energy, Contractor Employee Protection Program 10 CFR § 708 1999   
   
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 1999   
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Table14. USA and Japan Timeline of Enacted Laws from 1999 to 2004 
  
1999~2004 USA Japan 
 
Justice Department Part Office of Inspector General Whistleblower Protection for 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Employees, 28 CFR § 27 
1999   
   
Title VII Whistleblower Protection for Intelligence Community Employees Reporting 
Urgent Concerns to Congress 5 U.S.C.A. App. § 3 § 8H Note 
1999   
   
Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation; Rewrite of Regulations Governing 
Management and Operating Contracts, Department of Energy Action Final Rule 65 
Federal Register 80994 (December 22, 2000) 
2000   
   
Office of Special Counsel, Rules and Regulations, 5 CFR Part 1800 RIN 3255-ZA00 
Filing Complaints of Prohibited Personnel Practice or Other Prohibited Activity; Filing 
Disclosures of Information 65 FR 64881 (October 31, 2000) Final Rule 
2000   
   
Monetary Transactions, Whistleblower  Protection Provision (amended version) 31 
U.S.C. § 5328 
2001   
   
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act, Sec. 806, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 2002   
   
Sec. 3(b)(1) of Sarbanes-Oxley Enforcement 15 U.S.C. 7202(b)(1) 2002   
   
Corporate Responsibility Sec. 307, Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 Rules of Professional 
Responsibility for Attorneys 15 U.S.C. § 7245 
2002   
   
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60129 2002   
   
Coast Guard Whistleblower Protection Provision of Seamen against discrimination 46 
U.S.C. § 2114 
2002   
   
FAA and OSHA Memorandum of Understanding, 67 FR 55883 2002   
   
Homeland Security Act of 2002 Sec. 883, 6 U.S.C. § 463 2002   
   
Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002, 
Pub.L. 107-174 (May 15, 2002), [5 U.S.C. § 2301 Note] 
2002   
   
Standards Relating To Listed Audit Committees Securities And Exchange Commission 
Final Rule 68 Federal Register 18788-01 
2003   
   
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Securities and Exchange Commission 
17 C.F.R. Part 205 
2003   
   
Securities And Exchange Commission Audit Committee Rules/Complaint Process Final 
Rule 17 CFR 240.10A-3(b)(iv)(F)(3) 
2003   
   
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Procedures for Handling of 
Discrimination Complaints Aviation Investment and Reform Act 68 Federal Register 
14099 29 CFR § 1979 
2003   
   
Coast Guard Board For Correction of Military Records, Procedural Regulations 69 
Federal Register 34532 March 3, 2003 Final Rule 
2003   
   
Office of Special Counsel Part 1800 Filing Complaints and Allegations, 5 CFR §§ 
1800Whistleblower Laws and Regulations 
2003   
   
Office of Special Counsel 5 CFR Part 1800 Revision of Regulations to Describe Filing 
Requirements and Options, Including Electronic Filing 68 Federal Register 66695-01 
(November 28, 2003) Final rule 
2003   
   
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act Sec. 806, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
Final Rule 29 CFR Part 1980 U.S. Department of Labor Vol. 69 Federal Register 52104 
(August 24, 2004) 
2004     2004 
Japan 
Whistleblower 
Protection Act 
Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Minimum 
Training Requirements 49 CFR Part 380 (May 21, 2004) 
2004   
   
United States Sentencing Commission, Guideline Manual Section 8B2.1 (Nov.1, 2004) 2004   
   
Rewards for Information Relating to Violation of Internal Revenue Laws 26 CFR 
301.7263-1 
2004   
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Table15. USA and Japan Timeline of Enacted Laws from 2005 to 2013 
  
2005~2012 USA Japan 
  
Pipeline Safety DOL Rules and Procedures Final Rule 69 Federal 
Register 67 175889-17898 
2005   
    
Limitation on Legal Fee Reimbursement 42 USCS § 5853 2005   
    
Federal Non-disclosure Agreement Public Law 109-115 
Appropriations Act of 2006 Budget Resolution (November 30, 2005) 
2005   
    
Safe Containers for International Cargo Act, Employee Protection 
Provision, 46 U.S.C.§ 80507 
2006     2006 Corporations Act 
 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 Employee Education about False 
Claims Act Recovery Public Law 109-171 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(68) 
2006     2006 
Financial Instruments 
& Exchange Act  
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 Encouraging the Enactment of State 
False Claims Acts Public Law 109-171, Section 6031 42 U.S.C. § 
1396h 
2006   
    
Department of Homeland Security Office of the Secretary Procedures 
for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information 69 FR 8074 
2006   
    
Office of Personnel Management Implementation of Title II of the 
Notification and Federal Employee Anti-discrimination and 
Retaliation Act of 2002 5 CFR PART 724 (July 20, 2006) Final rule 
2006   
    
Award Claim Under Section 7623 (a) or (b);  Form 211 2006   
    
Railway Safety Labor Act: Employee Protection, 49 U.S.C. § 20109 2007     2007 
Prevention of Transfer of 
Criminal Proceeds Act 
Public Transportation Employee Protections National Transit Systems 
Security Act of 2007 (August 3, 2007) 6 U.S.C. § 1142 
2007   
    
Railroad Employee Protections Amending the Federal Rail Safety Act, 
(August 3, 2007) 49 U.S.C. § 20109 
2007   
    
Motor Carrier Employee Protections Amending the Surface 
Transportation Assistance Act (August 3, 2007) 49 U.S.C. § 31105 
2007   
    
Military Whistleblower Protection Department of Defense Directive 
Number 7050.6 (July 23, 2007) 
2007   
    
OSHA Policy on Settlement Agreements Containing Future 
Employment Waiver Clauses 7/23/2007 
2007   
    
Consumer Product Safety Act of 2008 Whistleblower Protection 
H.R. 4040 Section 219 15 U.S.C. § __  
2008   
    
Federal Acquisition Regulations; Contractor Business Ethics 
Compliance Program & Disclosure Requirements 73 FR 67064 
2008   
    
Corporate Responsibility Sec. 301, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Audit 
Committee, 15 U.S.C. § 78j -1-4 
2010   
    
Office of the Secretary of Labor Part 24-Procedures for the Handling 
of Discrimination Complaints under Federal Employee Protection 
Laws 29 CFR Part 24 
2011   
    
Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Under Federal Employee 
Protection Statutes 29 CFR Part 24 Interim Final Rule (Public 
comment due on October 9, 2007) 
2011   
    
Appendix A to part 24 Your Rights Under the Energy Reorganization 
Act 
2011   
    
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Rules for 
Implementing Section 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance 
Act, 29 CFR § 1978 
2012   
    
Department of Labor Adjudicatory Procedures for Corporate, 
Environmental, Nuclear, Airline and Transportation Whistleblower 
Claims 
2012   
    
   
  2013 
Act on the Protection of 
Specially Designated Secrets  
Source: http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=816&Itemid=129 
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VI. Whistleblowing Awareness in the United States 
An increase in whistleblowing activities in the lifeworld can lead to increased reporting 
and research on the issue.   Using Google as the search engine and ―Whistleblower,‖ 
Whistleblowing,‖ and ―Whistleblow‖ as the search terms, it was found that over the years these 
terms give more hits (Table 16). 
     Table 16. Counts of Terms in Google Search 1976-2016    
 
Whistleblower Whistleblowing Whistleblow Average/Year 
1950-1959 2 1 0 0.3 
1960-1969 14 9 0 2.3 
1970-1979 81 238 24 31.9 
1980-1989 462 1423 157 188.5 
1990-1999 2104 3874 514 597.8 
2000-2009 8932 13235 1518 2216.7 
2010-2016 15100 14300 2090 4498.6 
Total 26695 33080 4303 7536.1 
 
 Reports on whistleblowing during the 1950s and 1960s pertain to the act of blowing a 
physical whistle.  Ralph Nader coined the term ―whistleblower‖ in 1972 (Nader, Petkas & 
Blackwell, 1972). The term was inspired by a referee's whistle, which designates foul play when 
blown.  Nader wanted to convince the population that people who are considered a ―snitch‖ or 
―informer‖ should actually be viewed as heroes.  Academic journals during this decade have 
examined whistleblowing in the context of price fixing (Miller, 1978), the First Amendment 
(Katz, 1976) and management (Walters, 1974).  Google Scholar also produced several published 
works on a CIA scandal in the United States that gained public attention (Weissman, 1978; 
Stockwell, 1979).  In 1977, Frank Snepp blew the whistle against the CIA by publishing a 
memoir on the failure of the CIA to properly prepare for the fall of Saigon during the Vietnam 
War.  
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Published works on whistleblowing increased during the 1980s, expanding into other 
areas such as business ethics (Dunfee, 1987; Heacock & McGee, 1987; Jenson, 1987), nursing 
(Kiely & Kiely, 1987), physical therapy (Banja, 1985) and criminal justice (Rosecrance, 1988).  
During this decade, Marcia Miceli and Janet Near produced 38 articles on whistleblowing in 
management and psychology journals such as the Academy of Management, Journal of Business 
Ethics and Journal of Applied Psychology.  They analyzed whistleblowing in areas such as  
organizational dissidence (Near & Miceli, 1985), organizational conditions and positions (Miceli 
& Near, 1984), organizational climate (Miceli & Near, 1985), and as a prosocial behavior 
(Miceli & Near, 1988). 
Scholarly search results also produced articles on nuclear energy (Diamond, 1980; 
Tomain, 1988) such as the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (Kohn & Carpenter, 1986; Egan, 
1989), emotional distress of nuclear plant workers (Traylor, 1989), and suppression of opposed 
views towards nuclear technology (Martin, 1986).  This may be due to the changes in 
environmental policy during the 1980s and the environmental movement.  During this decade, 
whistleblowers such as Ronald Goldstein and Casey Rudd gained the public‘s attention after 
exposing safety concerns at their respected power plants.  There was also a movie made in 1983 
about Karen Silkwood, who mysteriously died after exposing safety violations at the Kerr-
McGee power plant in 1974.   
Published works on whistleblowing continued to grow during the 1990s.  Journal articles 
on whistleblowing focused on the predictors of blowing the whistles such as commitment 
(Lamar, 1992; Sims & Kroeck, 1994), internal and external whistleblowing (Barnett, 1992; Sims 
& Keenan, 1998), and consequences (Near, Dworkin & Miceli, 1990; Erien, 1992; Miceli & 
Near, 1994; Casal & Zakand, 1995; Faulkner, 1999; McDonald, 1999).  During this decade, 
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articles from Miceli and associates appeared numerous times in the search results. About 28 
articles appeared in areas such as the process of blowing the whistle (Near, Dworkin & Miceli, 
1993; Near & Miceli, 1995), the misconception about whistleblowers (Near & Miceli, 1996), and 
organizational and legal implications (Miceli, 1992).  Google search on whistleblowing during 
the 1990s also generated articles on the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (Devine, 1999; 
Fisher, 1990; Fong 1990; Cramton, 1991; Vaughn, 1999). 
Using Google Scholar and the same key terms during 2000 to 2009 produced results 
pertaining to the Sarbanes Oxley Act.  Specifically, 2, 710 results were generated for each term 
with respect to the Sarbanes Oxley Act that covered areas such as corporate whistleblowers 
(Baynes, 2002; Kohn, 2004; Vaughn, 2005; Moberly, 2006), flaws in the Act (Redner, 2002; 
Schreiber, Marshall & Young, 2006; Tanega, 2006; Schichor, 2007; Eckelkamp, 2009; Kim, 
2009), Enron (Reiser, 2004; Rockness & Rockness, 2005; Rapoport, Van Niel & Dharan, 2009) 
and Worldcom (Brickey, 2003; Veasey, 2003; Henry, 2004; Jeter, 2004; Li, Pincus & Rego, 
2008).  Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002 in response to corporate scandals such as Enron 
and Worldcom, which explains the high count in search results during this period. 
 Frank-Dodd Act was associated with the key terms from 2010 onward (Desai, 2011; 
Ebersole, 2011; Lee, 2011; Neal, 2011; Hansberry, 2012; Rapp, 2012; Quigley, 2012; Vega 
2012). Frank-Dodd Act generated about 17, 000 articles when searching for whistleblower in 
Google Scholar starting in 2010.  The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act or Frank-Dodd Act was enacted on July 21, 2010 as an attempt to regulate the financial 
markets to prevent the recurrence of events that caused the 2008 financial crisis.  Corporate fraud 
generated about 13, 100 articles when searching for whistleblower in the engine.     
 
37 
 
VII. Whistleblowing Awareness in Japan 
 The same search procedure was used for Japan by using the search terms -- ―Whistleblow 
and Japan,‖ ―Whistleblowing and Japan,‖ and ―Whistleblower and Japan.‖  Nothing was found 
before 1976 (Table 17).   
    Table 17. Counts of Terms in Google Search 1976-2016  
 
Whistleblower 
+ Japan 
Whistleblowing 
+ Japan 
Whistleblow 
+ Japan 
Average/Year 
1950-1959 0 0 0 0 
1960-1969 0 0 0 0 
1970-1979 1 15 2 1.8 
1980-1989 22 62 38 12.2 
1990-1999 67 182 97 28.6 
2000-2009 1360 1800 491 365.1 
2010-2016 3270 3440 1860 1224.3 
Total 4720 5499 2488 1632 
 
 In Japan, Lockheed bribery scandal gained public attention.  The scandal involved a US 
aerospace company, Lockheed, offering bribes during the 1970s in negotiating sales of its 
aircrafts in West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan.  Facing competition from 
McDonnell Douglas and Boeing, Lockheed paid up to $38 million in bribes to Japanese officials 
to facilitate aircraft sales to All Nippon Airways (ANA) between 1970 and 1975 (Peltz, 1995).   
The scandal led to the arrest of Kakuei Tanaka, the Prime Minister of Japan, in 1976 and he was 
charged with accepting a multimillion-dollar bribe from Lockheed (Galbraith, 2008).   Tanaka 
was the prime minister from 1972-74, and spoke to the president of ANA after receiving bribes 
from Lockheed.  ANA awarded Lockheed the contract (Hunziker, 1996).  There was no report of 
a whistleblower revealing Lockheed‘s bribery in Japan.  Instead, it was during the Watergate 
investigation that the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) discovered Lockheed disbursing 
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millions of dollars to foreign consultants and political leaders around the world (―Lockheed‘s 
Defiance‖, 1975).  The Watergate scandal began with five burglars from the White House sent to 
Democratic National Committee‘s headquarters at the Watergate complex in Washington to 
investigate leaks of sensitive information after the release of the Pentagon Papers (Dickinson, 
Cross & Polsky, 1973).  In 1976, the United States Senate Sub-Committee Public Hearings on 
U.S. Corporations Overseas Operations heard A.C. Kotchian, President of Lockheed Corporation, 
expose Lockheed's 2.4 billion yen ($29.57 million) payment to Yoshio Kodama, Lockheed‘s 
agent in Japan and their 163 million yen sales promotion fund for Japanese government officials 
(Church, 1976; Hunziker, 1996). 
Published works on whistleblowing continued to grow during the 1980s.  From 1986, 
published journals on whistleblowing revolved around unlawful termination and wrongful 
discharge.  This may be a reflection of the enactment of Japan‘s Equal Employment Opportunity 
Law (EEOL) of 1986.  The law prohibits discrimination against women in vocational training, 
fringe benefits, retirement, and dismissal.  It urged employers to treat women equally with men 
in respect to recruitment, job assignment and promotion. EEOL goes beyond the Japanese Labor 
Standard Law of 1947, which required equal wages for equal work for men and women but does 
not require equal job opportunities (Edwards, 1988). This law was introduced as part of Japan‘s 
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (Akamatsu, 1986). 
Although there were no Google Scholar results on scandals in Japan, two scandals, the 
Recruit Cosmo Scandal of 1988 and the HIV tainted blood scandal of 1989, gained public 
attention.  The Recruit Cosmo Scandal involved the chairman of Recruit, a human resource 
company, offering number of shares of its subsidiary, Cosmo, to business leaders and politicians 
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before the subsidiary went public in 1986 (―Recruiter To Go Public‖, 2012).   Recruit was started 
as a staffing agency by Hiromasa Ezoe in the 1960s.  By the 1980s, Ezoe was employing 10, 000 
employees to run his growing company, which had subsidiaries in diverse markets such as 
publishing, driving schools and real estate (Schlesinger, 2014).   For Recruit to continue 
expanding, it needed to go through regulations that slowed its growth.  To bypass these hurdles, 
Ezoe offered shares in its subsidiary to politicians and business executives at a low price to 
quickly raise the value after the IPO (Schlesinger, 2014). Among the politicians involved in the 
insider trading were Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro 
Nakasone, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Takao Fujinami (Sander, 1998). Recruit was found to 
have distributed more than $11 million to politicians, business leaders and ministry officials and 
led to the resignation of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita and his cabinet members (―Ex-
Executive is Sentenced‖, 1990).  Although Takeshita was accused, he retained his seat in the diet 
until his death in 1990 since he was never charged.  Takeshita was also the primary fundraiser 
for Tanaka when he was the prime minister and became the leader of the Tanaka-faction in the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).  The Economist characterized his era as ―a dizzy mixture of 
brilliance and corruption‖ (―Japan‘s Political Puppeteer‖, 2000).  The Wall Street Journal called 
him ―the last shadow shogun‖ (―The Last Shogun‖, 2000).  Hiroshi Yamamoto, a journalist for 
the Asashi Newspaper Yokohama Division, took the lead in investigating after becoming aware 
of Recruit‘s illegal stock activities.  He was responsible for exposing Ezoe‘s actions to the public 
(Murayama, 2014). 
In 1989, 1,800 hemophiliacs infected with HIV filed a lawsuit against the state and the 
pharmaceutical companies after using blood-clotting agents contaminated with the virus (Pollack, 
1996).   Dr. Takeshi Abe, a hemophilia expert who headed a government advisory panel on 
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AIDS in the 1980's, allowed the use of unheated blood-clotting agents tainted with HIV.  Heated 
blood products was approved by the Food and Drug Administration as a way to prevent the 
spread of HIV in the U.S. when the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta issued warnings that 
blood products might be tainted with the virus in 1983 (Miyamoto, 1996).  The Health Ministry 
and Dr. Abe delayed the approval of heat-treated blood products to help Green Cross, a provider 
of blood products, and other drug companies catch up to foreign companies (Pollack, 1996).  
Baxter was the main U.S. firm exporting blood products to Japan at that time.  The committee 
failed to make heated blood products available quickly because of its ties with Japanese 
pharmaceutical companies, which did not have the technology to manufacture the products 
(Fieldman, 1997).  Biologist Atsushi Gunji from the Ministry of Health, expressed concerns over 
the tainted blood but Abe assured its safety.  However, after further investigation, Gunji admitted 
that the blood was a health hazard and submitted his findings to his superiors. (―薬害エイズ‖, 
1999). 
During the 1990s, whistleblowing research expanded to areas such as business ethics, 
auditing and corruption.  This may be due to the anti-corruption and sexual harassment measures 
that were implemented in Japan.  In 1993, the Unfair Competition Prevention Act (UCPA) was 
amended to protect trade secrets during trial.  The original UCPA was enacted in 1934 by 
implementing the provisions of the Paris Convention relating to unfair competition (Eguchi, 
1994).  The amendment was the result of GATT member countries putting pressure on the 
Japanese government to harmonize its system with the systems of foreign countries (Eguchi, 
1994).  In 1997, the EEOL was amended by adding protection against sexual harassment in the 
workplace.  The revision added criminal sanctions for violations of the law, which was not 
addressed in the 1985 version.  In 1998, the UCPA was amended again where bribery of foreign 
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public officials was defined as a chargeable offense.  In 1999, the National Public Service Ethics 
Act was passed to limit the value of gifts to public officials.  The law also prohibits receiving 
gifts by those who may have conflict of interest.   
Although no hit resulted in Google Scholar during the 1990s, there was one scandal, 
Sagawa Express Scandal, which captured the Japanese attention in 1992. Sagawa Kyubin, a 
parcel delivery company, made donations to politicians and offered the services of criminal 
syndicates, or the yakuza, to the LDP.  Top executives of Sagawa Kyubin had been acting as 
intermediaries between yakuza organizations and Japanese cabinet members (McCarthy, 1993).  
Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita sought the aid of criminal syndicates through the president of 
Sagawa Kyubin to help stop the harassment by the right-wing group Kominto (McCarthy, 1993).  
Kominto harassed Takeshita by gathering sound trucks outside his home and blasting out cynical 
slogans (Helm, 1992).  The harassment stopped almost immediately.  The president also offered 
loans and donations to both politicians and criminal syndicates.  Prime Minister Morihiro 
Hosokawa was forced to resign from his position after his financial connections with Sagawa 
Kyubin was exposed (Sanger, 1994).  No whistleblowers were reported in this scandal. 
Between 2000 and 2009, whistleblowing research continued in the areas of business 
ethics, auditing, corruption, and healthcare.  By 2004, the Whistleblower Protection Act was 
enacted to protect employees from disclosing public interest information.  Also, in 2006, the 
Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, which is like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was passed in 
response to corporate scandals such as Kanebo, Livedoor, and the Murakami Fund Scandals.  In 
2005, three executives from Kanebo, a cosmetics maker, were arrested for falsifying financial 
statements of as much as $1 billion in 2001 and 2002 (―The Inglorious History ―, 2011).  There 
were no reports of whistleblowing with Kanebo.  In 2006, the president and three executives 
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from Livedoor, an internet service company, were arrested for securities fraud.  They provided 
false financial information for one of Livedoor‘s subsidiaries to boost its share price (Frederick, 
2006).  Livedoor manipulated the market when its subsidiary, Livedoor Marketing, announced 
that it was buying a publishing company, Money Life, when in fact it already controlled it 
(―From Hero to Zero‖, 2006).  In that same year, Yoshiaki Murakami, a former trade ministry 
official and founder of M&A Consulting, was arrested for insider trading activity.  Murakami 
traded shares with prior knowledge of a takeover bid by Livedoor for Nippon Broadcasting 
System (―Murakami Gets Two Years‖, 2007).  Murakami colluded with Horie in purchasing 
shares in a failed takeover bid attempt of Nippon Broadcast.  There were no whistleblowers that 
came forward from this scandal.   However, Ryouji Miyauchi , Director of Finance at Livedoor 
confessed of the illegal activities in court.  He confessed being aware of the illegal takeover of 
Nippon Broadcast Systems by both companies, and responsible for carrying out the purchase of 
stocks of Nippon Broadcast Systems on behalf of Horie and Murakami (Ueno, 2011). 
During this decade, disclosure of public interest information increased compared to 
previous decades.  In 2000, Snow Brand Milk Products Co., a dairy company, harmed nearly 
15,000 people with contaminated milk by recycling old milk to produce other dairy products 
(Yamaguchi, 2000).  Two years later, Snow Brand Food Co. was exposed for mislabeling 
imported beef as domestic beef in order to collect benefits from the government‘s beef buy-back 
program (Wolff, 2004).  In 2000, Mitsubishi Motors was exposed of failing to inform the public 
about 64,000 customer complaints over faulty vehicles since 1977 (Wolff, 2004).  In, 2005, 
Japanese architect, Hidetsugu Aneha, admitted breaching construction rules by falsifying quake 
resistance data in order to cut costs for at least 71 buildings of the 208 he designed since 1998 
(Wallace, 2005).  In June of 2007, Fujiya, a confectioner company, was exposed. It made cakes 
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and other confectionary using expired ingredients (Onishi, 2007).  Other companies like 
confectioners Ishiya of Hokkaido, Akafuku of Mie Prefecture, and Osaka restaurant Senba 
Kitcho were also found guilty of passing off expired goods as fresh (Legewie, 2007).   
Public awareness of whistleblowing is evident when comparing the number of hits 
produced from 2000 to 2009 and 2010 to 2016.  The number of research articles in the seven 
years surpassed the total number produced in the previous decade.  Three whistleblowing 
activities may have led to the increased reports and research in those seven years.  In 2012, 
Japan's Supreme Court ruled in favor of a whistleblower for the first time.  Masaharu Hamada, 
an Olympus employee, sued Olympus in 2008 for unfair retaliatory treatment after he was 
demoted for raising the issue of supplier complaints to management (Kageyama, 2012).  
Hamada‘s victory followed Michael Woodford‘s settlement with Olympus in 2011.  Woodford 
was fired within two weeks of being promoted as president and CEO of Olympus in 2011 for 
questioning Olympus‘ accounting practices.   Olympus hid investment losses from the 1990s by 
using a series of inflated acquisition bid to clear its balance sheet (Tabuchi, 2011).   
In 2013, the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets was passed by the 
National Diet.  The law was designed to protect state secrets with harsh penalties for violators if 
they were to leak classified information to the public (Craft, 2013).  The law is a step backward 
in civil liberties as it clouds government transparency by concealing government misdeeds, 
which makes it harder to blow the whistle. 
VIII. Discussion 
 The number of hits for the United States and Japan clearly displays a gap in awareness of 
whistleblowing in both the lifeworld and microworld.  In the United States, the awareness of 
whistleblowing has been increasing since the 1960s.  Whistleblowing is reported both in 
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academic journals and the popular press.  Although reports of whistleblowing have been growing 
in Japan, it is nowhere near that reported in the United States.  It is likely caused by very little 
whistleblowing activity present in the lifeworld in Japan.  The enactment of the Whistleblower 
Protection Act might lead to an increase in whistleblowing activities in the lifeworld in Japan.   
IX. Whistleblowers in the United States  
Reported acts of whistleblowing in the United States can be traced back to 1777 (Tables 
18 - 27).  Whistleblowing activity increased from 1960s: six cases were reported during the 
1960s, nine during the 1970s, seven during the 1980s, 13 during the 1990s, 69 during the 2000s, 
and 25 from 2010.  As of 2016, there were 133 reported cases of whistleblowing in the U.S., and 
39 involved fraudulent activities targeted at or conducted by a government agency.  Cases such 
as unethical surveillance by an agency, fraud against the government, and discrimination were 
exposed by whistleblowers.  Of these, 23 cases of whistleblowing activity involved the defence 
industry.   Whistleblowers in these cases exposed torture and abuse towards POWs and civilians, 
fraud by contractors, and human rights abuse during war.  Fourteen cases involved threats to 
public health where whistleblowers exposed patient abuse, contamination, and inhumane 
treatments at slaughterhouses.  Twelve reported cases were in the pharmaceutical industry where 
whistleblowers exposed issues such as toxicity of drugs, illegal marketing practices, poor 
manufacturing process, data manipulation of drug performance, and fraud.   
Corporate whistleblowers became prominent in the late 1980s where 11 of the 132 cases 
of whistleblowing activity involved issues of accounting fraud, price-fixing, and corruption.  
Eleven cases were in the energy industry, which involved exposing safety issues at nuclear plants 
and irregular levels of chemical content in gasoline.  Seven cases of risky mortgage operations, 
securities violation, and report manipulations to meet regulations were exposed in the banking 
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industry. Issues of safety violations, safety issues, and design flaws were reported in the seven 
cases of whistleblowing in the transportation industry. Four cases of whistleblowing in the 
communication industry involved warrantless surveillance by telecommunication companies and 
the government.   Three cases of  the law enforcement industry involved corruption complicit in 
enforcement practice.  Two cases in the education industry involved exposing fraud and data 
manipulation.  Finally, bribery in the sports industry and reports of sex abuse were exposed by 
whistleblowers respectively. 
The number of whistleblowers has consistently been increasing every decade starting 
from the 1960s. In her 1962 book, Silent Spring, Rachel Carson blew the whistle on the United 
States Government on the health risk of using DDT on humans and animals (Paull, 2013).  Her 
efforts led to the ban of DDT in 1972.  In 1966, Peter Buxtun exposed the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Experiment conducted by the United States Public Health Services between 1932 and 1972 to 
study the natural progression of untreated syphilis in rural African-American men in Alabama 
(Jones, 1981). Neither were the men informed about the disease, nor were they given any 
treatment later.   
In the 1970s, many whistleblowers exposed corruption and fraud within the government.  
In 1971, Daniel Ellsberg (―The Nation‖, 1971) disclosed government studies on the Vietnam 
War known as the Pentagon Papers.  The papers revealed that the government had prior 
knowledge that war could not be won.  In that same year, Frank Serpico exposed corruption in 
the New York Police Department by contributing to a front page story in the New York Times 
after no action was taken when he reported his findings to his superiors (Haberman, 1997).  In, 
1972, W. Mark Felt, later known as ―Deep Throat,‖ provided information to the Washington Post 
about the misdeeds of the Nixon administration which came to be known as the Watergate 
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Scandal (Gaines, 2003).  In 1977, Frank Snepp published a book on the CIA‘s failure to properly 
prepare for the fall of Saigon during the Vietnam War (Hastedt, 2010; Snepp, 1977)).  
Whistleblowers in the 1980s exposed fraud by military contractors and safety violations 
at energy plants.  In 1984, John Gravitt exposed General Electric defrauding the Department of 
Defense by falsely billing for work on the B-1 Lancer bomber (Atlas, 2001).  In 1989, William 
Schumer exposed fraud by Hughes Aircraft with respect to the B-2 bomber (Vartabedian, 1992).  
In 1989, Myron Mehlman was fired for warning managers that the gasoline Mobil was selling in 
Japan contained benzene in excess of 5%.  He was invited to address managers at Mobil‘s Japan 
subsidiary on environmental health issues.  He warned the managers of the high amounts of 
benzene in the Japanese gasoline.  Upon his return, he was fired.  Mehlman filed suit and was 
awarded $3, 440, 300 in compensatory damages and $3, 500, 000 in punitive damages (Hoke, 
1994).  
The number of whistleblowers doubled in the 1990s compared to the previous decade 
who exposed unethical activities in different industries.   William Sanjour won a landmark suit in 
1995 against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which established the First 
Amendment right of federal employees to ―blow the whistle‖ on their employers (Carozza, 2007).  
In 1996, Jeffrey Wigand exposed Brown & Williamson manipulating the level of nicotine in 
cigarettes to create addiction in smokers (Brenner, 1996). In 1998, Linda Tripp exposed the 
Lewinsky Scandal by secretly recording Lewinsky's phone calls about her relationship with the 
President (Posner, 2009).  In that same year, Marc Holder, an International Olympic Committee 
member, blew the whistle on the Winter Olympic bid scandal for the 2002 Salt Lake City games 
(Mallon, 2009).  In 1999, Harry Markopolos was responsible for tipping the Security Exchange 
Commission of securities fraud by Bernard Madoff (Lindsay, 2008). 
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The highest number of reported cases of whistleblowers occurred between 2000 and 2009.  
Starting in 2000, Marsha Coleman-Adebayo exposed racial and gender discrimination in 
violation of Civil Rights Act of 1964 by the Environmental Protection Agency (Fears, 2006).  In 
2002, Cynthia Cooper and Sherron Watkins unearthed the accounting fraud at Worldcom 
(Pulliman & Soloman, 2002) and Enron (Foley, 2006) respectively.  In 2005, Thomas Tamm 
wrote a Pulitzer Prize-winning story in the New York Times about the Bush administration‘s 
warrantless wiretapping program (Pickler, 2011). James Hansen blew the whistle in 2006 on 
NASA and the Bush administration‘s attempts to silence him from speaking out about the 
dangers of global warming (Eilperin, 2005).  In that same year, Adam Resnick exposed Medicare 
and Medicaid fraud by the pharmaceutical company Omnicare (―Prominent New York‖, 2010). 
In 2007, John Kiriakou exposed the CIA's torture program such a waterboarding detainees 
(Warrick & Eggen, 2007).  Linda Almonte exposed corrupt practices of robosigning at JP 
Morgan in 2009 (Taibbi, 2012). 
There were 24 whistleblowers from 2010 to 2014.  In 2010, Chelsea Manning released 
the largest set of classified documents about the war in Afghanistan through Wikileaks (Tate, 
2013).  Also in 2010, Walter Tamosaitis was fired for reporting safety and operational issues at 
the Hanford Nuclear Site (Gerken, 2013).  In 2011, Eileen Foster exposed systemic fraud at 
Countrywide Financial (Froomkin, 2012).  That same year, Michael Winston was fired because 
he refused to lie for Countrywide‘s succession planning to alleviate concerns by Moody‘s Credit 
Services and exposed unsafe working conditions (Taibbi, 2015).  Everett Stern exposed illegal 
money laundering transactions by HSBC in 2011 (Taibbi, 2013).  Most recently, Edward 
Snowden exposed secretive data-mining program, the PRISM surveillance program, in 2013 
(Strom & Wilber, 2014). 
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Table 18. List of Whistleblowers in the USA from 1770 to 1977 
Year Name Organization Action Industry 
1777 Samuel Shaw 
United States 
Continental Navy 
Exposed the torture of British POW by a commander-in-
chief of the Continental Navy 
Military 
1872 Julius Chamber 
Bloomingdale 
Insane Asylum 
Exposed patient abuse by admitting himself to the asylum Public Health 
1906 Upton Sinclair 
Chicago pig 
slaughterhouse 
Exposed the conditions of slaughterhouse in his novel Public Health 
1931 Herbert Yardley 
United States 
Cipher Bureau 
Exposed the unethical surveillance policies of 
U.S. SIGINT 
Government 
1933 Smedley Butler 
United States 
Marine Corps 
Exposed a coup d'état by a fascist group against the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration 
Military 
1962 Rachel Carson 
United States 
Government 
Exposed the side effects of DDT on humans and animals, 
banning DDT in 1972 
Government 
1963 John Paul Vann 
United States 
Army 
Asked to resign his commission after reporting to his 
superiors that American policy and tactics were seriously 
flawed during the Vietnam War. 
Military 
1966 James Boyd 
United States 
Government 
Exposed Senator Thomas Dodd's $200,000 of unreported 
campaign funds for personal expenses 
Government 
1966 Peter Buxtun 
United States 
Public Health 
Service 
Exposed the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. Public Health 
1967 John White 
United States 
Navy 
Wrote a letter to the editor of the New Haven Register of 
President Lyndon Johnson lying to Congress about faulty 
sonar reports used to justify the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution. 
Military 
1969 Ron Ridenhour Congress 
Wrote to Congress of events at My Lai during the 
Vietnam War, including torture, sexual abuse, mutilation 
and mass murder of hundreds of unarmed civilians 
Military 
1971 Daniel Ellsberg 
United States 
State Department 
Disclosed government study of the Vietnam War known 
as the Pentagon Papers 
Military 
1971 Frank Serpico 
New York Police 
Department 
Reported of police corruption in the NYPD. Law Enforcement 
1971 Perry Fellwock 
National Security 
Agency 
Exposed the NSA's worldwide covert surveillance 
network. 
Government 
1972 W. Mark Felt 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 
Later known as "Deep Throat", played a critical role in 
the Watergate scandal. 
Government 
1973 
A. Ernest 
Fitzgerald 
United States 
Department of 
Defense 
Reported the cost overrun associated with Lockheed's C-
5A cargo plane and military contractor fraud 
Military 
1974 Karen Silkwood Kerr-McGee 
Exposed the negligence to plant safety at the Kerr-McGee 
plutonium fuels production  
Energy 
1976 
Gregory C. Minor, 
Richard B. 
Hubbard, and Dale 
G. Bridenbaugh 
General Electric Revealed safety problems at nuclear power plants Energy 
1977 Frank Camp Ford 
Warned Ford Motors design flaws that place the Pinto at 
risk. 
Transportation 
1977 Frank Snepp 
Central 
Intelligence 
Agency 
Published a book about Operation Frequent Wind and the 
failure of the CIA and other American entities to properly 
prepare for the fall of Saigon.  
Military 
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Table 19. List of Whistleblowers in the USA from 1984 to 1995 
Year Name Organization Action Industry 
1984 
John Michael 
Gravitt 
General Electric 
Sued GE for defrauding the United States 
Department of Defense by falsely billing for work on 
the B1 Lancer bomber 
Military 
1985 
Ronald J. 
Goldstein 
EBASCO 
Constructors Inc. 
Sued EBASCO for getting fired for issuing failure of 
issuing safety compliance reports and quality control 
violations affecting the safety of the plant.  
Energy 
1986 Casey Rudd 
Hanford Nuclear 
Reservation 
Testified about missing plutonium, and public and 
worker health dangers, at the nation‘s nuclear 
weapons reservation in Hanford, Washington 
Energy 
1988 Roland Gibeault 
Genisco 
Technology 
Uncovered the company's fraudulent test methods 
which were being used to pass key components off 
on the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) 
missile.  
Military 
1989 
Douglas D. 
Keeth 
United 
Technologies 
Corporation 
Uncovered inflated progress billings by UTC Corporate 
1989 
William 
Schumer 
Hughes Aircraft 
Reported fraud by Hughes Aircraft with respect to 
the B-2 bomber.  
Military 
1989 Myron Mehlman Mobil Corporation 
Reported gasoline that was being sold in Japan 
contained benzene in excess of 5 percent 
Energy 
1990 
Arnold 
Gundersen 
Nuclear Energy 
Services 
Discovered radioactive material in an accounting 
safe at Nuclear Energy Services (NES) in Danbury, 
Connecticut 
Energy 
1992 Mark Whitacre 
Archer Daniels 
Midland 
Exposed price-fixing cartel in his company Corporate 
1994 William Sanjour 
United States 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Won a landmark lawsuit against the federal 
government which established the First Amendment 
rights of federal employees to criticize their 
employer 
Government 
1995 
Janet 
Howard,Tanya 
Ward Jordan and 
Joyce E. 
Megginson 
United States 
Department of 
Commerce 
Exposed widespread systemic racism and retaliation 
within the Department of Commerce against 
African-American employees. 
Government 
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Table 20. List of Whistleblowers in the USA from 1996 to 2000 
Year Name Organization Action Industry 
1996 George Galatis 
Nuclear power 
industry 
Reported safety problems at the Millstone 1 Nuclear 
Power Plant relating to reactor refueling procedures. 
Energy 
1996 Jeffrey Wigand 
Brown & 
Williamson 
Exposed B & W intentionally manipulated the level 
of nicotine in cigarette smoke to addict smokers.  
Corporate 
1996 David Franklin Parke-Davis 
Exposed illegal promotion of the epilepsy 
drug Neurontin for un-approved uses while 
withholding evidence of the effectiveness of the 
drug.  
Pharmaceutical 
1996 
Michael 
Ruppert 
Los Angeles 
Police 
Department 
Reported the CIA was not complicit in drug 
trafficking during a town hall meeting at Los 
Angeles' Locke High School on November 5, 1995.  
Law 
Enforcement 
1996 Nancy Olivieri Apotex 
Exposed the toxicity of the study drug, Apotex, and 
to the drug being inefficacious 
Pharmaceutical 
1997 
Frederic 
Whitehurst 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 
Reported a lack of scientific standards and serious 
flaws in the FBI Lab, including in the first World 
Trade Center bombing cases and the Oklahoma City 
bombing case. 
Government 
1998 Marc Hodler 
International 
Olympic 
Committee 
IOC member who blew the whistle on the Winter 
Olympic bid scandal for the 2002 Salt Lake City 
games. 
Sports 
1998 Linda Tripp 
Clinton 
Administration 
Exposed the Lewisnsky Scandal by secretly 
recording Lewinsky's confidential phone calls about 
her relationship with the President  
Government 
1999 
Harry 
Markopolos 
Bernard Madoff 
Tipped off the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) repeatedly of securities 
fraud by Bernard Madoff. 
Corporate 
2000 
Karen 
Kwiatkowski 
United States Air 
Force 
Exposed corruption of political influences on military 
intelligence leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
Military 
2000 
Stefan P. 
Kruszewski 
Pharmaceutical 
companies 
Exposed the inadequate care of mentally ill children 
through overmedication and physical and chemical 
restraints by Southwood Psychiatric Hospital, Pfizer, 
Inc., and AstraZeneca. 
Pharmaceutical 
2000 
Marsha 
Coleman-
Adebayo 
United States 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency 
Exposed racial and gender discrimination in violation 
of Civil Rights Act of 1964 by the EPA  
Government 
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Table 21. List of Whistleblowers in the USA from 2001 to 2002 
Year Name Organization Action Industry 
2001 
Joseph 
Nacchio 
Qwest /National 
Security Agency 
CEO of Qwest, refused to participate in NSA spying 
on its customers in February 2001.  
Communication 
2001 
Pascal 
Diethelm,Jean-
Charles Rielle 
Philip Morris USA and 
University of Geneva 
Revealed the secret ties of Ragnar Rylander, 
professor of environmental health, to the tobacco 
industry, publishing article which denied the toxicity 
of secondhand smoke.  
Corporate 
2001 
Bogdan 
Dzakovic 
Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Warned of the vulnerability of USA airports but was 
told not to report it by his superiors. 
Transportation 
2001 
Jesselyn 
Radack 
United States 
Department of Justice 
Exposed DOJ destroyed documents of John Walker 
Lindh's interrogation without having legal counsel 
present. 
Government 
2001 John Munsell ConAgra Reported E.coli-tainted meat from ConAgra. Public Health 
2001 
Kathryn 
Bolkovac 
US military contractor 
Exposed human rights abuses committed against 
young girls, forced into prostitution by U.S. military 
contractors and international organizations 
Military 
2001 Jack Spadaro 
Mine Safety and Health 
Administration 
Found evidence that the owner of the impoundment 
dam had prior knowledge of problems with the mine 
that led to the spilling of 300 million gallons of coal 
slurry into 100 miles of streams in Kentucky and 
West Virginia 
Public Health 
2002 
Cynthia 
Cooper 
Worldcom Unearthed $3.8 billion in fraud at WorldCom Corporate 
2002 
Sherron 
Watkins 
Enron Uncovered accounting irregularities within Enron Corporate 
2002 Coleen Rowley 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 
Outlined the FBI's slow action before the September 
11, 2001 attacks 
Government 
2002 
William 
Binney, J. 
Kirke Wiebe, 
Edward 
Loomis 
National Security 
Agency 
Exposed the wasteful spending and mismanagement 
with the failed data collection program known as 
Trailblazer Project. 
Government 
2002 
Glenn Walp, 
Steven L. 
Doran 
University of California 
Los Alamos National 
Laboratory 
Exposed breaches of security as well as fraud and 
mismanagement to the Department of Energy 
Government 
2002 Sibel Edmonds 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 
Attempted to report cover-ups of security issues, 
potential espionage, and incompetence. 
Government 
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Table 22. List of Whistleblowers in the USA from 2003 to 2004 
Year Name Organization Action Industry 
2003 John Oberg 
Department of 
Education 
Discovered illegal payments to student loan 
lenders of federal tax dollars. 
Education 
2003 Katherine Gun 
National Security 
Agency 
Leaked an e-mail detailing illegal activities by 
the USA and UK in their push to invade Iraq. 
Government 
2003 Courtland Kelley General Motors 
Reported faulty ignition switches in the 
Cobalt, which cut power to the car while in 
motion, were eventually linked to many 
crashes resulting in fatalities. 
Transportation 
2003 Robert MacLean 
United States 
Transportation 
Security 
Administration 
Revealed a cost-cutting plan to cancel Federal 
Air Marshal coverage from long-distance 
flights on the eve of a confirmed al-Qaeda 
suicidal hijacking 
Transportation 
2003 Joseph Wilson 
United States 
Government 
Exposed reasons for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Military 
2003 
Richard 
Convertino 
United States 
Department of 
Justice 
Testified before the U.S. Senate Finance 
Committee in September 2003 about the lack 
of Bush Administration support of anti-
terrorism prosecutions post-9/11. 
Government 
2004 Joe Darby United States Army 
Exposed torture and abuse of prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib 
Military 
2004 
Neil Patrick 
Carrick 
Greater Grace 
World Outreach 
Uncovered financial and sexual abuse by 
church leaders. 
Religion 
2004 Gerald W. Brown 
Nuclear power 
industry 
Uncovered the Thermo-lag circuit 
integrity scandal and silicone foam scandals in 
U.S. and Canadian nuclear power plants. 
Energy 
2004 David Graham 
Food and Drug 
Administration 
Discovered that the pain-
reliever Vioxx increased the risk of 
cardiovascular problems and spoke out against 
the policies of the Food and Drug 
Administration 
Pharmaceutical 
2004 Samuel Provance United States Army 
Revealed the role of interrogators in the 
abuses and cover up the Abu Ghraib prisoner 
abuse. 
Military 
2004 Peter Rost Pfizer 
Exposed accounting irregularities and other 
illegal business practice by Pfizer 
Pharmaceutical 
2004 
Victoria 
Hampshire 
Wyeth 
Pharmaceuticals 
Discovered a popular heartworm medication 
for dogs was killing hundreds of animal 
Pharmaceutical 
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Table 23. List of Whistleblowers in the USA in 2005 
Year Name Organization Action Industry 
2005 
Richard 
Levernier 
United States 
Department of Energy 
Identified security problems at U.S. 
nuclear facilities and in response to this 
complaint, the U.S. Department of 
Energy withdrew Levernier's security 
clearance and he was assigned to clerical 
work. 
Energy 
2005 Russ Tice 
United States 
Government 
Warrantless surveillance of the USA 
population by the NSA. 
Government 
2005 
Thomas 
Andrews 
Drake 
National Security 
Agency 
Identified the Trailblazer project as a 
massively wasteful and ineffective 
program that sacrificed security and 
privacy 
Government 
2005 
Bunnatine 
"Bunny" H. 
Greenhouse 
Halliburton 
Exposed illegality in the no-bid contracts 
for reconstruction in Iraq by a 
Halliburton subsidiary. 
Military 
2005 
Brad 
Birkenfeld 
UBS 
Exposed a multi-billion dollar 
international tax fraud scandal over at 
UBS. 
Banking 
2005 Susan Wood 
Food and Drug 
Administration 
Resigned in protest to the Bush 
administration‘s decision to delay the 
approval of Plan-B  
Government 
2005 
Thomas 
Tamm 
United States 
Department of Justice 
Informed The New York Times for the 
story that became a 2005 exposé on mass 
warrantless surveillance. 
Government 
2005 
Shawn 
Carpenter 
Sandia National 
Laboratories 
Discovered that a sophisticated group 
of hackers were systematically 
penetrating hundreds of computer 
networks at major U.S. defense 
contractors to access sensitive 
information.  
Government 
2005 Rick S. Piltz 
National Aeronautics 
and Space 
Administration 
Resigned over the White House‘s attempt 
to manipulate climate change reports. 
Government 
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Table 24. List of Whistleblowers in the USA in 2006 
Year Name Organization Action Industry 
2006 
Richard 
Bowen 
Citigroup 
Warn about the rise in defective 
mortgages at Citigroup and its practice 
of lowering its standards for subprime 
mortgage pools 
Banking 
2006 
Aubrey 
Blumsohn 
Proctor & Gamble 
Blew the whistle on data manipulation 
performed on behalf of Procter & 
Gamble regarding that company‘s 
osteoporosis drug, Actonel. 
Pharmaceutical 
2006 James Hansen 
National Aeronautics 
and Space 
Administration 
Blew the whistle on NASA officials‘ 
and the Bush administration‘s attempts 
to silence him from speaking out about 
the dangers of global warming 
Government 
2006 
Gary J. 
Aguirre 
United States Securities 
and Exchange 
Commission 
Exposed SEC's failure to allow a proper 
investigation of John Mack in insider 
trading case involving Pequot Capital 
Management and Arthur J. Samberg. 
Corporate 
2006 
Walter 
DeNino 
Eric Poehlman 
 Exposed Poehlman falsifying data in a 
grant application. 
Education 
2006 
Marco 
Pautasso 
World Intellectual 
Property Organization 
Exposed fraud and attempted fraud 
committed by WIPO Director 
Government 
2006 Mark Klein 
AT&T, National 
Security Agency 
Reported a construction of a monitoring 
facility in San Fransico thought to be 
operated by NSA as a part of 
warrantless surveillance program. 
Communication 
2006 
Kenneth 
Kendrick 
Peanut Corporation of 
America 
Blew the whistle on the origins of 
salmonella-tainted peanut butter that 
sickened hundreds and even killed 
several people in the USA 
Public Health 
2006 Cate Jenkins 
United States 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Reported EPA lied about the danger of 
the dust which caused chemical burns in 
the lungs of responders from the 9/11 
attacks  
Government 
2006 Frank Terreri 
Federal Air Marshal 
Service 
Disclosed numerous security problems 
on behalf of 1,500 air marshals. 
Transportation 
2006 
Richard M. 
Bowen III 
Citigroup 
Exposed extreme risks being taken on 
by the mortgage operation by Citigroup. 
Banking 
2006 
Adam B. 
Resnick 
Omnicare 
Exposed Medicare and Medicaid fraud 
by the pharmaceutical company 
Omnicare 
Pharmaceutical 
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Table 25. List of Whistleblowers in the USA from 2007 to 2009 
Year Name Organization Action Industry 
2007 Franz Gayl Marine Corp 
Exposed the Corps failure to provide American troops 
in Iraq with armored vehicles in a timely manner that 
could have protected soldiers against improvised 
explosive devices. 
Military 
2007 Kit Forshee Beef Product Inc. 
Blew the whistle on the ammonization process used by 
BPI on its low-grade beef product 
Public Health 
2007 Justin Hopson 
New Jersey State 
Police 
Witnessed an unlawful arrest and false report made by 
his training officer. 
Law 
Enforcement 
2007 John Kiriakou 
Central 
Intelligence 
Agency 
Exposed the CIA's torture program such 
a waterboarding detainees 
Military 
2007 George Sarris Air Force 
Discovered serious maintenance concerns with two 
types of aircraft critical for national security mission 
Military 
2007 
James 
Wasserstrom 
United Nations 
Exposed alleged internal corruption involving UN 
officials. 
Government 
2008 Babak Pasdar Verizon 
Discovered Verizon re-routing and capturing all 
customer mobile phone communications 
Communication 
2008 Kunal Saha World Bank 
Found evidence that World Bank funds had been used 
to purchase defective test kits designed to detect for 
HIV/AIDS in blood samples 
Government 
2008 Rudolf Elmer Julius Bär 
Gave secret documents detailing the activities of Julius 
Bär in the Cayman Islands and its role in alleged tax 
evasion 
Corporate 
2008 
Robert J. 
McCarthy 
United States 
Government 
Exposed the Interior Department‘s mismanagement of 
$3.5 billion in Indian trust resources. 
Government 
2009 Gabe Bruno 
Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Alleged the FAA lacked a national security screening 
mechanism for mechanics 
Transportation 
2009 Wendell Potter CIGNA Testified against the HMO industry in the USA Senate Public Health 
2009 Renee Dufault 
Food and Drug 
Administration 
Forced to stop investigating traces of mercury found in 
high fructose corn syrup.  
Public Health 
2009 Cathy Harris 
United States 
Customs Service 
Reported racial profiling against black travelers 
at Hartsfield International Airport in Atlanta, Georgia.  
Transportation 
2009 
John 
Kopchinski 
Pfizer 
Exposed Pfizer‘s illegal marketing of prescription 
painkiller Bextra 
Pharmaceutical 
2009 
Jim Wetta, 
Joseph Faltaous, 
Steven 
Woodward, 
Jaydeen 
Vincente, 
Robert Rudolph, 
Hector Rosado, 
Robert Evan 
Dawitt, William 
Lofing,Bradly 
Lutz 
Eli Lilly 
Exposed Eli Lilly illegally marketing the 
drug Zyprexa for uses not approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration 
Pharmaceutical 
2009 Linda Almonte JP Morgan Chase 
Exposed corrupt practices including robosigning at JP 
Morgan. 
Corporate 
2009 Dean Wyatt 
US Department of 
Agriculture 
Discovered humane handling violations at two 
slaughter plants in Oklahoma and Vermont 
Public Health 
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Table 26. List of Whistleblowers in the USA from 2010 to 2011 
Year Name Organization Action Industry 
2010 
Chelsea (formerly 
Bradley) Manning 
United States Army 
Released the largest set of classified 
documents about the war in 
Afghanistan through Wikileaks. 
Military 
2010 Cheryl D. Eckard GlaxoSmithKline 
Exposed contamination problems at 
GSK's pharmaceutical manufacturing 
operations. 
Pharmaceutical 
2010 Wilma Subra BP Deepwater Horizon 
Found evidence of serious health 
risks for clean-up workers and Gulf 
Coast residents from crude oil, 
aerosol forms of oil, and dispersant 
used on the spill. 
Public Health 
2010 Walt Tamosaitis Hanford Nuclear Site 
Terminated for bringing concerns 
about safety and operational issues at 
the radioactive waste facility 
Energy 
2010 Samy Kamkar 
Apple, Google, 
Microsoft 
Exposed the illicit global mobile 
phone tracking of all users, 
regardless of GPS or Location 
Services settings 
Communication 
2010 Jim Wetta AstraZeneca 
 AstraZeneca violating the Federal 
Anti-Kickback Statute and 
promoting the unapproved use of the 
(anti-psychotic) drug Seroquel. 
Pharmaceutical 
2011 Eileen Foster Countrywide Financial 
Exposed systemic fraud at 
Countrywide Financial and the 
corrupt activities of company 
officials 
Banking 
2011 Blake Percival USIS 
Defrauded the U.S. Government by 
submitting unfinished background 
investigations to the government for 
payment 
Government 
2011 Christian Sanchez US Border Patrol 
Harassed after refusing overtime pay 
when there was no extra work  
Government 
2011 Everett Stern HSBC 
Exposed illegal money laundering 
transactions by HSBC 
Corporate 
2011 Peter Van Buren State Department 
Exposed fraud in reconstruction 
efforts in Iraq from 2009-10 
Government 
2011 
Michael G. 
Winston 
Countrywide Financial 
Refused to writing a report about 
Countrywide's succession planning 
and other governance issues to 
alleviate concerns by Moody‘s 
Credit Services 
Banking 
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Table 27. List of Whistleblowers in the USA 
Year Name Organization Action Industry 
2012 
Larry Alt, Pete 
Forcelli 
Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms & 
Explosives  
Exposed issues surrounding the Operation 
Fast and Furious scandal 
Government 
2012 Eric Ben-Artzi  Deustche Bank 
Discovered evidence of multi-billion 
dollar securities violations at Deutsche 
Bank 
Banking 
2012 Phyllis McKelvey  
US Department of 
Agriculture 
Witnessed the damage the agency‘s new 
poultry inspection model created 
Public Health 
2012 John Parsons The Global Fund 
Reported Global Fund grants may have 
been lost to corruption through forged 
documents and other irregularities 
Government 
2012 Ted Siska 
Ward Diesel Filter 
Systems, Inc. of New York 
Exposed Ward Diesel had been routinely 
overcharging government agencies that 
purchased diesel filter systems through its 
contract 
Government 
2012 Joshua Wilson 
Captain, United States Air 
Force 
Exposed the malfunctioning oxygen 
system on board the F-22 Raptor systems 
Military 
2012 Carmen Segarra 
US New York Federal 
Reserve's appointed 
regulator to Goldman 
Sachs 
Refused to tone down a scathing report on 
conflicts of interest within Goldman 
Sachs which it did not have any policy 
on. 
Banking 
2013 Sherry Medina Tyson Foods 
Exposed the serious health issues that she 
experienced while working at a Tyson  
Public Health 
2013 Jim Schrier Tyson Foods 
Reported humane handling violations 
involving market hogs at a Tyson Foods 
slaughter facility 
Public Health 
2013 David P. Weber 
United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission 
Alleged the commission‘s negligent 
handling of computer information, 
jeopardizing  the integrity of the U.S. 
trading system 
Government 
2013 Edward Snowden National Security Agency 
Exposed secretive data-mining program, 
or the PRISM surveillance program  
Government 
2014 John Tye U.S. State Department 
 Exposed electronic surveillance practices 
of the U.S. government under Executive 
Order 12333 
Government 
2014 J. Kirk McGill 
United States Department 
of Defense -Defense 
Contract Audit Agency 
 Discovered National Ecological 
Observatory Network (NEON) and the 
Office of the Inspector General of 
the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
conspired to evade the prohibition against 
payment of certain costs to Government 
grantees including lobbying, Christmas 
parties, luxury foreign travel, and alcohol.  
Government 
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X. Whistleblowers in Japan 
Some whistleblowers have come forward to expose unethical behaviors in Japan over the 
past few decades.  In 1974, Hiroaki Kushioka exposed Tonami Transportation Co., a trucking 
company, of illegally inflating bills in a cartel.  He reported to the media of his discovery when 
no action was taken by his boss or the labor union after reporting to them first.  As a result of his 
action, Kushioka was stuck at an entry-level position, being bypassed for promotions and given 
only menial tasks such as weeding and cleaning (Kageyama, 2005).  He also was completely 
ignored by his employer and colleagues while continuously turning down requests from the 
company to resign (Matsubara, 2004).  In 2002, Kushioka filed suit against the trucking 
company when his children finished school.  In 2005, the court ordered his employer to pay him 
13.5 million yen ($126,000) in compensation (Kageyama, 2005). 
In 1996, sumo stable master Ohnaruto and his support Seiichiro Hashimoto, exposed 
match rigging, drug use, sexcapades, dining with gangsters, and evading taxes within the Sumo 
community (WuDunn, 1996).  Coincidentally, they mysteriously died hours from each other 
after they came forward with the allegations.  Autopsy reported no foul play in the cause of their 
death.  
In 2005, Toshiro Semba blew the whistle on fellow police officers who were forging 
receipts to wine and dine on public money. He reported to the media the misuse of investigation 
funds by the Ehime Prefectural Police from 1973 to 1995 (―Court Backs Payment‖, 2008). Seven 
days later, Semba was transferred from the railway security division to a newly established office 
at the communications command center (―Court Backs Payment‖, 2008).  During his time with 
the force, Semba refused to falsify expenses that were connected to a slush fund.  As a result, 
Semba was passed over for promotions and remained a sergeant for 34 years (Kageyama, 
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2007).  Also for 500 days, he was ordered to sit alone in a tiny room at the Ehime 
Prefectural Police, and the department took his gun away saying that he was emotionally 
unstable to carry a weapon (Kageyama, 2007).  The Ehime Prefectural Personnel Committee 
revoked the transfer in June 2006 after Semba lodged a complaint.  In 2007, Semba sued and 
won one million yen ($8,800) in damages from the Ehime government (Ryall, 2010).   
In 2008, Masaharu Hamada sued Olympus Corporation for unfair treatment after raising 
the issue of supplier complaints to management. Three years later, Michael Woodford, was 
dismissed for questioning the accounting practices at Olympus (Tabuchi, 2011).   
In 2011, three sumo wrestlers, Chiyohakuhō, Kasuganishiki, and Enatsukasa came 
forward in admitting to throwing or fixing matches (Hongo & Fukue, 2011).  Initially, 
Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and National Police 
Agency announced that an investigation into allegations of baseball gambling by sumo wrestlers.  
During their investigation,  officials had found evidence of match fixing by sumo wrestlers via 
cell phone texts (Buerk, 2011).  As a result, 23 wrestlers were expelled and the Japan Sumo 
Association cancelled a tournament in Osaka (Buerk, 2011). 
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Table 28. List of Whistleblowers in Japan 
Year Name Organization Action Industry 
1974 
Hiroaki 
Kushioka 
Tonami 
Trucking 
Company 
Exposed illegal inflation of bills in a cartel Corporate 
1996 
Ohnaruto, 
Seiichiro 
Hashimoto 
Japan Sumo 
Association 
Exposed match rigging, drug use, sexcapades, ties with 
gangsters and tax evasion in the Sumo community 
Sports 
2005 
Toshiro 
Semba 
Ehime 
Prefectural 
Police  
Exposed the misuse of investigation funds by the police 
Law 
Enforcement 
2008 
Masaharu 
Hamada 
Olympus 
Corporation 
Sued unfair treatment after raising the issue of supplier 
complaints to management 
Corporate 
2011 
Michael 
Woodford 
Olympus 
Corporation 
Revealed past losses concealed and written off via 
excessive fee payments. 
Corporate 
2011 
Chiyohakuhō, 
Kasuganishiki 
and 
Enatsukasa  
Japan Sumo 
Association 
Revealed baseball gambling and match fixing by 
wrestlers. 
Sports 
 
XI. Discussion 
Whistleblowers who have come forward to expose unethical behaviors in the United 
States outnumber the whistleblowers in Japan.  As of 2016, there are 133 whistleblowers in the 
United States and six whistleblowers in Japan.  Legislation is one method of providing 
guidelines in defining socially accepted behavior in a society.  Because whistleblowing is a 
social behavior, incentives and sanctions need to be set through legislation to promote 
whistleblowing.  In the United States, the numerous laws could have resulted in the high amount 
of reported cases of whistleblowing.  Laws have been created for preventing pollution or 
corporate fraud.   
In Japan, whistleblowing seems to be repressed by social norms.  Only one law was 
passed recently to protect whistleblowers.  Over the past few decades, a handful of 
whistleblowers have come forward to expose wrongdoing.  This could be due to the strict social 
norms and social sanctions that would deter a potential whistleblower.  Ostracizing and other 
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forms of social harassment maybe an effective form of punishment for those in collectivist 
cultures or collectivist organizational systems.    
XII. Whistleblowing in the Media: United States 
Movies with whistleblowing themes received not only critical acclaims from the viewing 
public, but also were massive success at the box office.  Table 29 through 31 presents a summary 
of movies produced in the U.S. that covered whistleblowing. 
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Table 29.  Whistleblowing Movies in the USA from 1973 to 2000 
 
Title Box Office Year Plot Awards 
Serpico $29,800,000  1973 
Based on Peter Maas' biography of 
NYPD officer Frank Serpico, who 
went undercover to expose corruption 
in the force. After witnessing cops use 
drugs, commit violence, take payoffs 
and other forms of police corruption, 
Serpico decides to expose what he has 
seen, but he is harassed and 
threatened by his peers.  
Academy Awards: Nomination 
for Best Actor in a Leading 
Role and Best Writing, 
Screenplay Based on Material 
from Another Medium 
All the 
President's 
Men 
$70,600,000  1976 
Based on the 1974 non-fiction book 
by Carl Bernstein and Bob 
Woodward, the two journalists 
investigating the Watergate scandal 
for The Washington Post. 
Academy Awards: Nomination 
for Best Art Direction, Best 
Director, Best Editing,  Best 
Picture, Best Adapted 
Screenplay, Best Sound, Best 
Supporting Actor  , Best 
Supporting Actress 
Silkwood $35,615,609  1983 
Story about the life of Karen 
Silkwood, a labor union activist who 
died in a suspicious car accident 
while investigating alleged 
wrongdoing at the Kerr-McGee 
plutonium plant where she worked. 
Academy Awards: Nomination 
for Best Actress, Best 
Supporting Actress, Best 
Director, Best Original 
Screenplay, Best Film Editing: 
The Insider $60,289,912  1999 
 Based on the true story of a 60 
Minutes segment about tobacco 
industry whistleblower Jeffrey 
Wigand. The 60 Minutes story 
originally aired in November 1995 in 
an altered form because of objections 
by CBS' then-owner, Laurence Tisch, 
who also controlled the Lorillard 
Tobacco Company. The story was 
later aired on February 4, 1996 
Academy Awards: Nomination 
for Best Picture, Best Actor in 
a Leading Role, Best 
Cinematography, Best 
Director, Best Editing, Best 
Sound and Best Writing, 
Screenplay Based on Material 
Previously Produced or 
Published. 
Erin 
Brockovich 
$256,271,286  2000 
Story of Erin Brockovich, who fought 
against the energy corporation Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company who were 
contaminating the groundwater in 
Hinkley with carcinogenic hexavalent 
chromium 
Academy Awards: Nomination 
for Best Actress; Best Picture 
& Director 
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Table 30.  Whistleblowing Movies in the USA from 2005 to 2009 
 
Title Box Office Year Plot Awards 
Syriana $93,974,620  2005 
The film focuses on petroleum politics and 
the global influence of the oil industry, 
whose political, economic, legal, and social 
effects are experienced by a Central 
Intelligence Agency operative, an energy 
analyst, a Washington, D.C., attorney, and a 
young unemployed Pakistani migrant worker 
in an Arab state in the Persian Gulf. 
Academy Awards: 
Nomination Best Actor 
in a Supporting Role 
Good Night and 
Good Luck 
  $56.5 
million 
2005 
Portrays the conflict between veteran radio 
and television journalist Edward R. Murrow 
and U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy of 
Wisconsin, especially relating to the anti-
Communist Senator's actions with the Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 
Academy Awards: 
Nomination for Best 
Actor in a Leading Role, 
Best Art Direction, Best 
Cinematography, Best 
Director, Best Film, Best 
Screenplay – Original 
The Constant 
Gardener 
$82,466,670  2005 
A British diplomat in Kenya tries to solve the 
murder of his wife Tessa, an Amnesty 
activist, while running up against a drug 
corporation that is using Kenya's population 
for fraudulent testing of a tuberculosis drug 
("dypraxa") with known harmful side effects 
and disregards the well-being of its poor 
African test subjects. 
Academy Awards: 
Nomination for Best 
Adapted Screenplay, 
Best Original Score, 
Best Film Editing, and 
Best Supporting Actress. 
Nomination for Golden 
Globe Awards: Best 
Motion Picture (Drama), 
and Best Director.  
Enron: The 
Smartest Guys in 
the Room 
$4,854,164  2005 
 A documentary film based on the 2003 book 
which examines the 2001 collapse of the 
Enron Corporation, which resulted in 
criminal trials for several of the company's 
top executives; it also shows the involvement 
of the Enron traders in the California 
electricity crisis. 
Academy Awards: 
Nomination for Best 
Documentary Feature 
The Informant! $41,771,168  2009 
2009 American biographical-comedy-crime 
film depicts Mark Whitacre's involvement as 
a whistle blower in the lysine (an additive 
used in the commercial livestock industry) 
price-fixing conspiracy of the mid-1990s as 
described in the 2000 nonfiction book The 
Informant, by journalist Kurt Eichenwald. 
Satellite Award for Best 
Actor in a Motion 
Picture – Musical or 
Comedy, nomination 
from the Detroit Film 
Critics Society, Damon 
nomination for the 
Golden Globe Award for 
Best Performance by an 
Actor in a Motion 
Picture – Musical or 
Comedy 
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Source: Internet Movie Database 
Audiences in the United States seem to appreciate movies about underdogs going against 
all odds in their pursuit of justice.  Whistleblowers in Hollywood movies have been romanticized 
as do-gooders who seek to right ethical wrongs in making the world a better place.  Hollywood is 
able to capitalize this phenomenon within a two-hour film, such as Erin Brockovich, where the 
actual case took three years.  They extract the complicated legal procedures and dramatize the 
emotional stress whistleblowers face as they fight to expose the truth.  Though these films maybe 
loosely based on actual events, and may feel like a cliché at times, these David Versus Goliath 
themed movies do inspire people.  Depicting stories of the weak beating the powerful with some 
courage, ingenuity and faith gives viewers a sense of hope and strength in their reality.  As a 
result, whistleblowing movies produced in the United States have not only been financially 
Table 31.  Whistleblowing Movies in the USA from 2010 to 2016 
Title Box Office Year Plot Awards 
The 
Whistleblower 
$1,124,966  2010 
 Inspired by the story of 
Kathryn Bolkovac, a 
Nebraska police officer who 
was recruited as a 
peacekeeper for DynCorp 
International in post-war 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1999. While there, she 
discovered a sex trafficking 
ring serving (and facilitated 
by) DynCorp employees. 
Bolkovac was fired and 
forced out of the country 
after attempting to report 
(and shut down) the ring. 
She took the story to BBC 
News in England, and won a 
wrongful-dismissal lawsuit 
against DynCorp. 
Nomination: Whistler Film 
Festival  Audience Award, Best 
Narrative Feature, Phillip 
Borsos Award, Best Film; Palm 
Springs International Film 
Festival  Audience Award, Best 
Narrative Feature; Cinema for 
Peace Awards; Golden Space 
Needle Award – Best Director, 
Best Film, Best Picture, Best 
Performance by an Actress in a 
Leading Role 
The Fifth Estate $8,555,008  2013 
A 2013 American-British-
Belgian thriller film about 
the news-leaking website 
WikiLeaks. 
Nomination for Britannia 
Awards - British Artist of the 
Year 
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successful but also received numerous accolades from various honorary organizations such as the 
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences.  
Since the 1970s, movies about whistleblowing have enjoyed global success at the box 
office.  Movies such as Serpico, All the President‘s Men, Silkwood, The Insider, Erin 
Brockovich, Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room, The Constant Gardner, Good Night and 
Good Luck, and Syriana have all received Academy Award Nominations.  The Insider received 
the most nominations in this category with seven nominations from the Academy.  In terms of 
box office sales, Erin Brockovich grossed the highest, about $257 million worldwide.  Movies 
such as Syriana and the Constant Gardner also enjoyed box office success generating $93 million 
and $82 million respectively.   
Next, a search was conducted on IMDB (Internet Movie Database) to find the highest 
rated English language feature film that had at least 10, 000 votes.   A total of 4, 950 titles were 
listed on the website.  All of the movies that were listed in the Table 7 above (Erin Brockovich, 
All the President‘s Men, Good Luck and Good Night, The Whistleblower, The Informant, The 
Fifth Estate, The Insider, The Constant Gardner, Syriana, Serpico, and Silkwood) were listed 
except for Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room which was classified as a documentary.   
XIII. Whistleblowing in the Media: Japan 
A search of movies in Japan on whistleblowing in Japan was done through Google by 
using the following terms: ―内部告発 (Whistleblow)‖, ―内部告発 映画 (Whistleblow Movie)‖ 
and ―日本 内部告発 映画 (Japan Whistleblow Movie).‖  Not a single Japanese movies based on 
these themes were found. 
Next, a search was conducted on IMDB (Internet Movie Database) to find the highest 
rated Japanese language feature film that had at least 10,000 votes.  85 films resulted in meeting 
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the criterion.  Notably, out of the 85 listed films, 18 films were from Studio Ghibli, 11 films were 
directed by Akira Kurosawa, and four from Takeshi Kitano.  Also, 41 films were animation and 
16 films had historical settings.  None of the films listed revolved around a whistleblower or 
where the main character was the underdog disclosing public interest information. 
Because Google is US-based search engine, there may be limitations in searching for 
international films that may not be popular in the US.  Therefore, Japanese search engine such as 
Yahoo Japan was employed in this study to search for movies in Japan on whistleblowing.  The 
following terms were used to search for whistleblowing movies in Japan: ―内部告発 
(Whistleblow)‖, ―内部告発 映画 (Whistleblow Movie)‖ and  ―内部告発 洋画 (Whistleblow 
Japan Movie).  Again, not a single Japanese movie was found.  Next, other forms of media such 
as TV dramas and documentaries were looked into.  Three TV programs did result when using 
the following terms:   ―内部告発 番組 (Whistleblow Progams)‖, ―内部告発 ドラマ
(Whistleblow Drama)‖, ―内部告発 特別番組 (Whistleblow Special Progams), and ―内部告発  
ドキュメンタリー‖ (Whistleblow Documentary)‖.  The program was produced by NHK is 
called ―BS世界のドキュメンタリー‖ (BS World Documentary) and the title of the 
documentary was ―NSA 国家安全保障局の内幕 第 2回 内部告発‖ (The Lowdown of the 
NSA Part 2, Whistleblow) which was aired on July 16, 2014.  The documentary revolved around 
the recent events of Edward Snowden exposing surveillance programs in the US. 
 In 2008, NHK aired a seven part series titled ―たったひとりの反乱‖ (A Revolt By A Sole 
Individual), which dramatized actual events of whistleblowers in Japan who exposed unethical 
activities while dealing with retaliation.  The series covered: (i) an eight year battle to uncover a 
daughter‘s death due to medical malpractice; (ii) Yuri Konno, president of her own telephone 
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service company who fought sexual discrimination in a male dominated society,  (iii) a strike led 
by professional baseball players and the union in Japan in hopes of reforming the league and its 
management; (iv) a lawyer‘s battle to fight for victim‘s right in the Japanese court system after 
becoming the victim from his wife‘s murder; (v) a journalist‘s 10 year battle to clean up a 
polluted mudflat by himself; (vi) a whistleblower who exposed of false labeling and selling 
expired meat products at a meat processor; (vii) and a whistleblower who exposed Snow Brand 
Food Company repackaging Australian beef into boxes marked as Japanese to receive 
government subsidies aimed at mitigating the impact of mad cow disease in the Japan. 
In 2012, a drama titled ―運命の人,‖ depicted the events of Takichi Nishiyama, a 
journalist who exposed the Japanese government secretly paying the US government to end its 
occupation in Okinawa in 1972.  He and his source were arrested for violating a civil servant law.  
Disgraced, Nishiyama went into a 30 year self-imposed exile. 
XIV. Discussion 
Whistleblowers in the media are portrayed as heroes or martyrs who sacrifice themselves 
for the common good.  They are viewed as the underdog, going against all odds to seek personal 
justice for all the wrongdoing a corporation might have inflicted on the public.  It is witnessing 
or experiencing an unethical behavior that fuels their anger and they seek to fix it.  
Whistleblowers are typically depicted as a symbol: little guy against the cartel, a good man 
caught in a vise.    Whistleblowers in the United States are portraits of courage, categorized in 
the media as the lone hero who are fighting for those who were unknown victims of unethical 
conducts of corporations.  Clearly, there is a gap in how whistleblowers are portrayed in both 
countries, with little image available in Japan.   
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XV. Whistleblowing in Corporation 
A comparative case study is presented to highlight the differences that exist in how 
corporations in the United States and Japan deal with whistleblowers.  Both General Motors 
(GM) and Toyota tried to suppress negative exposure of their recall issues of faulty parts in their 
vehicles.  Both corporations represent whistleblowing within an organization that was not 
welcomed and was buried and ignored.  However, the legal framework, allowed employees and 
managers to expose unethical activities in the US but not in Japan.   
a. United States: Case Study of GM’s Faulty Ignition 
In February 2014, GM recalled nearly 778, 562 compact cars (Chevrolet Cobalt 2005-
2007 and Pontiac G5 2007).  By April 2014, GM recalled nearly 2.59 million small cars (2003-
2007 Saturn Ions, 2007 Saturn Sky, 2006-07 Chevrolet HHR, and Pontiac Solstice).  GM 
admitted the ignition switch on more than 2 million vehicles may suddenly move to the off or 
accessory position, shutting down the engine, disabling power steering, power brakes, the seat 
belts and the airbags.  Based on their preproduction reports, GM first noticed the problem in 
2001, citing that issues were identified with the ignition switch.  The issue was with a tiny part in 
the recalled vehicle known as a detent plunger, that was discovered to be too short and could slip, 
making it possible for the ignition to shift while driving. Courtland Kelley was the head of the 
General Motors inspection and quality assurance program at the time.  He discovered the faulty 
ignition problem in 2001 and repeatedly reported it to his supervisors. Little was done by his 
supervisors to solve the problem.  In 2003, Kelley sued GM alleging that the company had been 
slow to address the dangers in its cars and trucks. In March 2005, GM reported that a fix would 
take too long and cost GM $0.57 per vehicle.  The cause of GM‘s inaction resulted in 13 deaths 
and 32 crashes (reported by GM) connected to its faulty ignition switches and airbags that failed 
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to deploy.  Instead of fixing the problem, GM sent out service bulletins to its dealerships, 
warning drivers not to use heavy key chains.  GM knew for over a decade of a deadly design 
flaw, waited years without fixing it, botched the fix, and threatened to recoup legal cost from 
anyone who tried to sue them (Stout, Ruiz, & Ivory, 2014).   
Before this issue became public, Mary Barra took over GM as CEO on January 15, 2014.  
Soon thereafter, she was invited to the House Hearing Room.  At the hearing, she stated that she 
became aware of the ignition issue a few weeks after her promotion on January 30, 2014.  It was 
as if Barra was hired to take the blame from GM‘s past negligence.  GM hired a lawyer Feinberg 
not for the purpose of settlement with casualty caused by the ignition switch, but to wait and see 
how they felt about settling these cases with the victims.  GM, in this case, is not automatically 
liable for damages because under the terms of emergence from the Federal Bankruptcy 
Protection in 2009, GM is not liable for claims from accidents that happened before July of 2009.  
By declaring bankruptcy, GM was no longer legally liable for human deaths that they caused 
through their admitted negligence. 
b. Japan: Case Study of Toyota’s Unintended Acceleration 
On March 2014, the Justice Department announced that Toyota was to pay a $1.2 billion 
penalty to settle a four year criminal probe for concealing unintended acceleration problems that 
led to a recall of 8.1 million vehicles beginning in 2009.  Prior to this incident, automakers faced 
insignificant fines and no criminal penalties under the Vehicle Safety Act.  In the agreement with 
the Department of Justice, Toyota admitted that it misled U.S. consumers by providing false or 
incomplete statements to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in the events 
leading to recalls for floor mats that could trap gas pedals and gas pedals that could stick.    
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Toyota was already aware of the unintended acceleration issue in its vehicles for some 
time, yet no reports of this issue were made to proper authorities. In 2005, NHSTA began 
investigating several Lexus models for sudden acceleration defects (Finch, 2009).  In 2007, State 
Farm provided data to the NHSTA of sudden acceleration defects in certain Toyota vehicles 
(Finch, 2009).  Internal documents suggested Toyota saved $100 million by issuing only a small 
voluntary recall of floor mats in response to the NHTSA's inquiry (Thomas & Foster, 2010). It 
was not until August 28, 2009 when a car crashed in San Diego from accelerating out of control 
that Toyota recalled the vehicle. The crash involved an off-duty California Highway Patrol 
officer and three passengers in a Lexus ES dealer loaner car, which had an incorrect floor mat 
from another vehicle that trapped the accelerator. A 911 recording captured the driver struggling 
to slow down the car before the vehicle launched into an embankment at a speed of 113 mph.  
Toyota did issue a statement and an acknowledgement of the accident two days after the crash.   
However, Toyota did not issue a warning about the floor mats despite reports from 
regulator‘s preliminary investigation that the cause of the San Diego crash was likely from floor 
mats.  It was not until five days after the NHTSA confirmed their analysis that Toyota instructed 
dealers to inspect returned floor mats instead of issuing a recall.  About after a month of the San 
Diego crash, Toyota issued warnings to customers and announced a recall of 3.8 million vehicles, 
only after the NHTSA issued an alert about the floor mats. 
In addition to issues with floor mats and sticky pedals, safety experts alleged that 
problems with the vehicles' engine electronics were also at fault. However, there were no 
evidence that linked the accidents with electronic issues. In the months after that wreck, Toyota 
recalled millions of vehicles, and its top executives came from Japan to testify before several 
congressional committees investigating the problem. Toyota denied that its vehicles had an 
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electronic flaw that might cause them to accelerate unexpectedly. Toyota blamed such incidents 
on three possible causes: drivers mistaking the gas pedal for the brake; gas pedals getting stuck 
under floor mats; or sticky gas pedals that do not throttle back quickly as foot pressure eases.  A 
10-month investigation, conducted primarily by NASA engineers, found no evidence that 
electronic defects or software code errors could have caused the thousands of sudden-
acceleration incidents reported over the last decade. That review blamed the incidents on the 
same mechanical issues identified by Toyota.  However, an Oklahoma City jury found that faulty 
electronic systems caused a Camry sedan to suddenly accelerate and crash, killing one woman 
and injuring another. 
It was not until 2012 that Betsy Benjaminson, a translator, who provided internal 
documents to news reporters, revealed Toyota‘s cover-up of design flaws.  In 2010, the 
translation firm where Benjaminson worked was hired by Toyota‘s defense law firm. 
Benjaminson had access to thousands of Toyota‘s classified documents spanning from 2002-
2010, dealing with accident reports, records of repairs, and internal memos (Berman, 2014). 
Benjaminson noticed discrepancies in engineers reporting that acceleration was due to 
electronics and executives and lawyers writing memos about how to hide the issue from the 
public.  She posted on a blog what she learned from the internal documents related to 
acceleration defects. 
In 2013, Toyota agreed to pay $1.6 billion to settle a class-action case brought by 
thousands of Toyota owners who contended that sudden-acceleration problems damaged the 
value of their vehicles. Toyota also faced wrongful death and injury lawsuits that have been 
consolidated in California state and federal courts. In December, Toyota filed court documents 
saying it is in settlement talks on nearly 400 U.S. lawsuits, a total that includes most but not all 
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of the cases. Toyota already paid two federal fines of $16.375 million in 2010 for delays in 
reporting the floor mat and pedal defects, and another $17.35 million in 2012 related to an 
additional mat recall. 
c. Discussion 
Both Toyota and GM represent whistleblowing within an organization that was not 
welcomed and was buried and ignored (Miceli et al., 1991). In this situation, internal 
whistleblowing did occur at Toyota as evidence suggested from the criminal investigation that 
internal memos were inadmissible evidence against management for dismissing the unintended 
acceleration issue in its vehicles.  Rather than pursuing it through their own internal quality 
check or issuing a recall of its vehicles, Toyota ignored it and continued to deny it when 
wrongful deaths and injuries resulted from this issue.  The failure to report the pedal and floor 
mat issue to the public or even issuing a recall cost Toyota more than $2 billion in legal fees and 
penalties as well as innocent lives that were involved in avoidable accidents if recalls were 
issued.  GM also had preproduction reports of faulty ignition switch, however opted to take no 
action nor offered to replace the parts after it was made public.  Regardless of the number of 
casualty from this switch, GM is not taking any swift action as they are not liable for any claims 
due to federal protection.   
XVI. General Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the whistleblowing phenomenon in the 
lifeworld for the United States and Japan in their respective historical contexts.  Differences can 
be observed in the history of whistleblowing legislation, the number of published articles 
produced on the topic, the number of whistleblowers who came forward to report wrongdoing, 
and the media coverage in the two countries.  Therefore, understanding the lifeworlds of both 
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nations provides a better understanding in the different cultural conception of whistleblowing.  
By looking at the historical antecedents of whistleblowing in these two nations, it is apparent that 
culture is a factor in influencing how people in different domains of life have blown the whistle 
over the years.  People in Japan are less inclined to blow the whistle as the concept is still new to 
them.  People still abide by the social norm.  However, in the United States, people will more 
likely to blow the whistle and expose the wrongdoings.  
Criminal rates in the two countries were compared.  In the United States, the Department 
of Justice reported that the number of white collar crimes (which include consumer fraud, 
healthcare fraud, insurance fraud, tax fraud, embezzlement, etc.) that were handled as criminal 
cases in the United States District Courts numbered 7, 420 cases.  As for violent crimes, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation‘s Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics reported that during 2014, 
there were 14, 249 reported cases of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter and 325, 802 
reported cases of robbery in the nation.  As for Japan, the National Policy Agency reported 39, 
439 cases of fraud in 2014.  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported 395 cases 
of homicide and 3, 056 cases of robbery in 2014.  Looking at the numbers, Japan has much lower 
violent crime rate than the United States.  The low crime rate in Japan is the result of strict gun 
laws and social norms, whereas in the United States, each state has different gun policies and 
criminal law that could influence the increase in homicide rate.  
However, the number of reported cases of fraud in Japan was more than five times as 
much as that reported in the United States.  The low white collar crime rate in the United States 
may be the result of offering whistleblowers legal protection from retaliation.  The high number 
of reported cases of fraud in Japan may be the result of the high risk involved of exposing the 
illegal activity as no extensive legal protection are offered to Japanese whistleblowers.      
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 There is a need to analyze whistleblowing in a global context.  The act of blowing the 
whistle is no longer limited to domestic issues as organizations globalize.  Governance and 
transparency is also a growing concern worldwide.  Myron Mehlman is an example of 
international whistleblower fired from Mobil USA for warning managers in Mobil Japan about 
the high amount benzene in their gas (Hoke, 1994).   
Findings from this study show a contradiction between the Tightness and Looseness 
construct in the lifeworld.   The construct suggest that there would be fewer rules and norms in 
loose cultures (the United States) and many rules and norms in tight cultures (Japan).  It was 
expected that tight cultures would have strict laws and clear rules to minimize uncertainty and 
ambiguity as much as possible.  Loose cultures was expected to have fewer laws as people are 
more accepting of different opinions and have high tolerance to unpredictable situations.  
Findings from this study show that there are more whistleblowing legislation in the United States 
than Japan.  Japan is found to have more social norms than the United States.   
Adherence to norms is shown to be much more effective in Japan especially in the case of 
the ritsuryo.   The law itself had nothing about legal rights and only encouraged moral standards.  
This law was not replaced until 1, 245 years after it was implemented.  For Japan, social norms 
are much more effective than legislation in aligning attitudes with morally acceptable behaviors.  
In the United States, laws are constantly being introduced and revised since its independence in 
1776.  These rules and regulations are effective as they provide incentives and sanctions to guide 
individuals toward socially acceptable behaviors.  The laws are also a reflection of the social 
issues that were significant during that period in time.  Individualist cultures do not promote 
adherence to the group norm.  Thus, social norms may be ineffective in individualistic cultures 
as social sanctions may not be a strong enough incentive to promote prosocial behavior. 
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Dozier and Micelli (1985) stated that whistleblowing is a form of prosocial behavior.  It 
involves both selfish (egotistic) and unselfish (altruistic) motives of the whistleblower.  Blowing 
the whistle is a form of correcting a moral conflict that the individual is experiencing from 
witnessing or participating in an unethical situation.  The act of blowing the whistle is perceived 
as helping those who are victims from this unethical situation.  Thus, people in Japan are less 
likely to blow the whistle if whistleblowing is viewed negatively as a norm.  Conversely, 
whistleblowing may occur as laws are created to promote and protect whistleblowers in the 
United States. 
  Internationalization and technology has globalized whistleblowing.  It has freed the act 
from regional boundaries through globalization of MNCs.  As in the case of Myron Mehlman 
and Michael Woodford, whistleblowers are no longer limited to one country.  Also, technology 
has made it easier to share information and spread awareness of unethical situations across the 
world.  Wikileaks is an example of whistleblowers using the internet as a channel of exposing 
unethical issues across the world.   
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ESSAY 2: MORAL INTENSITY & WHISTLEBLOWING BEHAVIOR 
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I. Introduction 
General attitude measures predict general behaviors, whereas specific attitude measures 
predict specific behaviors.  However, general attitude measures do not predict specific behaviors, 
and specific attitude measures do not predict general behaviors (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974).  In view of these findings about the link between attitude and behavior, 
there is a need to develop context specific scenarios to examine whistleblowing behavior.  
Scenarios have been used in business ethics research (Baumhart 1961, Brenner & 
Molander, 1977; Fritzsche & Becker, 1984; Robertson & Anderson, 1993), especially in 
examining participant‘s attitude towards sales practices (e.g., Dabholkar & Kellaris, 1992; 
Dawson, 1992; Reidenback, Robin & Dawson, 1991).  Past research has suggested that culture 
may impact ethical perceptions and behaviors (Buller, Kohls & Anderson 1991; Cohen, Pant & 
Sharp, 1992).  However, scenarios have not been developed to capture whistleblowing behavior.  
This study fills that gap.     
In this study, twenty one scenarios were developed in which a target person takes items 
from the office, appropriates office resources for personal gain, sexually harasses another 
individual, and pollutes the environment.  Each scenario consisted of situations varying in 
degrees of moral intensity.  Data was collected from United States and Japan to compare the 
responses of people in different cultures.  It is hoped that this will provide insight in how people 
act in different cultures when facing the same ethical situation. 
II. Literature Review 
Cavanagh and Fritzsche (1985) noted that scenarios capture the real world better than 
simple attitude type of statements and raise complex issues associated with decision making.  
Behavioral settings (Barker, 1968) are better captured by scenarios than using attitude items, 
78 
 
since they provide the participant the context in which they have to act or make a decision.  
Scenarios have also been used in cross-cultural research in the measurement of vertical and 
horizontal individualism and collectivism (Triandis, Chen & Chan, 1998; Triandis & Gelfand, 
1998).  
A context-specific scenario identifies situations in which people use ethical reasoning.  
Ethical reasoning was originally measured by using the Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest, 1979, 
1986; Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz & Anderson, 1974).  The DIT is a self-administered, 
multiple-choice questionnaire based on Kohlberg‘s (1969) cognitive moral development theory.   
Items used in the DIT were based on Kohlberg‘s interview data.   Participants taking the DIT are 
required to rate and rank 12 short issue statements. After reading the story, participants are asked 
to select what the protagonist should do.  After their selection, 12 items are presented and rated 
in terms of importance on a 5-point scale.  Once completed, participants are asked to consider the 
12 items as a set and then rank the four most important items.   Research in business ethics have 
developed instruments based on the DIT using context-specific scenarios in areas such as 
accounting (Thorne, 2000, 2001; Welton, Lagrone & Davis, 1994), auditing (Massey, 2002; 
Weber, 1991), management (Loviscky, Trevino & Jacobs, 2007), tax compliance (Fisher, 1992) 
and business ethics (Fraedich, 1994).  In this study, a similar approach was used in collecting 
data using scenarios. 
Dabholkar and Kellaris (1992) developed the ―Personal Selling Ethics‖ (PSE) scale by 
using 20 scenarios to test perceptions of acceptability of sales practice.  PSE captures the 
sensitivity of sales professional and students to ethical issues.  Findings suggest that gender, 
religiosity and money affect ethical sensitivity.  Specifically, women were found to be more 
sensitive to unethical situations than men.  Unethical sales practices involving money were 
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viewed as less ethical by the participants.  Also, religiosity was reported as influencing ethical 
judgment.   
Donoho and Heinze (2011) developed an updated version of the PSE scale (PSE-2) that 
also consisted of 20 scenarios. Unlike the original scale, PSE-2 focused on the personal selling 
process.  Later, Donoho, Herschel and Heinze (2013) designed a shorter version of the revised 
scale (PSE-2S) consisting of seven scenarios designed for busy professionals.   
Reidenback and Robin (1988, 1990) designed the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) 
to measure ethical judgments across a range of moral dimensions in the field of business ethics.  
MES was originally a 33-item scale based on a content analysis of five ethical philosophies: 
justice, deontology, relativism, utilitarianism, and egoism to measure moral reactions of people.  
MES was revised into a short eight-item scale with three-subscales (Reidenback & Robin, 1990).  
This includes items related to justice, relativism, deontology, a relativistic dimensions, and 
contractualism.  The first subscale, Moral Equity, is based on the idea that ethics is acquired in 
childhood.  This subscale includes two items from justice (―fair/unfair,‖ ―just/unjust‖), one item 
from relativism (―acceptable/unacceptable to my family‖) and one item from deontology 
(―morally/not morally right‖).  The second subscale, Relativism, is based on the idea that culture 
shapes values, which in turn influences ethical judgment.  This subscale includes two items from 
relativism (―culturally acceptable/unacceptable,‖ ―traditionally acceptable/unacceptable‖).  The 
third subscale, Contractualism, is based on the idea that a social contract exists between society 
and business.  This subscale includes two items from deontology (―violates/does not violate an 
unspoken promise,‖ ―violates/does not violate an unwritten contract‖).  
MES was originally developed to measure the complexity of the ethical reasoning 
process in the field of marketing.  Subsequent studies have used MES in areas such as 
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accounting (Cohen, Pant & Sharp, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 2001; Cruz, Shafer & Strawser, 
2000; Flory, Phillips, Reidenbach & Robin, 1992), project management (Loo, 2000, 2001 and 
2004) and tourism (Fennell & Malloy, 1999). 
Scenario methods have also been used to examine sexual harassment (Baker, Terpstra, & 
Cutler, 1990; Terpstra & Baker, 1986).  There is research on how different working standards 
affect perceptions of sexual harassment (Perry, Schmidtke & Kulikt 1998; Wiener & Hurt, 1997, 
2000); how work environment can affect perception of sexual harassment (Wiener, Watts, 
Goldkamp, & Gasper, 1995; Wiener, Hurt, Russell, Mannen, & Gasper, 1997; Wiener, Hackney, 
Kadela, Rauch, Seib, Warren & Hurt, 2002); how gender difference affects perceptions and 
judgments of sexual harassment (O‘Connor, Gutek, Stockdale, Geer & Melancon, 2004; Wiener 
et al., 2002; Wiener & L. Hurt, 2000); how working adults view ambiguous workplace behaviors 
(Gordon, Cohen, Grauer & Rogelberg, 2005); and how to determine responsibility in a sexual 
harassment situation (Klein, Apple & Kahn, 2011).  Scenarios were also used in assessing the 
effects of position power, personal power, and organizational efficacy on whistleblowing 
behavior in the context of sexual harassment (Perry, Kulik & Schmidtke, 1997).   
Scenarios have also been used to study the relationship between theft and turnover rates 
(Thoms, Wolper, Scott, & Jones, 2001) and the type of fraud and whistleblowing intentions 
(Robinson, Robertson, & Curtis, 2012).  Stevens (2001) asked participants to rate ethical 
situations such as theft, sexual harassment and racial preference in the hospitality industry.  
Findings from Stevens‘ (2001) study show act of theft was the most unethical followed by sexual 
harassment.  Racial preference was fourth. 
Scenarios have also been developed to study pollution in sustainability research (Bowen, 
Cousins, Lamming & Faruk, 2001; Carter Kale & Grimm, 2000; Handfield, Walton, Sroufe & 
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Melnyk, 2002; Min & Galle, 1997).  Many researchers have studied the influence of attitudes on 
sustainability behavior (Buchan, 2005; Flannery and May, 2000; Hung & Tangpong, 2011; Ritter, 
2006; Swaim, Maloni, Napshin & Henley, 2014).  Scenarios depicting pollution were found in 
research on cross-cultural comparison of ethical value in business (Whitcomb, Erdner & Li, 
1998), in examining ethical management behavior (Jackson & Artola, 1997), and in studying the 
effects of the six dimensions of moral intensity on recognizing moral issues (Chia & Mee, 2000).  
Jones (1991) proposed the study of moral intensity, which is a measure of severity of the 
moral imperative in a situation that requires ethical reasoning.  The higher the moral intensity, 
the higher the influence of the individual‘s personal ethics in the decision making process.  
Scenarios have also been used to examine the effect of moral intensity on moral judgment (Jones 
& Huber, 1992; Decker, 1994; Morris & McDonald, 1995; Singer, 1996, 1998; Singer, Mitchell 
& Turner, 1998; Singer & Singer, 1997; Singhapakdi , Vitell & Kraft, 1996; McMahon & 
Harvey, 2006, 2007), in a business context (Frey, 2000), in a cross-cultural context (Davis, 
Johnson & Ohmer,1998), on consequences of ethical judgment (Tsakilis, et al, 2001) and in the 
perception of crime severity (Ramchand, MacDonald, Haviland & Morral, 2009; Tornblom & 
Kazemi, 2010).   
III. Methodology 
Ethical issues for the scenarios were based on current events that were addressed in the 
news, movies and other forms of media.  Familiarity with current events invokes different levels 
of responses from individuals.  Familiarity is referred to as ‗story pull‘ effect (Elm & Weber, 
1994), which elicits different levels of responses based on the ethical dilemmas (Rest, 1986).  
The extent of story pull depends on the subject‘s ability to associate with the protagonist in the 
scenario due to the occurrence of a similar personal experience (Freeman & Giebink, 1979; 
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Magowen & Lee, 1970; Weber, 1990, 1991; Elm & Weber, 1994).  Researchers posit that 
familiarization with business dilemmas can elicit accurate representation of the ethical reasoning 
from managers (Dellaportas et al., 2006; Ponemon, 1993; Weber, 1991).   
a. Scenario Development 
Some of the scenarios developed for this study were inspired from the television show 
―What Would you Do?‖  The program captures people‘s reaction to different ethical scenarios on 
hidden camera.  The host of the show would follow up on the person‘s decision-making process 
after revealing the staged situation.  Some of the scenarios that drew inspiration from this 
program are: a boy reveals in a store to other boys that he is gay in a store and other boys react 
negatively to the revelation, a waitress is sexually harassed by her boss in front of customers, a 
waiter is flirting with a man‘s wife, and stealing of a waiter‘s tip. 
Twenty one scenarios were developed that depicted a person witnessing some behavior 
that might be considered improper.  Three scenarios had four situations each that increased in 
intensity of the target character‘s behavior.  A gender-free name was used for characters in the 
scenarios unless the person was specifically a man or a woman.  Specifically, the model depicted 
in the four situations in Scenario Four is woman while the client that is harassing her is a man. 
The participants were asked to put themselves in the shoes of a character who witnesses the 
target character‘s behavior.   
Three scenarios captured taking some office supplies, taking cash from the petty cash box 
or transferring stock to one‘s personal account.  Four scenarios captured sexual harassment and 
two scenarios captured environmental pollution.  The participants were asked to choose an action 
from the list of five.  The first choice stated ―I would ignore it‖ meaning that the participants 
would choose to take no action.  The second choice stated, ―I would keep an eye on X to see if 
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this action is repeated before taking further action,‖ where X stands for the target character.  The 
third action stated, ―I would confront X privately.‖  The fourth action stated, ―I would request 
my coworkers to keep an eye on X before taking any further action‖ for Scenario One.  For 
Scenarios Two through Eight, the fourth actions stated, ―I would inform my boss.‖   The final 
action in Scenario One stated, ―I would report this action to my boss.‖  The final action in 
Scenario Two stated, ―I would formally report this action to my boss‖.  The final action in 
Scenario Three stated, ―I would formally report this action to the SEC (Security Exchange 
Commission)‖. The final action in Scenario Four, Five and Eight stated, ―I would formally report 
this action to the EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission)‖. The final action in 
Scenario Six and Seven stated, ―I would formally report this action to the EPA (Environmental 
Protection Agency)‖.   
For each of the five listed actions, participants were asked to express their agreement on a 
seven point Likert scale:  strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), somewhat disagree (3), neutral (4), 
somewhat agree (5), agree (6) and strongly agree (7).  Prior to the start of each scenario, 
participants were informed that the names of the characters depicted in each scenario were 
gender-free -- ―The names of all the characters in all of the scenarios given in this survey are 
purposely chosen to be gender-free.  Select one of the responses from a list of actions given 
for the following scenario‖. 
In Scenario One, situations were presented such that the value of the office supplies that 
was being taken by the target character increased in value from one dollar to five dollars to ten 
dollars to twenty dollars.   In Situations One, Two and Four, the target character is stated to have 
taken office supply only once, whereas in Situation Three, the target character is stated to have 
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taken office supplies worth five dollars on two occasions (total value 10 dollars) showing the 
behavior as a pattern.  Scenario One and the four situations are presented below: 
Scenario 1. Kris has been working with the current employer for two years. Kris enjoys 
the job and the coworkers. Kris’s boss is dependable and approachable. Kris sees the 
job as a career and hopes to stay with this company for many years. 
Situation 1. One day, Kris saw Alex, an intern from another department, take a few 
sugar packs, coffee stir sticks and a coffee creamer from the pantry (total value of about 
$1.00). Alex did not use those items to make coffee but rather, stuffed the items into a 
bag. At the end of the day, Alex left with the bag without returning the items. 
Situation 2. One day, Kris saw Alex, an intern from another department, take supplies 
such as a box of paper clips, pens and a box of staples from the office cabinet (total 
value of about $5.00). Alex stuffed the items into a bag. At the end of the day, Alex left 
with the bag without returning the items.  
 
Situation 3. Kris saw Alex, an intern from another department, take supplies such as 
paper clips, pens and staples from the office cabinet on TWO OCCASIONS (combined 
value of about $10.00). Alex stuffed the items into a bag. At the end of the day, Alex left 
with the bag without returning the items. 
 
Situation 4. One day, Kris saw Alex, an intern from another department, take supplies 
such as a ream of paper, a stapler and a graphic calculator from the office cabinet (total 
value of about $20). Alex stuffed the items into a bag. At the end of the day, Alex left 
with the bag without returning the items.  
 
After reading the first scenario, response of the participants was sought using the 
following format after each of the four situations: 
Visualize yourself in Kris’s situation and tell us what you would do. Please choose a 
response from the ones given below: 
 
A. I would ignore it. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Somewhat Disagree    Neutral      Somewhat Agree Agree       Strongly Agree 
         1                     2                  3                     4  5      6 
 7  
B. I would keep an eye on Alex to see if this action is repeated before taking further 
action. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Somewhat Disagree    Neutral      Somewhat Agree Agree       Strongly Agree 
         1                     2                  3                     4  5      6 
 7  
C. I would confront Alex privately. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Somewhat Disagree    Neutral      Somewhat Agree Agree       Strongly Agree 
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         1                     2                  3                     4  5      6 
 7  
D. I would request my coworkers to keep an eye on Alex before taking any further 
action. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Somewhat Disagree    Neutral      Somewhat Agree Agree       Strongly Agree 
         1                     2                  3                     4  5      6 
 7  
E. I would report this action to my boss. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Somewhat Disagree    Neutral      Somewhat Agree Agree       Strongly Agree 
         1                     2                  3                     4  5      6 
 7  
 
Further, participants were asked to rank the five actions from one (highest) to five 
(lowest): 
Please rank A, B, C, D, and E in the order that you will most likely take. 
 
 A B C D E 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
 
Finally, after ranking the five actions, participants were asked to choose one of the five: 
If you had to pick one of the five above, which one will you choose? 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
 
 Following each situation, participants were reminded that each of the situation was 
independent -- ―The following situation is independent of the incident above‖. 
In Scenario Two, situations were presented such that cash taken by the target character 
from the petty cash box increased in value from 10 dollar to 50 dollars to 100 dollars to 500 
dollars.    
Scenario 2. A petty cash box, which has about $5,000, is accessible to Harper and Jamie. 
Money withdrawn from the petty cash box must only be used to purchase company 
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related goods or services. Receipts must be submitted for balancing the ledger and the 
petty cash box. Harper and Jamie must record each transaction in a ledger. Harper is 
the main person responsible for overseeing the petty cash box. 
  
Situation 1. On Monday, after checking the ledger, Harper noticed that $10 was missing 
from the petty cash box. Harper saw Jamie returning $10 into the petty cash box. The 
only plausible and logical conclusion for Harper to reach is that Jamie used this money 
for personal use over the weekend. 
 
Situation 2. On Monday, after checking the ledger, Harper noticed that $50 was missing 
from the petty cash box. Harper saw Jamie returning $50 into the petty cash box. The 
only plausible and logical conclusion for Harper to reach is that Jamie used this money 
for personal use over the weekend. 
 
Situation 3. On Monday, after checking the ledger, Harper noticed that $100 was 
missing from the petty cash box. Harper saw Jamie returning $100 into the petty cash 
box. The only plausible and logical conclusion for Harper to reach is that Jamie used 
this money for personal use over the weekend. 
 
Situation 4. On Monday, after checking the ledger, Harper noticed that $500 was 
missing from the petty cash box. Harper saw Jamie returning $500 into the petty cash 
box. The only plausible and logical conclusion for Harper to reach is that Jamie used 
this money for personal use over the weekend. 
 
In Scenario Three, situations were presented where value of stock appropriated to one‘s 
personal account by the target character increased in value from $5,000 to $10,000 to $25,000 to 
$50,000.    
Scenario 3. As a stock trader, Quinn’s responsibilities include managing client 
portfolios, research financial market performance and buying/selling bonds and stocks. 
Quinn’s coworker, Riley, has 5 clients, each worth about $5 million in portfolio value 
(total value of about $25 million). Riley also does personal trading (value of about 
$50,000). 
 
Situation 1. On Monday, Quinn overheard Riley planning on transferring $5,000 from 
the client’s portfolio into Riley’s own personal account. One of Riley’s personal 
investments had suffered a substantial loss from stock market crash on the previous 
Friday. Riley is planning on transferring the money to tide over until the end of the 
week when Riley can file for a loan to replenish the client’s portfolio without them 
noticing.  
 
Situation 2. On Monday, Quinn overheard Riley planning on transferring $10,000 from 
the client’s portfolio into Riley’s own personal account. One of Riley’s personal 
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investments had suffered a substantial loss from stock market crash on the previous 
Friday. Riley is planning on transferring the money to tide over until the end of the 
week when Riley can file for a loan to replenish the client’s portfolio without them 
noticing. 
 
Situation 3. On Monday, Quinn overheard Riley planning on transferring $25,000 from 
the client’s portfolio into Riley’s own personal account. One of Riley’s personal 
investments had suffered a substantial loss from stock market crash on the previous 
Friday. Riley is planning on transferring the money to tide over until the end of the 
week when Riley can file for a loan to replenish the client’s portfolio without them 
noticing. 
 
Situation 4. On Monday, Quinn overheard Riley planning on transferring $50,000 from 
the client’s portfolio into Riley’s own personal account. One of Riley’s personal 
investments had suffered a substantial loss from stock market crash on the previous 
Friday. Riley is planning on transferring the money to tide over until the end of the 
week when Riley can file for a loan to replenish the client’s portfolio without them 
noticing. 
 
In Scenario Four, intensity of the behavior by the client increased from overhearing the 
target character sexually harass the model verbally to witnessing the target character flirt with the 
model to the target character touching the model inappropriately to the target character touching 
the model inappropriately more than once.   In Situations One, Two and Three, the target 
character is stated to have sexually harassed the model only once, whereas in Situation Four, the 
target character is stated to have sexually harassed the model on a few occasions showing the 
behavior as a pattern.   
Scenario 4. Lee had been working for an advertising agency for three years. As a junior 
designer, Lee’s job consisted of designing websites and working with photographers in 
capturing certain shots for print ads. One day, Lee took a client to a studio to discuss 
plans of future ads with the photographer and stylist. Once the concept was solidified, 
the model was brought in to start the photo shoot. 
 
Situation 1. During the photo shoot, Lee overheard the client describe the model as “hot” 
and “sexy”. The model heard these comments and complained to Lee about it later.  
 
Situation 2. During the photo shoot, Lee saw the client flirt with the model. The model 
seemed uncomfortable with the advances made by the client and complained to Lee 
about it later. 
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Situation 3. During the photo shoot, Lee saw the client touch the model inappropriately. 
The model seemed uncomfortable with touching and complained to Lee about it later. 
 
Situation 4. During the photo shoot, Lee saw the client touch the model inappropriately 
a FEW TIMES. The model seemed uncomfortable with these actions and complained to 
Lee about it later. 
 
In Scenario Five, a situation is presented such that sexual harassment was not witnessed 
but was learned about through the gossip of coworkers. 
Scenario 5. Jessie has been working for an apparel company for six years. The company 
has over 100 stores worldwide. As a sales associate, Jessie oversees sales and operations 
in one of the stores.  Yesterday, Jessie was called in by the manager along with the other 
sales staff to discuss about strategies to increase sales during the holiday season. During 
the meeting, some of the sales staff talked about how the manager laid off female 
employees that the manager found not to be physically appealing. 
 
In Scenario Six, the target character is stated to knowingly dump environmentally 
harmful products in a river. 
Scenario 6. Sam has worked for a national consumer goods company for 5 years. Sam’s 
company produces cleaning agents and home/personal care products.  On the way to 
work one morning, Sam noticed that the manager of another department was dumping 
solvents and cleaning solutions in a drain that runs into a nearby river, which is the 
only drinking water source for the communities living in that area. The waste that the 
company produces is so toxic and harmful in nature, that death would result from 
continuous ingestion of the polluted water.  
 
In Scenario Seven, the target character is described to unknowingly harm the 
environment. 
Scenario 7. Randy has been a working as an assistant manager for a major retail store 
for 5 years. Randy's responsibilities include managing stock levels, making key 
decisions about stock control, analyzing sales figures and forecasting future sales 
volumes to maximize profits.  On the way to work one morning, Randy noticed that the 
Manager of the store had ordered stacking crates of fertilizer in the store's parking lot 
next to a drain that runs into a nearby river. Inventory was supposed to be stored in a 
secured covered area in the store according to company policy. However, to maximize 
the usage of storage space, the fertilizer bags were being stored in the parking lot in the 
open.  There are pesticides in the fertilizer, which can cause serious health problems as 
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the rainwater would carry some of the pesticide to the river. The river water is used for 
drinking purposes by the community.  
 
In Scenario Eight, the target character is stated to hear a subordinate reporting to him or 
her make a comment, which is offensive to homosexuals. 
Scenario 8. Aubrey has been working as a salesperson for a sporting goods retailer for 
three years. The company has six stores statewide. As a salesperson, Aubrey is in 
charge of greeting customers and making sales. 
 
Situation 1. One day, Aubrey overheard one of the sales staff say "I don't want to be 
around someone who is gay” and “I can’t work with someone who is gay”.  
 
Situation 2. One day, Aubrey overheard one of the MANAGERS of the store say "I 
don't want to be around someone who is gay” and “I can’t work with someone who is 
gay”. 
 
b. Translation 
The battery of instruments that included the scenarios reported in this essay and the other 
instruments reported in essay three were translated from English to Japanese using the back 
translation procedure (Brislin, 1980).  Initially, a court interpreter translated the items from 
English into Japanese and a graduate student translated the Japanese items into English without 
reference to the original English text.  Both translators were first generation Japanese-Americans.  
A total of five revisions were made on items that were found to have discrepancies between the 
original English items and the back translated English version.  Next, a professor from the 
Department of East Asian Languages & Literature who is from Japan, assisted in reviewing the 
accuracy of the Japanese items comparing them with the original English items.  After the 
revisions were made, a professor in the Department of Psychology in Japan, checked the 
accuracy of the Japanese version.  Finally, another psychology professor in Japan reviewed and 
provided edits for the Japanese version.   
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c. Sample 
Data for this study were collected in the United States and Japan.  The respondents were 
undergraduate business students.  Sample sizes varied from 114 in Japan to 251 in the United 
States. Data was collected from six class sections in Japan and 18 class sections in the United 
States.  One of the students did not report their college level.  As a result, the sample from Japan 
consisted of 14 seniors, 39 juniors, 54 sophomore and six freshmen students.  One freshmen and 
one sophomore did not select a gender.  As a result, 46 males and 66 females were recorded for 
this study.  One student was 40 years of age, 47 of the participants were under the age of 20 
while the remaining were between the ages of 20 and 23.  All of the participants from Japan were 
single and of Japanese origin.  The sample from the United States consisted of 175 seniors, 72 
juniors and three sophomore students.  137 males and 113 females participated in this study.  
Seven students were under the age of 20 and 215 were between the ages of 20 and 39.  One 
student did not answer any of the demographic items and seven students left the age item blank.  
Three faculty members from Japan and 11 from the United States were involved in data 
collection.   
Permission from faculty from each location was obtained prior to distributing the 
electronic questionnaire to the students.  Students in each location were given the battery of 
instruments though a link unique to each class and they filled out the questionnaire at a time 
convenient to them.  Students were given extra credit by the professors for completing the 
instruments.    
IV. Results 
Data was analyzed for each sample separately and then the samples were compared.  
Results for each of the following analyses are presented in this section: Ranking Response, 
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Preferred Choice, Combined Scores of Five Given Responses, Combined Scores of Four Given 
Response, Whistleblowing Response, Scenario Order Effect, Gender Effect, and Ethnicity Effect.  
For Ranking Response, frequency was used to identify differences in how the samples differ in 
the ranking of the five responses in respect to the situation.  Frequency was also used in 
Preferred Choice to highlight differences between the two groups in their selection of the best 
response to a given situation.  For Combined Scores of Five Given Responses, a mean response 
for each situation was calculated based on the five responses.  For Combined Scores of Four 
Given Responses, a mean response for each situation was calculated after removing one of the 
responses to improve reliability.  For Whistleblowing Response, the mean response of the fifth 
response for each situation was used to measure the likelihood of reporting the unethical 
behavior to an external party for each sample. To test if there was an effect of what order the 
scenarios were presented in, a t-test was conducted.  A t-test was also used to measure gender 
and ethnicity effect. Response to the first item (I would ignore it) was reverse coded for all 
scenarios.   
A mean score for each situation was computed by adding the scores for the five items.  A 
total of 21 mean scores (S1S1 to S8S2) were computed.  Next, the mean score for each situation 
for each country was computed.   
a. Ranking Responses For The Sample From the United States 
 Participants in this study were asked to rank the five different responses for each situation 
in the order of their preference.  Each response was recoded into numerical value (A=1, B=2, 
C=3, D=4 and E=5).  This is presented in Tables 1 through 8 for the sample from the United 
States and Tables 9 through 16 for the sample from Japan. 
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Table 1. Sample from USA: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=251) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally report 
to Boss/ Third 
Party 
S1S1R1 129 (51.4) 98 (39) 13 (5.2) 4 (1.6) 7 (2.8) 
S1S1R2 44 (17.5) 125 (49.8) 49 (19.5) 24 (9.6) 9 (3.6) 
S1S1R3 26 (10.4) 17 (6.8) 116 (46.2) 67 (26.7) 25 (10) 
S1S1R4 21 (8.4) 9 (3.6) 54 (21.5) 119 (47.4) 48 (19.1) 
S1S1R5 37 (14.7) 5 (2) 21 (8.4) 32 (12.7) 156  (62.2) 
S1S2R1 71 (28.3) 124 (49.4) 33 (13.1) 9 (3.6) 14 (5.6) 
S1S2R2 56 (22.3) 89 (35.3) 53 (21.1) 40 (15.9) 13 (5.2) 
S1S2R3 41 (16.3) 22 (8.8) 95 (37.8) 65 (25.9) 28 (11.2) 
S1S2R4 23 (9.2) 14 (5.6) 54 (21.5) 102 (40.6) 58 (23.1) 
S1S2R5 66 (26.3) 3 (1.2) 15 (6) 34 (13.5) 133 (53) 
S1S3R1 43 (17.1) 82 (32.7) 77 (30.7) 13 (5.2) 36 (14.3) 
S1S3R2 24 (9.6) 85 (33.9) 48 (19.1) 62 (24.7) 32 (12.7) 
S1S3R3 34 (13.5) 46 (18.3) 69 (27.5) 67 (26.7) 35 (13.9) 
S1S3R4 32 (12.7) 33 (13.1) 43 (17.1) 82 (32.7) 61 (24.3) 
S1S3R5 125 (49.8) 5 (2) 11 (4.4) 23 (9.2) 87 (34.7) 
S1S4R1 27 (10.8) 71 (28.3) 80 (31.9) 16 (6.4) 57 (22.7) 
S1S4R2 29 (11.6) 70 (27.9) 54 (21.5) 65 (25.9) 33 (13.10 
S1S4R3 28 (11.2) 43 (17.1) 75 (29.9) 68 (27.1) 37 (14.7) 
S1S4R4 32 (12.7) 62 (24.7) 33 (13.1) 70 (27.9) 54 (21.5) 
S1S4R5 139 (55.4) 8 (3.2) 13 (5.2) 24 (9.6) 67 (26.7) 
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Table 2. Sample from USA: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=251) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally report 
to Boss/ Third 
Party 
S2S1R1 52 (20.7) 88 (35.1) 90 (35.9) 7 (2.8) 14 (5.6) 
S2S1R2 37 (14.7) 109 (43.4) 58 (23.1) 37 (14.7) 10 (4) 
S2S1R3 49 (19.5) 21 (8.4) 84 (33.5) 68 (27.1) 29 (11.6) 
S2S1R4 19 (7.6) 30 (12) 12 (4.8) 131 (52.2) 59 (23.5) 
S2S1R5 97 (38.6) 6 (2.4) 10 (4) 4 (1.6) 134 (53.4) 
S2S2R1 26 (10.4) 65 (25.9) 105 (41.8) 31 (12.4) 24 (9.6) 
S2S2R2 18 (7.2) 93 (37.1) 53 (21.1) 57 (22.7) 30 (12) 
S2S2R3 48 (19.1) 33 (13.1) 61 (24.3) 77 (30.7) 32 (12.7) 
S2S2R4 28 (11.2) 56 (22.3) 23 (9.2) 78 (31.1) 66 (26.3) 
S2S2R5 141 (56.2) 2 (0.8) 7 (2.8) 5 (2) 96 (38.2) 
S2S3R1 19 (7.6) 44 (17.5) 101 (40.2) 39 (15.5) 48 (19.1) 
S2S3R2 10 (4) 70 (27.9) 42 (16.7) 92 (36.7) 37 (14.7) 
S2S3R3 36 (14.3) 27 (10.8) 78 (31.1) 60 (23.9) 50 (19.9) 
S2S3R4 21 (8.4) 107 (42.6) 18 (7.2) 51 (20.3) 54 (21.5) 
S2S3R5 174 (69.3) 4 (1.6) 8 (3.2) 5 (2) 60 (23.9) 
S2S4R1 15 (6) 26 (10.4) 60 (23.9) 53 (21.1) 97 (38.6) 
S2S4R2 5 (2) 42 (16.7) 40 (15.9) 126 (50.2) 38 (15.1) 
S2S4R3 18 (7.2) 46 (18.3) 109 (43.4) 36 (14.3) 42 (16.7) 
S2S4R4 14 (5.6) 133 (53) 30 (12) 33 (13.1) 41 (16.3) 
S2S4R5 206 (82.1) 5 (2) 6 (2.4) 1 (0.4) 33 (13.1) 
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Table 3. Sample from USA: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=251) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally 
report to Boss/ 
Third Party 
S3S1R1 17 (6.8) 30 (12) 68 (27.1) 92 (36.7) 44 (17.5) 
S3S1R2 17 (6.8) 58 (23.1) 52 (20.7) 78  (31.1) 46 (18.3) 
S3S1R3 18 (7.2) 64 (25.5) 85 (33.9) 39 (15.5) 45 (17.9) 
S3S1R4 34 (13.5) 93 (37.1) 34 (13.5) 32 (12.7) 58 (23.1) 
S3S1R5 170 (67.7) 6 (2.4) 7 (2.8) 10 (4) 58 (23.1) 
S3S2R1 15 (6) 18 (7.2) 58 (23.1) 107 (42.6) 53 (21.1) 
S3S2R2 5 (2) 51 (20.3) 49 (19.5) 87 (34.7) 59 (23.5) 
S3S2R3 11 (4.4) 55 (21.9) 102 (40.6) 30 (12) 53 (21.1) 
S3S2R4 24 (9.6) 125 (49.8) 30 (12) 23 (9.2) 49 (19.5) 
S3S2R5 199 (79.3) 3 (1.2) 7 (2.8) 4 (1.6) 38 (15.1) 
S3S3R1 12 (4.8) 17 (6.8) 52 (20.7) 94 (37.5) 76 (30.3) 
S3S3R2 5 (2) 33 (13.1) 45 (17.9) 108 (43) 60 (23.9) 
S3S3R3 10 (4) 64 (25.5) 107 ( 42.6) 23 (9.2) 47 (18.7) 
S3S3R4 24 (9.6) 128 (51) 37 (14.7) 19 (7.6) 43 (17.1) 
S3S3R5 207 (82.5) 8 (3.2) 7 (2.8) 3 (1.2) 26 (10.4) 
S3S4R1 12 (4.8) 11 (4.4) 30 (12) 110 (43.8) 88 (35.1) 
S3S4R2 4 (1.6) 27 (10.8) 48 (19.1) 101 (40.2) 71 (28.3) 
S3S4R3 8 (3.2) 67 (26.7) 119 (47.4) 17 (6.8) 40 (15.9) 
S3S4R4 22 (8.8) 138 (55) 40 (15.9) 12 (4.8) 39 (15.5) 
S3S4R5 212 (84.5) 6 (2.4) 8 (3.2) 3 (1.2) 22 (8.8) 
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Table 4. Sample from USA: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=251) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally report 
to Boss/ Third 
Party 
S4S1R1 42 (16.7) 80 (31.9) 82 (32.7) 38 (15.1) 9 (3.6) 
S4S1R2 24 (9.6) 89 (35.5) 77 (30.7) 49 (19.5) 12 (4.8) 
S4S1R3 42 (16.7) 42 (16.7) 70 (27.9) 77 (30.7) 20 (8) 
S4S1R4 49 (19.5) 34 (13.5) 17 (6.8) 78 (31.1) 73 (29.1) 
S4S1R5 109 (43.4) 4 (1.6) 8 (3.2) 5 (2) 125 (49.8) 
S4S2R1 20 (8) 60 (23.9) 105 (41.8) 56 (22.3) 10 (4) 
S4S2R2 13 (5.2) 67 (26.7) 75 (29.9) 75 (29.9) 21 (8.4) 
S4S2R3 27 (10.8) 60 (23.9) 49 (19.5) 70 (27.9) 45 (17.9) 
S4S2R4 52 (20.7) 60 (23.9) 15 (6) 41 (16.3) 83 (33.1) 
S4S2R5 159 (63.3) 4 (1.6) 2 (0.8) 3 (1.2) 83 (33.1) 
S4S3R1 14 (5.6) 22 (8.8) 83 (33.1) 89 (35.5) 43 (17.1) 
S4S3R2 8 (3.2) 37 (14.7) 63 (25.1) 103 (41) 40 (15.9) 
S4S3R3 14 (5.6) 49 (19.5) 82 (32.7) 36 (14.3) 70 (27.9) 
S4S3R4 24 (9.6) 132 (52.6) 14 (5.6) 20 (8) 61 (24.3) 
S4S3R5 207 (82.5) 6 (2.4) 6 (2.4) 2 (0.8) 30 (12) 
S4S4R1 14 (5.6) 16 (6.4) 49 (19.5) 110 (43.8) 62 (24.7) 
S4S4R2 4 (1.6) 25 (10) 63 (25.1) 102 (40.6) 57 (22.7) 
S4S4R3 7 (2.8) 50 (19.9) 118 (47) 23 (9.2) 53 (21.1) 
S4S4R4 25 (10) 154 (61.4) 14 (5.6) 13 (5.2) 45 (17.9) 
S4S4R5 210 (83.7) 5 (2) 6 (2.4) 3 (1.2) 27 (10.8) 
 
Table 5. Sample from USA: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=251) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally report 
to Boss/ Third 
Party 
S5R1 50 (19.9) 92 (36.7) 26 (10.4) 53 (21.1) 30 (12) 
S5R2 35 (13.9) 62 (24.7) 48 (19.1) 71 (28.3) 35 (13.9) 
S5R3 20 (80 33 (13.1) 108 (43) 50 (19.9) 40 (15.9) 
S5R4 21 (8.4) 66 (26.3) 46 (18.3) 62 (24.7) 56 (22.3) 
S5R5 134 (53.4) 5 (2) 19 (7.6) 11 (4.4) 82 (32.7) 
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Table 6. Sample from USA: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=251) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally 
report to Boss/ 
Third Party 
S6R1 14 (5.6) 18 (7.2) 42 (16.7) 80 (31.9) 97 (38.6) 
S6R2 5 (2) 28 (11.2) 35 (13.9) 121 (48.2) 62 (24.7) 
S6R3 8 (3.2) 44 (17.5) 137 (54.6) 30 (12) 32 (12.7) 
S6R4 22 (8.8) 155 (61.8) 25 (10) 15 (6) 34 (13.5) 
S6R5 206 (82.1) 6 (2.4) 9 (3.6) 2 (0.8) 28 (11.2) 
 
Table 7. Sample from USA: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=251) 
  Ignore It Keep an eye 
Confront in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally 
report to Boss/ 
Third Party 
S7R1 13 (5.2) 15 (6) 70 (27.9) 94 (37.9) 59 (23.5) 
S7R2 7 (2.8) 31 (12.4) 58 (23.1) 105 (41.8) 50 (19.9) 
S7R3 9 (3.6) 53 (21.1) 95 (37.8) 31 (12.4) 63 (25.1) 
S7R4 27 (10.8) 142 (56.6) 17 (6.8) 20 (8) 45 (17.9) 
S7R5 203 (80.9) 6 (2.4) 7 (2.8) 2 (0.8) 33 (13.1) 
 
Table 8. Sample from USA: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=251) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally report 
to Boss/ Third 
Party 
S8S1R1 48 (19.1) 56 (22.3) 77 (30.7) 48 (19.1) 22 (8.8) 
S8S1R2 25 (10) 70 (27.9) 72 (28.7) 67 (26.7) 17 (6.8) 
S8S1R3 30 (12) 51 (20.3) 78 (31.1) 57 (22.7) 35 (13.9) 
S8S1R4 33 (13.1) 64 (25.5) 20 (8) 72 (28.7) 62 (24.7) 
S8S1R5 129 (51.4) 5 (2) 7 (2.8) 4 (1.6) 106 (42.2) 
S8S2R1 38 (15.1) 36 (14.3) 49 (19.5) 88 (35.1) 40 (15.9) 
S8S2R2 13 (5.2) 59 (23.2) 55 (21.9) 83 (33.1) 41 (16.3) 
S8S2R3 13 (5.2) 67 (26.7) 98 (39) 34 (13.5) 39 (15.50 
S8S2R4 32 (12.7)  88 (35.1)  31 (12.4) 41 (16.3) 59 (23.5) 
S8S2R5 163 (64.9) 7 (2.8) 14 (5.6) 4 (1.6) 63 (25.1) 
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 Reported in Tables 1 through 8 is the frequency of the ranked response for each situation 
in the sample from the United States.  Initially, participants chose to ―ignore the situation‖ as 
their first choice when the moral intensity was low (mean = 1.65).  As the intensity increased, 
taking some sort of action became the first choice (mean = 3.02).  When the value of the office 
supply was $1, the last choice of action was to ―inform the boss‖ (mean = 4.06).  When the value 
increased to $20, the sample from the United States chose to ―ignore the situation‖ (mean = 2.49) 
as their last choice of action.    
When cash is involved, the participants chose to ―keep an eye on the target person‖ as 
their first choice (mean = 2.37) and ―inform the boss‖ as their last choice (mean = 3.29) when the 
amount taken was $10. When the cash amount increased to $500, they chose to ―inform the boss‖ 
as their first choice of action (mean = 3.76) and ―ignore the situation‖ as their last choice (mean 
= 1.61).  When the situation involved the unauthorized transfer of stocks from a client‘s account 
to the target person‘s personal account, the sample from the United States chose to ―inform the 
boss‖ as their first choice (mean = 3.46) when the amount taken was $5,000.  Choosing ―ignore 
the situation‖ was their last choice of action (mean = 2.12). When the cash amount increased to 
$50,000, they still chose to ―inform the boss‖ as their first choice of action (mean = 4.00) and 
―ignore the situation‖ as their last choice (mean = 1.47).  
When the situation involved receiving a report about sexual harassment or witnessing the 
client flirt with the model, the participants chose to ―keep an eye on the target person‖ as their 
first choice (mean = 2.57).  When the participants witnessed the sexual harassment taking place 
once or multiple times, the first choice of action shifted to ―inform the boss‖ as their first choice 
of action (S4S2R1: mean = 2.90; S4S3R1: mean = 3.50; S4S4R1: mean = 3.76).  ―Ignore the 
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situation‖ was the last choice all through the four situations (S4S1R5: mean = 3.13; S4S2R5: 
mean = 2.39; S4S3R5: mean = 1.57; S4S4R5: mean = 1.53). 
 In Scenario Six where a manager is stated to pollute the environment knowingly, 
participants chose ―report to the EPA‖ as their first choice of action (mean = 3.91) (the only 
scenario where blowing the whistle was the first choice). They chose to ―ignore the situation‖ as 
their last choice of action (mean = 1.57).   In Scenario Seven where a manager is said to pollute 
the environment unknowingly, the participants chose to ―inform the boss‖ as their first choice 
(mean = 3.68) and ―ignore the situation‖ as their last choice of action (mean = 1.63).   
 Finally, in Scenario Eight, participants chose to ―confront the target person in private‖ as 
their first choice of action (mean = 2.76) when overhearing another staff refusing to work 
because of subordinate‘s homosexuality and ―ignore the situation‖ as their last choice (mean = 
2.81).  They chose to ―inform the boss‖ if the target person was their manager as their first 
choice (mean = 3.22) and ―ignore the situation‖ as their last choice (mean = 2.19). 
b. Ranking Responses for the Sample from Japan 
Reported in Tables 9 through 16 is the frequency of the ranked response for each 
situation in the sample from Japan.  Initially, participants chose to ―keep an eye on the target 
person‖ as their first choice when the moral intensity was low (mean = 1.93).  As the intensity 
increased, taking some sort of action became the first choice (mean = 2.80).  When the value of 
the office supply was $1, the last choice of action was to ―inform the boss‖ (mean = 4.07).  When 
the value increased to $20, the sample from the United States chose to ―ignore the situation‖ 
(mean = 2.54) as their last choice of action.   
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Table 9. Sample from Japan: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=114) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront 
in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally 
report to 
Boss/ Third 
Party 
S1S1R1 35 (30.7) 55 (48.2) 16 (14) 4 (3.5) 4 (3.5) 
S1S1R2 24 (21.1) 44 (38.6) 36 (31.6) 5 (4.4) 5 (4.4) 
S1S1R3 24 (21.1) 12 (10.5) 36 (31.6) 29 (25.4) 13 (11.4) 
S1S1R4 12 (10.5) 2 (1.8) 16 (14) 56 (49.1) 28 (24.6) 
S1S1R5 17 (14.9) 1 (0.9) 12 (10.5) 19 (16.7) 65 (57) 
S1S2R1 26 (22.8) 57 (50) 23 (20.2) 3 (2.6) 5 (4.4) 
S1S2R2 21 (18.4) 38 (33.3) 32 (28.1) 14 (12.3) 9 (7.9) 
S1S2R3 14 (12.3) 12 (10.5) 39 (34.2) 37 (32.5) 12 (10.5) 
S1S2R4 17 (14.9) 5 (4.4) 15 (13.2) 39 (34.2) 38 (33.3) 
S1S2R5 37 (32.5) 2 (1.8) 8 (7) 19 (16.7) 48 (42.1) 
S1S3R1 15 (13.2) 45 (39.5) 34 (29.8) 7 (6.1) 13 (11.4) 
S1S3R2 20 (17.5) 37 (32.5) 28 (24.6) 17 (14.9) 12 (10.5) 
S1S3R3 11 (9.6) 20 (17.5) 32 (28.1) 36 (31.6) 15 (13.2) 
S1S3R4 17 (14.9) 10 (8.8) 14 (12.3) 37 (32.5) 36 (31.6) 
S1S3R5 52 (45.6) 2 (1.8) 10 (8.8) 14 (12.3) 36 (31.6) 
S1S4R1 12 (10.5) 39 (34.2) 35 (30.7) 10 (8.8) 18 (15.8) 
S1S4R2 11 (9.6) 31 (27.2) 30 (26.3) 21 (18.4) 21 (18.4) 
S1S4R3 15 (13.2) 18 (15.8) 24 (21.1) 41 (36) 16 (14) 
S1S4R4 15 (13.2) 24 (21.1) 16 (14) 30 (26.3) 29 (25.4) 
S1S4R5 61 (53.5) 4 (3.5) 10 (8.8) 11 (9.6) 28 (24.6) 
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Table 10. Sample from Japan: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=114) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront 
in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally 
report to 
Boss/ Third 
Party 
S2S1R1 13 (11.4) 53 (46.5) 38 (33.3) 4 (3.5) 6 (5.3) 
S2S1R2 21 (18.4) 39 (34.2) 35 (30.7) 18 (15.8) 1 (0.9) 
S2S1R3 28 (24.6) 11 (9.6) 29 (25.4) 37 (32.5) 9 (7.9) 
S2S1R4 15 (13.2) 10 (8.8) 4 (3.5) 53 (46.5) 32 (28.1) 
S2S1R5 37 (32.5) 2 (1.8) 8 (7) 1 (0.9) 66 (57.9) 
S2S2R1 11 (9.6) 40 (35.1) 44 (38.6) 12 (10.5) 7 (6.1) 
S2S2R2 14 (12.3) 35 (30.7) 29 (25.4) 30 (26.3) 6 (5.3) 
S2S2R3 20 (17.5) 22 (19.3) 26 (22.8) 33 (28.9) 13 (11.4) 
S2S2R4 14 (12.3) 16 (14) 5 (4.4) 36 (31.6) 43 (37.7) 
S2S2R5 55 (48.2) 3 (2.6) 10 (8.8) 4 (3.5) 42 (36.8) 
S2S3R1 6 (5.3) 26 (22.8) 44 (38.6) 22 (19.3) 16 (14) 
S2S3R2 9 (7.9) 27 (23.7) 27 (23.7) 36 (31.6) 15 (13.2) 
S2S3R3 19 (16.7) 27 (23.7) 24 (21.1) 25 (21.9) 19 (16.7) 
S2S3R4 16 (14) 30 (26.3) 11 (9.6) 27 (23.7) 30 (26.3) 
S2S3R5 64 (56.1) 5 (4.4) 8 (7) 3 (2.6) 34 (29.8) 
S2S4R1 4 (3.5) 23 (20.2) 32 (28.1) 24 (21.1) 31 (27.2) 
S2S4R2 7 (6.1) 16 (14) 25 (21.9) 51 (44.7) 15 (13.2) 
S2S4R3 15 (13.2) 23 (20.2) 37 (32.5) 15 (13.2) 24 (21.1) 
S2S4R4 15 (13.2) 46 (40.2) 11 (9.6) 16 (14) 26 (22.8) 
S2S4R5 74 (54.9) 5 (4.4) 10 (8.8) 7 (6.1) 18 (15.8) 
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Table 11. Sample from Japan: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=114) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront 
in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally 
report to 
Boss/ Third 
Party 
S3S1R1 2 (1.8) 32 (28.1) 31 (27.2) 30 (26.3) 19 (16.7) 
S3S1R2 11 (9.6) 24 (21.1) 33 (28.9) 31 (27.2) 15 (13.2) 
S3S1R3 13 (11.4) 23 (20.2) 33 (28.9) 28 (24.6) 17 (14.9) 
S3S1R4 19 (16.7) 31 (27.2) 9 (7.9) 23 (20.2) 32 (28.1) 
S3S1R5 69 (60.5) 4 (3.5) 8 (7) 3 (2.6) 30 (26.3) 
S3S2R1 4 (3.5) 21 (18.4) 30 (26.3) 38 (33.3) 21 (18.4) 
S3S2R2 8 (7) 16 (14) 25 (21.9) 40 (35.1) 25 (21.9) 
S3S2R3 13 (11.4) 31 (27.2) 39 (34.2) 14 (12.3) 17 (14.9) 
S3S2R4 13 (11.4) 45 (39.5) 10 (8.8) 18 (15.8) 28 (24.6) 
S3S2R5 79 (69.3) 2 (1.8) 10 (8.8) 2 (1.8) 21 (18.4) 
S3S3R1 3 (2.6) 17 (14.9) 23 (20.2) 40 (35.1) 31 (27.2) 
S3S3R2 7 (6.1) 12 (10.5) 27 (23.7) 46 (40.4) 22 (19.3) 
S3S3R3 9 (7.9) 32 (28.1) 41 (36) 12 (10.5) 20 (17.5) 
S3S3R4 17 (14.9) 48 (42.1) 15 (13.2) 12 (10.5) 22 (19.3) 
S3S3R5 78 (68.4) 6 (5.3) 10 (8.8) 3 (2.6) 17 (14.9) 
S3S4R1 2 (1.8) 15 (13.2) 22 (19.3) 43 (37.7) 32 (28.1) 
S3S4R2 6 (5.3) 11 (9.3) 23 (20.2) 46 (40.4) 28 (24.6) 
S3S4R3 4 (3.5) 25 (21.9) 46 (40.4) 15 (13.2) 24 (12.2) 
S3S4R4 16 (14) 58 (50.9) 13 (11.4) 8 (7) 19 (16.7) 
S3S4R5 86 (75.4) 6 (5.3) 10 (8.8) 0 12 (10.5) 
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Table 12. Sample from Japan: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=114) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront 
in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally 
report to 
Boss/ Third 
Party 
S4S1R1 8 (7) 58 (50.9) 28 (24.6) 16 (14) 4 (3.5) 
S4S1R2 26 (22.8) 37 (32.5) 33 (28.9) 17 (14.9) 1 (0.9) 
S4S1R3 25 (21.9) 10 (8.8) 39 (34.2) 34 (29.8) 6 (5.3) 
S4S1R4 18 (15.8) 8 (7) 7 (6.1) 43 (37.7) 38 (33.3) 
S4S1R5 36 (31.6) 1 (0.9) 9 (7.9) 2 (1.8) 66 (57.9) 
S4S2R1 4 (3.5) 39 (34.2) 35 (30.7) 25 (21.9) 11 (9.6) 
S4S2R2 13 (11.4) 36 (31.6) 29 (25.4) 30 (26.3) 6 (5.3) 
S4S2R3 23 (20.2) 22 (19.3) 28 (24.6) 30 (26.3) 11 (9.6) 
S4S2R4 18 (15.8) 17 (14.9) 11 (9.6) 24 (21.1) 44 (38.6) 
S4S2R5 56 (49.1) 1 (0.9) 10 (8.8) 4 (3.5) 43 (37.7) 
S4S3R1 2 (1.8) 25 (21.9) 35 (30.7) 39 (34.2) 13 (11.4) 
S4S3R2 11 (9.6) 32 (28.1) 27 (23.7) 29 (25.4) 15 (13.2) 
S4S3R3 11 (9.6) 26 (22.8) 38 (33.3) 28 (24.6) 11 (9.6) 
S4S3R4 15 (13.2) 29 (25.4) 9 (7.9) 19 (16.7) 42 (36.8) 
S4S3R5 75 (65.8) 2 (1.8) 6 (5.3) 1 (0.9) 30 (26.3) 
S4S4R1 0 14 (12.3) 32 (28.1) 53 (46.5) 15 (13.2) 
S4S4R2 7 (6.1) 33 (28.9) 26 (22.8) 27 (23.7) 21 (18.4) 
S4S4R3 11 (9.6) 24 (21.1) 37 (32.5) 20 (17.5) 22 (19.3) 
S4S4R4 12 (10.5) 42 (36.8) 15 (13.2) 11 (9.6) 34 (29.8) 
S4S4R5 85 (74.6) 2 (1.8) 5 (4.4) 0 22 (19.3) 
 
Table 13. Sample from Japan: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=114) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront 
in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally 
report to Boss/ 
Third Party 
S5R1 22 (19.3) 48 (42.1) 10 (8.8) 25 (21.9) 9 (7.9) 
S5R2 23 (20.2) 26 (22.8) 22 (19.3) 26 (22.8) 17 (14.9) 
S5R3 15 (13.2) 18 (15.8) 41 (36) 22 (19.3) 18 (15.8) 
S5R4 12 (10.5) 22 (19.3) 21 (18.4) 36 (31.6) 23 (20.2) 
S5R5 44 (38.6) 4 (3.5) 19 (16.7) 2 (1.8) 45 (39.5) 
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Table 14. Sample from Japan: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=114) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront 
in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally 
report to Boss/ 
Third Party 
S6R1 3 (2.6) 10 (8.8) 12 (10.5) 59 (51.8) 30 (26.3) 
S6R2 5 (4.4) 16 (14.4) 27 (23.7) 36 (31.6) 30 (26.3) 
S6R3 8 (7) 44 (38.6) 43 (37.7) 9 (7.9) 10 (8.8) 
S6R4 19 (16.7) 40 (35.1) 22 (19.3) 7 (6.1) 26 (22.8) 
S6R5 80 (70.2) 6 (5.3) 9 (7.9) 2 (1.8) 17 (14.9) 
 
Table 15. Sample from Japan: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=114) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront 
in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally 
report to Boss/ 
Third Party 
S7R1 3 (2.6) 15 (13.2) 25 (21.9) 52 (45.6) 19 (16.7) 
S7R2 7 (6.1) 27 (23.7) 30 (26.3) 35 (30.7) 15 (13.2) 
S7R3 7 (6.1) 24 (21.1) 40 (35.1) 15 (13.2) 28 (24.6) 
S7R4 17 (14.9) 45 (39.5) 12 (10.5) 11 (9.6) 29 (25.4) 
S7R5 80 (70.2) 4 (3.5) 8 (7) 0 22 (19.3) 
 
Table 16. Sample from Japan: Frequencies (%) for Ranking Responses (n=114) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront 
in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally 
report to 
Boss/ Third 
Party 
S8S1R1 29 (25.4) 35 (30.7) 36 (31.6) 4 (3.5) 10 (8.8) 
S8S1R2 22 (19.3) 50 (43.9) 21 (18.4) 19 (16.7) 2 (1.8) 
S8S1R3 23 (20.2) 16 (14) 45 (39.5) 25 (21.9) 5 (4.4) 
S8S1R4 8 (7) 13 (11.4) 10 (8.8) 63 (55.3) 20 (17.5) 
S8S1R5 33 (28.9) 0 4 (3.5) 1 (0.9) 76 (66.7) 
S8S2R1 26 (22.8) 37 (32.5) 19 (16.7) 22 (19.3) 10 (8.8) 
S8S2R2 21 (18.4) 41 (36) 21 (18.4) 23 (20.2) 8 (7) 
S8S2R3 14 (12.3) 17 (14.9) 55 (48.2) 17 (14.9) 11 (9.6) 
S8S2R4 11 (9.6) 20 (17.5) 12 (10.5) 49 (43) 22 (19.3) 
S8S2R5 41 (36) 1 (0.9) 7 (6.1) 4 (3.5) 61 (53.5) 
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When cash is involved, the participants chose to ―keep an eye on the target person‖ as 
their first choice (mean = 2.34) and ―inform the boss‖ as their last choice (mean = 3.68) when the 
amount taken was $10. When the cash amount increased to $500, they chose to ―report to the 
boss‖ as their first choice of action (mean = 3.46) and ―ignore the situation‖ as their last choice 
(mean = 2.04).  When the situation involved the unauthorized transfer of stocks from a client‘s 
account to the target person‘s personal account, the sample from Japan chose both to ―keep an 
eye‖ as their first choice (mean = 3.32) when the amount taken was $5,000.  Choosing to ―ignore 
the situation‖ was their last choice of action (mean = 2.20). When the stock value increased to 
$50,000, they still chose to ―inform the boss‖ as their first choice of action (mean = 3.73) and 
―ignore the situation‖ as their last choice (mean = 1.73).  
When the situation involved receiving a report about sexual harassment or witnessing the 
client flirt with the model, the participants chose to ―keep an eye on the target person‖ as their 
first choice (mean = 2.48).  Their last choice was to ―inform the boss‖ (mean = 3.71).  When the 
participants witnessed the sexual harassment, their first choice of action shifted to ―inform the 
boss‖(mean = 3.18).  When the participants witnessed the sexual harassment taking place 
multiple times, the first choice of action was to ―inform the boss‖ (mean = 3.55).  ―Ignore the 
situation‖ was the last choice for the remaining three situations (S4S2R5: mean = 3.13; S4S3R5: 
mean = 2.45; S4S4R5: mean = 2.05). 
 In Scenario Six where a manager is stated to pollute the environment knowingly, 
participants chose to ―inform the boss‖ as their first choice of action (mean = 3.86). They chose 
to ―ignore the situation‖ as their last choice of action (mean = 1.89).   In Scenario Seven where a 
manager is said to pollute the environment unknowingly, the participants chose to ―inform the 
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boss‖ as their first choice (mean = 3.70) and ―ignore the situation‖ as their last choice of action 
(mean = 1.88).   
 Finally, in Scenario Eight, participants chose to ―confront the target person in private‖ on 
the staff as their first choice of action (mean = 2.39) when overhearing another staff refusing to 
work because of subordinate‘s homosexuality and ―inform the boss‖ as their last choice (mean = 
4.04).  They chose to ―keep an eye on the target person‖ as their first choice (mean = 2.46) and 
―inform the boss‖ as their last choice (mean = 3.63). 
c. Combined Score of the Ranking Responses for the United States and Japan 
Reported in Tables 17 through 24 are the results of the t-test of the ranked responses for 
each situation for the samples from the United States and Japan.  Findings show significant 
difference between the two samples on 45 out of the 104 ranked responses. 
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Table 20. Descriptive Statistics and t-test for Ranking Choice         
 
USA (n=251) 95% C.I. 
 
Japan (n=114) 95% C.I. 
   
Variables M SD Lower Upper   M SD Lower Upper t p Cohen's d 
S4S1R1 2.57 1.05 2.44 2.70 
 
2.48 0.83 2.39 2.74 0.07 0.94 0.09 
S4S1R2 2.75 1.03 2.62 2.87 
 
2.45 1.01 2.20 2.58 3.09 0.00 0.29 
S4S1R3 2.96 1.21 2.81 3.11 
 
2.95 1.26 2.65 3.10 0.64 0.53 0.01 
S4S1R4 3.37 1.51 3.18 3.55 
 
3.52 1.46 3.40 3.92 -1.75 0.08 -0.10 
S4S1R5 3.13 1.94 2.89 3.37 
 
3.71 1.85 3.20 3.87 -1.87 0.06 -0.31 
S4S2R1 2.90 0.97 2.78 3.02 
 
2.96 0.93 2.81 3.19 -0.85 0.39 -0.06 
S4S2R2 3.10 1.05 2.97 3.23 
 
2.80 1.09 2.62 3.03 2.25 0.03 0.27 
S4S2R3 3.18 1.28 3.02 3.34 
 
2.86 1.24 2.62 3.10 2.24 0.03 0.26 
S4S2R4 3.17 1.59 2.97 3.37 
 
3.30 1.64 3.24 3.80 -1.96 0.05 -0.08 
S4S2R5 2.39 1.88 2.16 2.62 
 
3.13 1.96 2.45 3.15 -1.92 0.06 -0.38 
S4S3R1 3.50 1.05 3.37 3.63 
 
3.18 0.88 3.13 3.50 1.56 0.12 0.33 
S4S3R2 3.52 1.03 3.39 3.65 
 
2.95 1.12 2.82 3.27 3.86 0.00 0.53 
S4S3R3 3.39 1.24 3.24 3.55 
 
2.96 1.24 2.81 3.23 2.78 0.01 0.35 
S4S3R4 2.85 1.39 2.68 3.02 
 
3.46 1.54 3.11 3.67 -3.32 0.00 -0.42 
S4S3R5 1.57 1.33 1.41 1.74 
 
2.45 1.90 1.88 2.53 -3.76 0.00 -0.54 
S4S4R1 3.76 1.07 3.62 3.89 
 
3.55 0.87 3.44 3.77 1.33 0.19 0.21 
S4S4R2 3.73 0.97 3.61 3.85 
 
3.05 1.10 2.97 3.42 4.49 0.00 0.65 
S4S4R3 3.26 1.09 3.12 3.39 
 
3.09 1.31 2.93 3.39 0.79 0.43 0.14 
S4S4R4 2.60 1.27 2.44 2.76 
 
3.21 1.51 2.85 3.38 -3.44 0.00 -0.44 
S4S4R5 1.53 1.29 1.37 1.69   2.05 1.74 1.58 2.17 -2.18 0.03 -0.34 
* p < .05, two-tailed 
          
 ** p < .01, two-tailed 
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Table 21. Descriptive Statistics and t-test for Ranking Choice     
 
USA (n=251) 95% C.I. 
 
Japan (n=114) 95% C.I. 
   
Variables M SD Lower Upper   M SD Lower Upper t p Cohen's d 
S5R1 2.69 1.33 2.52 2.85 
 
2.77 1.22 2.34 2.80 0.78 0.43 -0.06 
S5R2 3.04 1.28 2.88 3.20 
 
2.93 1.43 2.64 3.15 0.95 0.34 0.08 
S5R3 3.23 1.11 3.09 3.37 
 
2.96 1.39 2.86 3.32 1.07 0.28 0.21 
S5R4 3.26 1.29 3.10 3.42 
 
3.25 1.19 3.08 3.55 -0.36 0.72 0.01 
S5R5 2.61 1.83 2.38 2.84   2.98 1.80 2.67 3.33 -1.90 0.06 -0.20 
* p < .05, two-tailed 
          
 ** p < .01, two-tailed 
          
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22. Descriptive Statistics and t-test for Ranking Choice  
 
USA (n=251) 95% C.I. 
 
Japan (n=114) 95% C.I. 
   
Variables M SD Lower Upper   M SD Lower Upper t p Cohen's d 
S6R1 3.91 1.16 3.76 4.05 
 
3.86 0.94 3.72 4.08 0.04 0.97 0.05 
S6R2 3.82 0.99 3.70 3.95 
 
3.61 1.23 3.40 3.83 1.79 0.07 0.20 
S6R3 3.14 0.96 3.02 3.25 
 
2.71 1.02 2.54 2.92 3.69 0.00 0.43 
S6R4 2.54 1.17 2.39 2.68 
 
2.86 1.42 2.57 3.09 -2.10 0.04 -0.25 
S6R5 1.57 1.31 1.40 1.73   1.89 1.52 1.58 2.13 -1.91 0.06 -0.23 
* p < .05, two-tailed 
          
 ** p < .01, two-tailed 
          
 
Table 23. Descriptive Statistics and t-test for Ranking Choice  
 
USA (n=251) 95% C.I. 
 
Japan (n=114) 95% C.I. 
   
Variables M SD Lower Upper   M SD Lower Upper t p Cohen's d 
S7R1 3.68 1.06 3.55 3.81 
 
3.70 0.81 3.42 3.79 0.65 0.52 -0.02 
S7R2 3.64 1.02 3.51 3.76 
 
3.27 1.21 3.00 3.42 3.57 0.00 0.33 
S7R3 3.34 1.17 3.20 3.49 
 
3.27 1.24 3.06 3.52 0.40 0.69 0.06 
S7R4 2.66 1.30 2.50 2.82 
 
2.88 1.47 2.64 3.18 -1.67 0.09 -0.16 
S7R5 1.63 1.39 1.46 1.80   1.88 1.55 1.65 2.24 -1.94 0.05 -0.17 
* p < .05, two-tailed 
          
 ** p < .01, two-tailed 
          
 
111 
 
 
 The sample from the United States had smaller mean responses in Scenario One, 
Situation One, Rank One (t(363) = -3.50, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.32).  However, the sample 
from the United States had a larger mean response in Scenario One, Situation One, Rank Three 
(t(363) = 1.83, p = 0.07, Cohen‘s d = 0.15) and Scenario One, Situation Three, Rank Two (t(363) 
= 2.09, p = 0.04, Cohen‘s d = 0.59). 
In Scenario Two, the sample from the United States had larger mean responses in 
Scenario Two, Situation Three, Rank Three (t(363) = 1.77, p = 0.08, Cohen‘s d = 0.21) and 
Scenario Two, Situation Four, Rank One (t(363) = 2.02, p = 0.04, Cohen‘s d = 0.24).  The 
sample from the United States had smaller mean responses in Scenario Two, Situation Two, 
Rank Four (t(363) = -1.88, p = 0.06, Cohen‘s d = -0.46), Scenario Two, Situation Three, Rank 
Five (t(363) = -1.83, p = 0.07, Cohen‘s d = -0.24) and Scenario Two, Situation Four, Rank Five 
(t(363) = -2.65, p = 0.01, Cohen‘s d = -0.29). 
Table 24. Descriptive Statistics and t-test for Ranking Choice           
 
USA (n=251) 95% C.I. 
 
Japan (n=114) 95% C.I. 
   
Variables M SD Lower Upper   M SD Lower Upper t p Cohen's d 
S8S1R1 2.76 1.22 2.61 2.91 
 
2.39 1.11 2.18 2.61 2.70 0.01 0.32 
S8S1R2 2.92 1.10 2.79 3.06 
 
2.38 0.98 2.19 2.57 4.48 0.00 0.53 
S8S1R3 3.06 1.21 2.91 3.21 
 
2.63 1.15 2.55 2.97 2.24 0.03 0.37 
S8S1R4 3.26 1.41 3.09 3.44 
 
3.55 1.19 3.44 3.86 -2.58 0.01 -0.22 
S8S1R5 2.81 1.94 2.57 3.05 
 
4.04 1.71 3.43 4.10 -4.43 0.00 -0.67 
S8S2R1 3.22 1.30 3.06 3.38 
 
2.46 1.24 2.35 2.82 4.35 0.00 0.60 
S8S2R2 3.32 1.15 3.18 3.46 
 
2.55 1.16 2.39 2.84 5.34 0.00 0.66 
S8S2R3 3.08 1.11 2.94 3.21 
 
3.02 1.15 2.75 3.15 1.03 0.30 0.05 
S8S2R4 3.03 1.40 2.85 3.20 
 
3.38 1.27 3.21 3.68 -2.73 0.01 -0.26 
S8S2R5 2.19 1.73 1.98 2.41   3.63 1.81 3.03 3.72 -5.91 0.00 -0.81 
* p < .05, two-tailed 
           ** p < .01, two-tailed 
           
112 
 
In Scenario Three, the sample from the United States had larger mean responses in 
Scenario Three, Situation Two, Rank One (t(363) = 1.72, p = 0.09, Cohen‘s d = 0.19), Scenario 
Three, Situation Two, Rank Three (t(363) = 2.39, p = 0.02, Cohen‘s d = 0.14) and Scenario 
Three, Situation Four, Rank One (t(363) = 1.93, p = 0.05, Cohen‘s d = 0.26). The sample from 
the United States had smaller mean responses in Scenario Three, Situation Three, Rank Five 
(t(363) = -2.40, p = 0.02, Cohen‘s d = -0.17). 
In Scenario Four, the sample from the United States had larger mean responses in 
Scenario Four, Situation One, Rank Two (t(363) = 3.09, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.29), Scenario 
Four, Situation Two, Rank Two (t(363) = 2.25, p = 0.03, Cohen‘s d = 0.27), Scenario Four, 
Situation Two, Rank Three (t(363) = 2.24, p = 0.03, Cohen‘s d = 0.26), Scenario Four, Situation 
Three, Rank Two (t(363) = 3.86, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.53), Scenario Four, Situation Three, 
Rank Three (t(363) = 2.78, p = 0.01, Cohen‘s d = 0.35), and Scenario Four, Situation Four, Rank 
Two (t(363) = 4.49, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.65).  The sample from the United States had smaller 
mean responses in Scenario Four, Situation One, Rank Four (t(363) = -1.75, p = 0.08, Cohen‘s d 
= -0.10), Scenario Four, Situation One, Rank Five (t(363) = -1.87, p = 0.06, Cohen‘s d = -0.31), 
Scenario Four, Situation Two, Rank Four (t(363) = -1.96, p = 0.05, Cohen‘s d = -0.08), Scenario 
Four, Situation Two, Rank Five (t(363) = -1.92, p = 0.06, Cohen‘s d = -0.38), Scenario Four, 
Situation Three, Rank Four (t(363) = -3.32, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.42), Scenario Four, 
Situation Three, Rank Five (t(363) = -3.76, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.54), and Scenario Four, 
Situation Four, Rank Four (t(363) = -3.44, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.44).  In Scenario Five, the 
sample from the United States had a smaller mean response for Scenario Five, Rank Five (t(363) 
= -1.90, p = 0.06, Cohen‘s d = -0.20).   
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In Scenario Six, the sample from the United States had a larger mean response for Rank 
Two and Three (S6R2: t(363) = 1.79, p = 0.07, Cohen‘s d = 0.20; S6R3: t(363) = 3.69, p = 0.00, 
Cohen‘s d = 0.43) and a smaller mean response for Rank Four and Five (S6R4: t(363) = -2.10, p 
= 0.04, Cohen‘s d = -0.25; S6R5: t(363) = -1.91, p = 0.06, Cohen‘s d = -0.23). In Scenario Seven, 
the sample from the United States had a larger mean response for Rank Two (t(363) = 3.57, p = 
0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.33) and a smaller mean response from Rank Four and Five (S7R4: t(363) = -
1.67, p = 0.09, Cohen‘s d = -0.16; S7R5: t(363) = -1.94, p = 0.05, Cohen‘s d = -0.17). 
Finally, in Scenario Eight, the sample from the United States had larger mean responses 
in Scenario Eight, Situation One, Rank One, Two and Three (S8S1R1: t(363) = 2.70, p = 0.01, 
Cohen‘s d = 0.32; S8S1R2: t(363) = 4.48, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.53; S8S1R3: t(363) = 2.24, p 
= 0.03, Cohen‘s d = 0.37) and in Scenario Eight, Situation Two, Rank One and Two (S8S2R1: 
t(363) = 4.35, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.60; S8S2R2: t(363) = 5.34, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.66).  
The sample from the United States had smaller mean responses in Scenario Eight, Situation One, 
Rank Four and Five (S8S1R4: t(363) = -2.58, p = 0.01, Cohen‘s d = -0.22; S8S1R5: t(363) = -
4.43, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.67) and in Scenario Eight, Situation Two, Rank Four and Five 
(S8S2R4: t(363) = -2.73, p = 0.01, Cohen‘s d = -0.26; S8S2R5: t(363) = -5.91, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s 
d = -0.81). 
d. Preferred Choice for the Sample from the United States 
Following the ranking of responses, participants in this study were asked to pick only one 
of the five actions for each situation.   Reported in Table 25 is the frequency of the preferred 
choice of response from the given five responses for each situation in the sample from the United 
States.    Each response was coded into the following values: A=1, B=2, C=3, D=4 and E=5. 
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Table 25. Sample from USA: Frequencies (%) for Preferred Choice (n=251) 
  Ignore It 
Keep an 
eye 
Confront in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an 
Eye/Inform Boss 
Formally report 
to Boss/ Third 
Party 
S1S1 109 (43.4) 110 (43.8) 25 (10) 4 (1.6) 3 (1.2) 
S1S2 56 (22.3) 134 (53.4) 38 (15.1) 11 (4.4) 12 (4.8) 
S1S3 30 (12) 80 (31.9) 87 (34.7) 18 (7.2) 36 (14.3) 
S1S4 14 (5.6) 63 (25.1) 92 (36.7) 19 (7.6) 63 (25.1) 
S2S1 40 (15.9) 85 (33.9) 103 (41) 12 (4.8) 11 (4.4) 
S2S2 11 (4.4) 61 (24.3) 113 (45) 41 (16.3) 25 (10) 
S2S3 9 (3.6) 39 (15.5) 101 (40.2) 53 (21.1) 49 (19.5) 
S2S4 6 (2.4) 22 (8.8) 57 (22.7) 70 (27.9) 96 (38.2) 
S3S1 10 (4) 31 (12.4) 71 (28.3) 96 (38.2) 43 (17.1) 
S3S2 9 (3.6) 18 (7.2) 54 (21.5) 111 (44.2) 59 (23.5) 
S3S3 6 (2.4) 12 (4.8) 41 (16.3) 112 (44.6) 80 (31.9) 
S3S4 6 (2.4) 9 (3.6) 27 (10.8) 120 (47.8) 89 (35.5) 
S4S1 35 (13.9) 84 (33.5) 82 (32.7) 43 (17.1) 7 (2.8) 
S4S2 14 (5.6) 56 (22.3) 107 (42.6) 63 (25.1) 11 (4.4) 
S4S3 9 (3.6) 18 (7.2) 84 (33.5) 98 (39) 42 (16.7) 
S4S4 7 (2.8) 13 (5.2) 40 (15.9) 125 (49.8) 66 (26.3) 
S5 45 (17.9) 88 (35.1) 27 (10.8) 63 (25.1) 28 (11.2) 
S6 6 (2.4) 17 (6.8) 39 (15.5) 87 (34.7) 102 (40.6) 
S7 7 (2.8) 8 (3.2) 77 (30.7) 102 (40.6) 57 (22.7) 
S8S1 43 (17.1) 55 (21.9) 82 (32.7) 51 (20.3) 20 (8) 
S8S2 30 (12) 32 (12.7) 52 (20.7) 100 (39.8) 37 (14.7) 
 
Initially, participants chose to ―keep an eye on the target person‖ when the office supply 
taken was valued at $1 (mean = 1.73) but as the intensity increased, ―confront the target person 
in private‖ became their choice of action (mean = 3.22).  When cash was involved, the 
participants selected ―confront the target person in private‖ when $10, $50 and $100 was taken 
from the cash box (S2S1: mean = 2.48; S2S2: mean = 3.03; S2S3: mean = 3.37).  When the 
amount was $500, the participants selected ―inform the boss‖ as their choice of action (mean = 
3.91). When the situation involved the unauthorized transfer of money from a client‘s account to 
the target person‘s personal account, the sample from the United States chose to ―inform the boss‖ 
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as their choice of action in four situations (S3S1: mean = 3.52; S3S2: mean = 3.77; S3S3: mean 
= 3.99; S3S4: mean = 4.10).   
 When the situation involved receiving a report about sexual harassment, participants 
chose to ―keep an eye on the target person‖ (mean = 2.61).  When the situation involved 
witnessing the client flirt with the model, the participants chose to ―confront the target person in 
private‖ (mean = 3.00).  When the participants witnessed the sexual harassment taking place 
once or multiple times, they chose to ―inform the boss‖ (S4S3: mean = 3.58; S4S4: mean = 3.92). 
 In Scenario Six where a manager is stated to pollute the environment knowingly, 
participants chose to ―report to the EPA‖ (mean = 4.04).  In Scenario Seven where a manager is 
said to pollute the environment unknowingly, the participants chose to ―inform the boss‖ (mean 
= 3.77).   
 Finally, in Scenario Eight, participants chose to ―confront the target person in private‖ as 
their first choice of action when overhearing another staff refusing to work because of a 
subordinate‘s homosexuality (mean = 2.80) and chose to ―inform the boss‖ if the target person 
was their manager (mean = 3.33). 
e. Preferred Choice for the Sample from Japan 
Reported in Table 26 is the frequency of the preferred choice for each situation in the 
sample from Japan.   
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Table 26. Sample from Japan: Frequencies (%) for Forced Responses (n=114) 
  Ignore It Keep an eye 
Confront in 
Private 
Ask Coworker to 
Keep an Eye/Inform 
Boss 
Formally report to 
Boss/ Third Party 
S1S1 35 (30.7) 51 (44.7) 18 (15.8) 5 (4.4) 5 (4.4) 
S1S2 25 (21.9) 52 (45.6) 28 (24.6) 3 (2.6) 6 (5.3) 
S1S3 16 (14) 40 (35.1) 37 (32.5) 7 (6.1) 14 (12.3) 
S1S4 15 (13.2) 32 (28.1) 38 (33.3) 11 (9.6) 18 (15.8) 
S2S1 15 (13.2) 46 (40.4) 40 (35.1) 7 (6.1) 6 (5.3) 
S2S2 11 (9.6) 31 (27.2) 44 (38.6) 21 (18.4) 7 (6.1) 
S2S3 7 (6.1) 20 (17.5) 40 (35.1) 33 (28.9) 14 (12.3) 
S2S4 2 (1.8) 21 (18.4) 29 (25.4) 33 (28.9) 29 (25.4) 
S3S1 2 (1.8) 28 (24.6) 34 (29.8) 35 (30.7) 15 (13.2) 
S3S2 2 (1.8) 21 (18.4) 29 (25.4) 40 (35.1) 22 (19.3) 
S3S3 2 (1.8) 14 (12.3) 25 (21.9) 45 (39.5) 28 (24.6) 
S3S4 2 (1.8) 11 (9.6) 20 (17.5) 46 (40.4) 35 (30.7) 
S4S1 7 (6.1) 54 (47.4) 37 (32.5) 12 (10.5) 4 (3.5) 
S4S2 4 (3.5) 35 (30.7) 40 (35.1) 28 (24.6) 7 (6.1) 
S4S3 2 (1.8) 19 (16.7) 40 (35.1) 43 (37.7) 10 (8.8) 
S4S4 0 12 (10.5) 30 (26.3) 58 (50.9) 14 (12.3) 
S5 22 (19.3) 48 (42.1) 10 (8.8) 25 (21.9) 9 (7.9) 
S6 1 (0.9) 7 (6.1) 15 (13.2) 59 (51.8) 32 (28.1) 
S7 1 (0.9) 11 (9.6) 30 (26.3) 54 (47.4) 18 (15.8) 
S8S1 26 (22.8) 38 (33.3) 40 (35.1) 5 (4.4) 5 (4.4) 
S8S2 26 (22.8) 38 (33.3) 20 (17.5) 22 (19.3) 8 (7) 
 
Initially, participants chose to ―keep an eye on the target person‖ when the office supply 
taken was valued at $1 (mean = 2.07) but as the intensity increased, ―confront the target person 
in private‖ became their choice of action (mean = 2.87).  When cash was involved, the 
participants chose to ―confront the target person in private‖ when the cash value being take was 
at $10, $50 and $100  (S2S1: mean = 2.50; S2S2: mean = 2.84; S2S3: mean = 3.24).  When the 
situation involved the unauthorized transfer of money from a client‘s account to the target 
person‘s personal account, the sample from Japan chose to ―inform the boss‖ as their choice of 
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action four all four situations (S3S1: mean = 3.29; S3S2: mean = 3.52; S3S3: mean = 3.73; 
S3S4: mean = 3.89).   
 When the situation involved receiving a report about sexual harassment, participants 
chose to ―keep an eye on the target person‖ (mean = 2.58).  When the situation involved 
witnessing the client flirt with the model and witnessing the sexual harassment taking place, the 
participants chose to ―confront the target person in private‖ (S4S2: mean = 2.99).  When the 
situation involved witnessing the client sexually harassing both once and multiple times, they 
chose to ―inform the boss‖ (S4S3: mean = 3.35; S4S4: mean = 3.65). 
 In Scenario Six where a manager is stated to polluting the environment knowingly, 
participants chose to report to their superior (mean = 4.00).  In Scenario Seven where a manager 
is said to pollute the environment unknowingly, the participants chose ―inform the boss‖ (mean = 
3.68).   
 Finally, in Scenario Eight, participants chose to ―confront the target person in private‖ as 
their first choice of action when overhearing another staff refusing to work because of 
subordinate‘s homosexuality (mean = 2.34) and chose to ―keep an eye on the target person‖ if 
the target person was their manager (mean = 2.54). 
f. Combined Score of the Preferred Choice for the United States and Japan 
Reported in Table 27 are the results of the t-test of the preferred choice for each situation 
in the samples from the United States and Japan.  Findings show significant difference between 
the two samples in five scenarios.   
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Table 27. Descriptive Statistics and t-test for Preferred Choice 
 
USA (n=251) 95% C.I. 
 
Japan (n=114) 95% C.I. 
   Variables M SD Lower Upper   M SD Lower Upper t p Cohen's d 
S1S1 1.73 0.80 1.63 1.83 
 
2.07 1.02 1.88 2.26 -3.42 0.00 -0.37 
S1S2 2.16 0.98 2.04 2.28 
 
2.24 1.00 2.05 2.42 -0.70 0.49 -0.08 
S1S3 2.80 1.19 2.65 2.95 
 
2.68 1.17 2.46 2.89 0.94 0.35 0.11 
S1S4 3.22 1.23 3.06 3.37 
 
2.87 1.24 2.64 3.10 2.49 0.01 0.28 
S2S1 2.48 0.96 2.36 2.60 
 
2.50 0.98 2.32 2.68 -0.20 0.84 -0.02 
S2S2 3.03 0.99 2.91 3.16 
 
2.84 1.04 2.65 3.03 1.67 0.10 0.19 
S2S3 3.37 1.07 3.24 3.51 
 
3.24 1.08 3.04 3.44 1.13 0.26 0.13 
S2S4 3.91 1.08 3.77 4.04 
 
3.58 1.11 3.37 3.79 2.67 0.01 0.30 
S3S1 3.52 1.04 3.39 3.65 
 
3.29 1.04 3.10 3.48 1.98 0.05 0.22 
S3S2 3.77 1.01 3.64 3.89 
 
3.52 1.06 3.32 3.71 2.18 0.03 0.24 
S3S3 3.99 0.94 3.87 4.11 
 
3.73 1.02 3.54 3.92 2.37 0.02 0.26 
S3S4 4.10 0.90 3.99 4.22 
 
3.89 1.01 3.70 4.07 2.06 0.04 0.23 
S4S1 2.61 1.01 2.49 2.74 
 
2.58 0.89 2.41 2.74 0.31 0.75 0.04 
S4S2 3.00 0.94 2.89 3.12 
 
2.99 0.97 2.81 3.17 0.12 0.91 0.01 
S4S3 3.58 0.97 3.46 3.70 
 
3.35 0.92 3.18 3.52 2.14 0.03 0.24 
S4S4 3.92 0.94 3.80 4.03 
 
3.65 0.83 3.49 3.80 2.61 0.01 0.30 
S5 2.76 1.31 2.60 2.93 
 
2.57 1.25 2.34 2.80 1.34 0.18 0.15 
S6 4.04 1.02 3.92 4.17 
 
4.00 0.86 3.84 4.16 0.40 0.69 0.05 
S7 3.77 0.93 3.66 3.89 
 
3.68 0.89 3.51 3.84 0.94 0.35 0.11 
S8S1 2.80 1.18 2.65 2.95 
 
2.34 1.02 2.15 2.53 3.59 0.00 0.42 
S8S2 3.33 1.22 3.17 3.48   2.54 1.23 2.31 2.77 5.65 0.00 0.64 
* p < .05, two-tailed 
           ** p < .01, two-tailed 
            
The sample from Japan had larger mean response in Scenario One, Situation One (S1S1: 
t(363) = -3.42, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.37).  The sample from the United States had a larger 
mean responses in Scenario One, Situation Four (S1S4: t(363) = 2.49, p = 0.01, Cohen‘s d = 
0.28), Scenario Two, Situations Two and Four (S2S2: t(363) = 1.67, p = 0.10, Cohen‘s d = 0.19; 
S2S4: t(363) = 2.67, p = 0.01, Cohen‘s d = 0.30), Scenario Three, Situations One, Two, Three 
and Four (S3S1: t(363) = 1.98, p = 0.05, Cohen‘s d = 0.22; S3S2: t(363) = 2.18, p = 0.03, 
119 
 
Cohen‘s d = 0.24; S3S3: t(363) = 2.37, p = 0.02, Cohen‘s d = 0.26; S3S4: t(363) = 2.06, p = 0.04, 
Cohen‘s d = 0.23).  Scenario Four, Situation Three and Four (S4S3: t(363) = 2.14, p = 0.03, 
Cohen‘s d = 0.24; S4S4: t(363) = 2.61, p = 0.01, Cohen‘s d = 0.30) and in Scenario Eight, 
Situations One and Two (S8S1: t(363) = 3.59, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.42; S8S2: t(363) = 5.65, p 
= 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.64).  
g. Combined Score of the Five Given Responses 
 Reported in Table 28 are the results of the t-test of the five given responses for each 
situation in the samples from the United States and Japan.  Findings show significant difference 
between the two samples in five scenarios.  
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The sample from the United States had smaller mean responses in Scenario One, 
Situation One (S1S1: : (t(363) = -2.29, p = 0.02, Cohen‘s d = -0.26), Scenario Three, Situations 
Two, Three and Four (S3S2: (t(363) = -3.33, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.38; S3S3: (t(363) = -3.25, 
p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.36; S3S4:  (t(363) = -3.30, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.37).  The sample 
from the United States also had a smaller mean response in Scenario Six (t(363) = -2.43, p = 0.02, 
Cohen‘s d = -0.27) and in Scenario Seven (t(363) = -1.67, p = 0.10, Cohen‘s d = -0.19).  
However, in Scenario Eight, Situations One and Two, the sample from the United States had 
larger mean responses (S8S1: t(363) = 3.73, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.42; S8S2: t(363) = 4.71, p = 
0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.53).  For other Scenarios, the mean differences between the samples were 
not significant. 
Cronbach‘s Alpha measures internal consistency and is considered to be a measure of 
reliability of instruments (Streiner & Norman, 1989).  Cronbach‘s Alpha for the sample from the 
United States was low except for S1S1, S1S2, S5 and S8S1 which had above 0.70.  For the 
sample from Japan, 10 out of the 21 situations had Cronbach‘s Alpha above 0.70 (e.g. S1S2, 
S1S3, S1S4, S2S1, S2S2, S2S3, S2S4, S5, S8S1, and S8S2). 
h. Combined Score of the Four Given Responses 
Reported in Table 29 are the results of the t-test of the four given responses for each 
situation in the samples from the United States and Japan.  The second response was dropped to 
improve Cronbach‘s Alpha for each situation.  Findings show significant difference between the 
two samples in four scenarios.   
 
 
 
122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   T
ab
le
 2
9
. 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s,
 t
-t
es
t,
 a
n
d
 C
ro
n
b
ac
h
's
 A
lp
h
a 
fo
r 
S
ce
n
ar
io
s 
w
it
h
 4
 i
te
m
s*
 
  
  
  
  
 
U
S
A
 (
n
=
2
5
1
) 
9
5
%
 C
.I
. 
 
Ja
p
an
 (
n
=
1
1
4
) 
9
5
%
 C
.I
. 
 
 
 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
M
ea
n
 
S
D
 
A
lp
h
a 
L
o
w
er
 
U
p
p
er
 
  
M
ea
n
 
S
D
 
A
lp
h
a 
L
o
w
er
 
U
p
p
er
 
t 
p
 
C
o
h
en
's
 d
 
S
1
S
1
 
3
.3
4
 
1
.2
5
 
0
.7
8
 
3
.1
8
 
3
.4
9
 
 
3
.2
1
 
1
.2
7
 
0
.7
2
 
2
.9
7
 
3
.4
4
 
9
.9
6
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.1
1
 
S
1
S
2
 
4
.2
6
 
1
.2
2
 
0
.7
4
 
4
.1
0
 
4
.4
1
 
 
3
.9
8
 
1
.4
3
 
0
.7
8
 
3
.7
1
 
4
.2
4
 
6
.5
7
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.2
1
 
S
1
S
3
 
4
.7
7
 
1
.2
5
 
0
.6
6
 
4
.6
2
 
4
.9
3
 
 
4
.7
4
 
1
.4
7
 
0
.7
9
 
4
.4
7
 
5
.0
1
 
0
.2
1
 
0
.8
3
 
0
.0
2
 
S
1
S
4
 
5
.1
5
 
1
.2
 
0
.5
8
 
5
.0
0
 
5
.3
0
 
 
5
.0
5
 
1
.4
9
 
0
.8
1
 
4
.7
7
 
5
.3
2
 
0
.7
0
 
0
.4
8
 
0
.0
8
 
S
2
S
1
 
4
.2
4
 
1
.4
7
 
0
.7
6
 
4
.0
6
 
4
.4
3
 
 
4
.1
0
 
1
.4
7
 
0
.7
9
 
3
.8
2
 
4
.3
7
 
0
.8
8
 
0
.3
8
 
0
.1
0
 
S
2
S
2
 
5
.0
7
 
1
.3
5
 
0
.7
 
4
.9
0
 
5
.2
3
 
 
4
.8
8
 
1
.5
1
 
0
.7
9
 
4
.5
9
 
5
.1
6
 
1
.2
1
 
0
.2
3
 
0
.1
4
 
S
2
S
3
 
5
.5
9
 
1
.2
3
 
0
.6
5
 
5
.4
4
 
5
.7
5
 
 
5
.4
4
 
1
.4
2
 
0
.8
0
 
5
.1
7
 
5
.7
0
 
1
.0
5
 
0
.2
9
 
0
.1
1
 
S
2
S
4
 
5
.9
 
1
.1
 
0
.5
1
 
5
.7
6
 
6
.0
3
 
 
5
.8
4
 
1
.3
4
 
0
.8
1
 
5
.5
9
 
6
.0
9
 
0
.4
2
 
0
.6
7
 
0
.0
5
 
S
3
S
1
 
5
.4
4
 
1
.1
4
 
0
.5
 
5
.3
0
 
5
.5
8
 
 
5
.4
3
 
1
.2
6
 
0
.7
1
 
5
.2
0
 
5
.6
6
 
0
.1
0
 
0
.9
2
 
0
.0
1
 
S
3
S
2
 
5
.7
1
 
1
.0
4
 
0
.3
7
 
5
.5
9
 
5
.8
4
 
 
5
.8
8
 
1
.0
9
 
0
.6
7
 
5
.6
8
 
6
.0
8
 
-1
.3
9
 
0
.1
7
 
-0
.1
6
 
S
3
S
3
 
5
.3
3
 
1
.2
2
 
0
.3
4
 
5
.1
8
 
5
.4
8
 
 
6
.0
1
 
1
.0
9
 
0
.6
7
 
5
.8
1
 
6
.2
1
 
-5
.0
9
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.5
9
 
S
3
S
4
 
5
.5
3
 
1
.2
2
 
0
.4
2
 
5
.3
8
 
5
.6
8
 
 
6
.1
1
 
1
.0
8
 
0
.6
7
 
5
.9
1
 
6
.3
2
 
-4
.3
8
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.5
1
 
S
4
S
1
 
4
.3
1
 
1
.3
6
 
0
.7
1
 
4
.1
4
 
4
.4
8
 
 
4
.1
0
 
1
.2
4
 
0
.6
6
 
3
.8
7
 
4
.3
3
 
1
.4
1
 
0
.1
6
 
0
.1
6
 
S
4
S
2
 
5
.1
8
 
1
.1
6
 
0
.6
 
5
.0
4
 
5
.3
3
 
 
4
.9
7
 
1
.1
8
 
0
.6
9
 
4
.7
5
 
5
.1
9
 
1
.6
2
 
0
.1
1
 
0
.1
8
 
S
4
S
3
 
5
.9
8
 
1
.0
2
 
0
.5
6
 
5
.8
5
 
6
.1
1
 
 
5
.6
2
 
1
.1
7
 
0
.7
0
 
5
.4
0
 
5
.8
4
 
2
.9
6
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.3
3
 
S
4
S
4
 
6
.1
3
 
0
.9
4
 
0
.4
7
 
6
.0
2
 
6
.2
5
 
 
5
.8
9
 
1
.1
3
 
0
.6
7
 
5
.6
8
 
6
.1
0
 
2
.1
4
 
0
.0
3
 
0
.2
3
 
S
5
 
4
.3
2
 
1
.5
6
 
0
.7
8
 
4
.1
3
 
4
.5
1
 
 
4
.1
9
 
1
.5
7
 
0
.8
4
 
3
.9
0
 
4
.4
8
 
0
.7
4
 
0
.4
6
 
0
.0
8
 
S
6
 
5
.9
9
 
1
.0
5
 
0
.5
7
 
5
.8
6
 
6
.1
2
 
 
5
.9
2
 
1
.1
2
 
0
.6
3
 
5
.7
1
 
6
.1
3
 
0
.5
8
 
0
.5
7
 
0
.0
6
 
S
7
 
5
.8
9
 
0
.9
4
 
0
.4
6
 
5
.7
8
 
6
.0
1
 
 
5
.7
4
 
1
.0
1
 
0
.5
5
 
5
.5
5
 
5
.9
3
 
1
.3
9
 
0
.1
7
 
0
.1
5
 
S
8
S
1
 
4
.6
6
 
1
.5
3
 
0
.7
7
 
4
.4
7
 
4
.8
5
 
 
3
.8
1
 
1
.5
7
 
0
.8
5
 
3
.5
2
 
4
.1
0
 
4
.9
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.5
5
 
S
8
S
2
 
5
.1
9
 
1
.4
2
 
0
.7
2
 
5
.0
2
 
5
.3
7
 
  
4
.1
0
 
1
.5
8
 
0
.8
4
 
3
.8
0
 
4
.3
9
 
6
.5
8
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.7
3
 
*T
h
e 
se
co
n
d
 r
es
p
o
n
se
 w
as
 r
em
o
ve
d
 w
h
en
 g
en
er
at
in
g 
C
ro
n
b
ac
h
’s
 A
lp
h
a 
fo
r 
4
 it
em
s 
fo
r 
al
l s
ce
n
ar
io
s 
in
 t
h
e 
sa
m
p
le
 f
ro
m
 U
SA
 e
xc
ep
t 
fo
r 
S3
S3
 a
n
d
 S
3
S4
 w
h
er
e 
th
e 
fi
rs
t 
re
sp
o
n
se
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
fi
ft
h
 r
es
p
o
n
se
 w
as
 r
em
o
ve
d
 r
e
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.  
Th
e 
se
co
n
d
 r
e
sp
o
n
se
 w
as
 r
em
o
ve
d
 w
h
en
 
ge
n
er
at
in
g 
C
ro
n
b
ac
h
’s
 A
lp
h
a 
fo
r 
4
 it
em
s 
fo
r 
al
l s
ce
n
ar
io
s 
ex
ce
p
t 
fo
r 
Sc
en
ar
io
 6
 w
h
er
e 
th
e 
fi
ft
h
 r
es
p
o
n
se
 w
as
 r
e
m
o
ve
d
 f
o
r 
th
e 
sa
m
p
le
 
fr
o
m
 J
ap
an
.  
*
p
 <
 .0
5
, t
w
o
-t
ai
le
d
 , 
**
 p
 <
 .0
1
, t
w
o
-t
ai
le
d
 
 
123 
 
The sample from the United States had a larger mean response in Scenario One, Situation 
One and Two (S1S1: t(363) = 9.96, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.11; S1S2: t(363) = 6.57, p = 0.00, 
Cohen‘s d = 0.21).  The sample from the United States had a smaller mean response in Scenario 
Three, Situations Three and Four (S3S3: (t(363) = -5.09, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.59; S3S4: 
t(363) = -4.38, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.51).  The sample from the United States had larger mean 
responses in Scenario Four, Situations Three and Four (S4S3: t(363) = 2.96, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d 
= 0.33; S4S4: (t(363) = 2.14, p = 0.03, Cohen‘s d = 0.23).  In Scenario Eight, Situations One and 
Two, the sample from the United States had larger mean responses (S8S1: t(363) = 4.90, p = 0.00, 
Cohen‘s d = 0.55; S8S2: t(363) = 6.58, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.73).  
Reliability scores for the remaining situations in the sample from the United States 
increased when the second response or the ―I would keep an eye on the offender before taking 
any action‖ was removed.  For S3S3 and S3S4, reliability scores for each of the situations 
increased when the first response and the fifth response were removed.  Cronbach‘s Alpha 
improved for S2S1, S2S2, S4S1, S5, S8S1 and S8S2 after the second response was dropped.  For 
the remaining 13 situations, though Cronbach‘s Alpha did increase slightly, it remained below 
0.70.   For the sample from Japan, Cronbach‘s Alpha improved for S1S1, S3S1 and S4S3 after 
the second response was dropped.  Cronbach‘s Alpha remained below 0.70 for S3S2, S3S3, 
S4S1, S4S2, S4S4, S6 and S7. 
i. Whistleblower Response (Only the Fifth Response for all Situations) 
Reported in Table 30 are the results of the t-test of the whistleblower response for each 
situation in the samples from the United States and Japan.  In each situation, the fifth response 
represents reporting an action to one‘s supervisor or to an external agency, and this is labeled as  
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the Whistleblower Response.  There was significant difference between the two samples on six 
scenarios.  
The sample from the United States had larger mean responses in Scenario One, Situation 
Four (S1S4: t(363) = 2.16, p = 0.03, Cohen‘s d = 0.24).  The sample from the United States had 
larger mean responses in Scenario Two, Situation Four (S2S4: t(363) = 2.05, p = 0.04, Cohen‘s d 
= 0.23).  The sample from the United States had larger mean responses in Scenario Four, 
Situations Three and Four (S4S3: t(363) = 3.40, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.38; S4S4: t(363) = 3.35, 
p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.37).  For Scenario Six and Seven, the sample from the United States had 
a larger mean response (S6: t(363) = 2.02, p = 0.04, Cohen‘s d = 0.23; S7: t(363) = 2.22, p = 
0.03, Cohen‘s d = 0.25).  In Scenario Eight, Situations One and Two, the sample from the United 
States had larger mean responses (S8S1: t(363) = 3.52, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.41; S8S2: t(363) 
= 6.31, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.72).  
j. Order Effect in Presentation of Scenarios 
Scenarios were originally presented in a sequential order where each situation increased 
in moral intensity within the scenario.  Presenting the scenarios in such an order may affect the 
findings.  To examine the order effect, the scenarios were randomized and data was collected 
from another sample of students in the United States. 
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 There was significant difference between the two samples only in one scenario.  The  
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sample from the United States had a smaller mean response in Scenario Seven (t(305) = -3.145, p 
= 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.30).  However, Scenario Seven has only one situation, so order of 
scenarios has really no effect.  Scenario Six and Seven should be presented as two situations in 
one scenario instead of two separate scenarios.   
k. Gender Effect 
Information about demographic variables was collected to examine if factors such as 
gender have influence on the ethical decision making process.  There was significant difference 
between genders in four scenarios.  The female sample had smaller mean responses in Scenario 
One, Situation Four (t(449) = -1.87, p = 0.03, Cohen‘s d = -0.18), Scenario Two, Situation Two 
and Three (S2S2: t(449) = -2.32, p = 0.01, Cohen‘s d = -0.22; S2S3: t(449) = -2.03, p = 0.02, 
Cohen‘s d = -0.19), Scenario Four, Situation One and Two (S4S1: t(449) = -2.87, p = 0.00, 
Cohen‘s d = -0.27; S4S2: t(449) = -1.65, p = 0.05, Cohen‘s d = -0.16), and Scenario 8, Situation 
One and Two (S8S1: t(449) = -2.22, p = 0.01, Cohen‘s d = -0.21; S8S2: t(449) = -2.04, p = 0.02, 
Cohen‘s d = -0.19). 
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Gender effect for the sample from Japan was also analyzed.  There was significant 
difference between genders in two scenarios. The female sample had larger mean responses in 
Scenario One, Situation Two, Three and Four (S1S2: t(110) = 1.71, p = 0.09; S1S3: t(110) = 1.94, 
p = 0.05; S1S4: t(110) = 1.68, p = 0.10), and Scenario Two, Situation One, Two and Three 
(S2S1: t(110) = 2.78, p = 0.01; S2S2: t(110) = 2.39, p = 0.02; S2S3: t(110) = 1.79, p = 0.08) 
Ethical decision making process based on specific gender was analyzed and compared 
between both countries.  For female participants, significant differences between US and Japan 
were reported in three scenarios.  Female participants from Japan reported a larger mean 
response in Scenario One, Situation One (t(164) = -1.82, p = 0.07) and Scenario Three, Situation 
Three and Four (S3S3: t(164) = -1.97, p = 0.05; S3S4: t(164) = -2.17, p = 0.03).  .  Female 
participants from the US reported a larger mean response in Scenario Eight Situation One and 
Two (S8S1: t(164) = 4.53, p = 0.00; S8S2: t(164) = 4.84, p = 0.00).  For males participants, 
significant differences between US and Japan were reported  in one scenario.  Male participants 
from Japan reported a larger mean response in Scenario Three, Situation Two, Three and Four 
(S3S2: t(172) = -2.19, p = 0.03; S3S3: t(172) = -2.02, p = 0.05; S3S4: t(172) = -1.97, p = 0.05).   
l. Ethnicity Effect 
Information about ethnicity was also collected to examine if ethnicity has influence on 
the ethical decision making process.   The Caucasian sample had smaller mean responses in 
Scenario One, Situation One, Two, Three and Four (S1S1: t(345) = -2.68, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 
-0.35; S1S2: t(345) = -3.15, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.39; S1S3: t(345) = -4.69, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s 
d = -0.58; S1S4: t(345) = -4.27, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.55), Scenario Two, Situation Three 
(t(345) = -1.68, p = 0.05, Cohen‘s d = -0.23), Scenario Three, Situation Two, Three and Four 
(S3S2: t(345) = -1.91, p = 0.03, Cohen‘s d = -0.26; S3S3: t(345) = -2.39, p = 0.01, Cohen‘s d = -
130 
 
0.32; S3S4: t(345) = -2.92, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.40), Scenario Four, Situation Two (t(345) = 
-2.27, p = 0.01, Cohen‘s d = -0.31), and Scenario Five (t(345) = -2.16, p = 0.02, Cohen‘s d = -
0.27). 
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There was significant difference between Caucasian and Asian samples in four scenarios.   
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Ethnicities such as Asians, Japanese, Caucasians and Mixed race from the United States 
were compared with the sample from Japan to test for any ethnicity influence in ethical decision 
making process for the eight scenarios.  There was significant difference between Caucasian and 
Japan samples in six scenarios.  The sample from Japan had a larger mean response in Scenario 
One, Situation One, Three and Four (S1S1: t(156) = -3.63, p = 0.00; S1S3: t(156) = -1.86, p = 
0.06; S1S4: t(156) = -1.75, p = 0.08), Scenario Two, Situation Four (t(156) = -2.06, p = 0.04), 
Scenario Three, Situation One, Two, Three, and Four (S3S1: t(156) = -1.72, p = 0.09; S3S2: 
t(156) = -3.59, p = 0.00; S3S3: t(156) = -3.66, p = 0.00; S3S4: t(156) = -3.72, p = 0.00), Scenario 
Five (t(156) = -1.73, p = 0.09) and Scenario Six (t(156) = -2.75, p = 0.01). 
There was significant difference between Asians from the United States and Japan sample 
in four scenarios.  The sample from Japan had a larger mean response in Scenario One, Situation 
One (t(258) = -1.77, p = 0.08), Scenario Three, Situation Two, Three and Four (S3S2: t(258) = -
1.69, p = 0.09; S3S3: t(258) = -1.90, p = 0.06; S3S4: t(258) = -1.74, p = 0.08) and Scenario Six 
(t(258) = -2.01, p = 0.05).  Asians from the United States had larger mean responses in Scenario 
Eight, Situation One and Two (S8S1: t(258) = 4.53, p = 0.00; S8S2: t(258) = 5.05, p = 0.00). 
There was significant difference between mixed race from the United States and Japan 
sample in three scenarios.  The sample from Japan had a larger mean response in Scenario Three, 
Situation Two and Four (S3S2: t(144) = -2.56, p = 0.01; S3S4: t(144) = -2.55, p = 0.01).  Mixed 
race sample from the United States had larger mean responses in Scenario Four, Situation Two 
(t(144) = 2.15, p = 0.03) and Scenario Eight, Situation One and Two (S8S1: t(144) = 2.56, p = 
0.01; S8S2: t(144) = 3.29, p = 0.00). 
There was significant difference between Japanese from the United States and Japan 
sample in three scenarios.  The sample from Japan had larger mean responses in Scenario One, 
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Situation One (t(142) = -1.68, p = 0.09) and Scenario Three, Situation Two and Three (S3S2: 
t(142) = -2.13, p = 0.04; S3S3: t(142) = -2.28, p = 0.02).  The Japanese sample from the United 
States had a larger mean response in Scenario Eight, Situation One and Two (S8S1: t(142) = 
2.06, p = 0.04; S8S2: t(142) = 3.19, p = 0.00). 
V.  Discussion 
The present study is one of the first to use scenarios in identifying cultural differences in 
whistleblowing behavior.  Findings from this study suggest that the Japanese participants were 
less likely to report stealing to their superior or to a third party.  The Japanese participants 
selected ―keep an eye on the target person‖ as their choice of action when the moral intensity 
was low (mean = 1.91).  As moral intensity increased, they chose to ―inform the boss‖ (mean = 
3.77).  This finding is novel in that it suggests that in some situations even collectivists may blow 
the whistle.  Park, Rehg and Lee (2005) found that in Asian societies that have a collectivist 
culture where loyalty, harmony and cooperation is valued and norms are accepted (Hofstede, 
1980; Hofstede & Bond, 1988), blowing the whistle may be viewed as disrupting the harmony in 
the organization; thus people may not blow the whistle in collectivistic culture. 
Results from this study indicate that participants from the United States were more likely 
to ―inform the boss‖ of sexual harassment (mean = 3.58) while the Japanese participants opted to 
―confront the target person in private‖ (mean = 3.21; t(305) = 2.64, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.41).  
This finding is consistent with prior research, which suggests that Asian men do not consider 
sexual advances as offensive due to their permissive attitude toward sex (Kennedy & Gorzalka, 
2002).  This implies that women are expected to accept such behaviors as compliment despite the 
sexual overtones (Rucker & Gendrin, 2008).   
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The United States participants reported whistleblowing behavior when they chose to‖ 
report to the EPA‖ in Scenario 6 (mean = 4.04; t(305) = 0.67, p = 0.25, Cohen‘s d = 0.11).  
Contrary to expectations, participants from Japan chose to ―inform the boss‖ when witnessing 
the manager polluting the environment (S6: mean = 3.95; S7: mean = 3.73; S7: t(305) = 0.31, p = 
0.38, Cohen‘s d = 0.05).  Again, this study shows that in some situations, people in collectivist 
cultures may also blow the whistle. 
In the US, children are raised to ―tattle tale‖ or report behaviors and actions that are 
frowned upon.  Tattling is a form of measuring a child‘s awareness of what is right and what is 
wrong.  In school, students are told to report to their teachers if they witness a classmate 
vandalizing school property, abusing drugs, cheat, or bully another student.  Outside of school, 
children are taught to call 911 if they witness a crime or an accident.  At home, some parents 
may ask their children to tell them every event that happened to them at school.  Thus, tattling 
could be a factor in influencing the participants from the United States to report the unethical 
behavior to a superior or to a third party.   
  There is an Indian proverb about stealing: ―A thief is a thief, whether he steals a 
diamond or a cucumber.‖  It means that regardless of the value of the item, the act of stealing 
itself is unacceptable. Whether it is stealing a $1 worth of office supplies or $500 in cash from 
the petty cash box, taking these items without authorization is a crime.  The penalty may differ 
between the two countries but the act is still unlawful.  The difference in the selection of 
response between the samples is a reflection of the cultural difference towards taking action 
blowing the whistle.  Whether it is due to social norms or strong interpersonal relations, the 
sample from Japan would rather deal with the situation in private rather than reporting the 
situation to the boss or a third party.  Only when the moral intensity of the situation increased did 
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they select ―inform the boss‖ as their choice of action.  Unlike their Japanese counterpart, the 
sample from the United States were willing to report the unethical behavior to the boss and even 
to a third party regardless of the value.    
There is also litigation cost that needs to be considered.  Not only is culture a factor, but 
the amount of risk an individual will shoulder by blowing the whistle may differ in each country.  
The level of protection offered to whistleblowers through legislation could also factor an 
individual‘s intent to blow the whistle.  
Women were less likely to blow the whistle than men as mean scores for men were 
higher in all scenarios compared to women.  It appears that women are less likely to action in an 
unethical situation.   
VI. Limitations 
First, the sample in this study may not represent the population in either country.  Second, 
the scenarios do not capture every type of unethical issues that may promote whistleblowing.  
Thus, there is a possibility that other unethical issues may produce significant results than the 
issues examined in this study.  Also, some of the scenarios developed for this study may be 
foreign to participants from other countries as the ethical issues selected for this study were 
derived from US current events.  Third, the selection of actions provided for each scenario may 
need to be reexamined as the reliability scores for some of the actions were low even when items 
were dropped.  Fourth, common unisex English names were used in each scenario.  Thus, 
changing the names to common Japanese names may provide a stronger connection with the 
character in each scenario.  
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VII. Summary & Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to determine if culture influences the ethical decision 
making process in predicting whistleblowing behavior.  To achieve this, scenarios were 
employed to explore cultural differences in ethical decision making based on various unethical 
situations.  Scenarios were used to link specific attitude with specific behaviors.  For this study, 
scenarios describing specific unethical settings were developed to predict whistle blowing 
behavior.  Cultural differences emerged between the participants from the United States and 
Japan in their choice of   action for each situation.  Results show that people in both samples 
were less responsive to unethical behavior when the moral intensity was low.  However, as the 
intensity increased, Americans were willing to take action by reporting to their superiors whereas 
Japanese were willing to confront the person privately.   
This study offers insight into how cultural influence can affect the threshold of tolerance 
as moral intensity increases.  This research is relevant as it explores cultural differences in the 
selection of action based increasing moral intensity.  Rather than generalize cultural differences 
based on broad ethical issues, this study examined specific ethical issues with incremental moral 
severity in identifying when culture influences the decision making process.   
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Essay 3: Cultural, Organizational & Individual Differences in Whistleblowing 
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I. Introduction 
This essay proposes to examine how cultural, organizational, and individual differences 
shape whistleblowing behavior.  Multiple culture theories -- Tightness and Looseness, 
Individualism and Collectivism, and Social Axiom theory -- were employed to examine which 
theory is more effective in predicting whistleblowing behavior.   Organizational level variables 
like Organizational Policy towards Whistleblowing, Perception of Organizational Support, 
Perception of Retaliation in Organizations, and Perception of Politics in Organization were used 
to examine their influence vis-à-vis cultural level variables.  Finally, individual difference 
variables like Allocentrism, Idiocentrism, and Big 5 Personality factors were employed to 
examine their influence on whistleblowing behavior as compared to cultural and organizational 
variables.  It is hoped that a multilevel model of whistleblowing behavior can be developed by 
using these variables.  Social desirability was controlled for by using the Marlowe-Crown scale.  
II. Literature Review  
Culture has been defined as ‗the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes 
the members of one human group from another‘ (Hofstede, 1980, p.25).  The world ‗culture‘ is 
reserved for societies as a whole, or nations, whereas ‗subculture‘ is used for the level of an 
organization, profession or family.  An essential feature of social systems is perceived to be the 
inclusion of a system of societal norms, consisting of the value systems shared by major groups 
within a nation.  Values have been defined as ‗a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs 
over others‘ (Hofstede, 1980, p.19). 
Past research has suggested that culture in different countries may impact ethical 
perceptions and behaviors differently (Buller et al., 1991, Cohen et al., 1992).  Cross-cultural 
business ethics research has found differences in business-related ethical perceptions, which can 
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affect the course of actions that a potential whistleblower would choose based on the subject‘s 
ethical perceptions (Brody et al., 1998).  Hofstede (1980, 2001) identified individualism, power 
distance, masculinity/femininity and uncertainty avoidance, as dimensions of international 
differences, which have served as a basis for a considerable amount of research. Where countries 
differ on one or more of these dimensions, the ethical perceptions and judgments of the 
individuals of these cultures may be expected to differ (Cohen et al., 1992, 1995, 1996; Gernon, 
1993; Gray, 1988).   
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Cross-cultural research in the area of whistleblowing has been limited to cultural theories 
such as Hofstede‘s dimensions (Brody et al., 1998; Gray, 1988; Cohen et al., 1992, 1995, 1996; 
Park et al., 2008; Schultz, 1993; Sims & Keenan, 1999) and Confucian ethics (Park, Rehg, & Lee, 
2005).  Brody et al. (1998) examined U.S. and Japanese auditing students‘ responses to a 
whistleblowing situation.  Based on Hofstede‘s dimensions, individualism was significant out of 
all the other dimensions, and Japanese accounting students were found to be less likely to report 
the manager of any wrongdoing compared to the United States students.  
Cohen, Pant and Sharp (1995) examined the responses of U.S., Japanese, and Latin 
American auditors to potentially questionable acts in a variety of scenarios. They identified 
ethical problems arising from cultural differences in international auditing by exploring the 
relationship between Hofstede‘s dimensions and ethical issues pertinent to auditing.  Eight 
vignettes were designed for this study to measure cultural difference.  The first vignette involves 
an auditor accepting the client‘s interpretation in recognizing a revenue transaction where the 
collectability of receivables is questionable.   The second vignette involves an auditor of a soon 
to be bankrupt company warning one of his clients who owes money to this company.  The 
amount owed is 10% of the company‘s receivables. The third vignette involves an accountant 
who accepts to perform an initial audit for the symphony.  The accountant is involved in 
community activities such as promoting the local symphony.  The fourth vignette involves 
management planning on acquiring a client to generate revenue for the firm.  The client places 
heavy emphasis on having an upward trend in reported earnings.  Compensation for management 
is based on recognized earnings.   
The fifth vignette involves a partner setting a bid significantly below cost.  The partner 
expects to raise audit fees a few years down the road to generate profit.  The sixth vignette 
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involves a potential client asking the partner to hire his son as a staff auditor.  The seventh 
vignette involves a senior partner planning on underreporting actual audit hours.  The accounting 
firm recently acquired a client and based on experience, 150 audit hours would be required to 
provide reasonable assurance.  Yet the partner suggests 100 audit hours.  The senior agrees and 
plans to underreport hours while doing all necessary work to provide reasonable assurance.  The 
eighth vignette is based on the seventh vignette.  However, in case judgment is required to 
determine the number of audit procedures, the senior performs fewer procedures. 
Cohen, Pant and Sharp (1995) concluded that cultural differences not only add 
complexity to organizational control in multinational accounting firms, but also call for special 
considerations for effective control of ethical behavior in international auditing firms. Gray 
(1998) extended the research of Cohen et al. by exploring the relationship between Hofstede‘s 
dimensions and accounting values. He concluded that cultural influence was significant on 
accounting systems internationally.    
Schultz, Johnson, Morris and Dyrnes (1993) exposed managers and staff in France, 
Norway, and the U.S. to six whistleblowing situations involving a superior‘s questionable act. 
The first case in the study involves an internal auditor questioning the Vice President‘s 
reimbursement request on personal purchases.  The second case involves a construction engineer 
reporting to his supervisor about a computation error.  The error led to the foundation not 
meeting building code requirements.  The supervisor refuses to rebuild the building due to cost.  
The third case involves an accountant who notifies his supervisor of removing profits from the 
company‘s current earnings due to the company‘s liberal return policy on their leased equipment.  
A competitor has brought a new modern computer at a competitive price.  Majority of their client 
were planning to use the return policy to acquire the new computer.  The supervisor does not 
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want the accountant to revise the current earnings as it would affect a merger, which involves a 
stock-for-stock exchange.  The fourth case involves a purchasing agent overhearing his 
supervisor accepting gifts from clients.  The company has a policy against accepting gifts.  The 
fifth case involves a plant manager requesting the accountant to change a consignment to a sale 
to receive bonuses.  The last case involves a product manager confessing to an engineer about 
falsifying quality inspection reports to deliver the products in time.  Findings showed that 
whistleblowing was a function of national (power distance and uncertainty avoidance) and 
specific circumstances.  Results also showed national culture to be more influential than 
organizational culture.   The French in this study had reported blowing the whistle less than other 
nationalities. 
Sims and Keenan (1999) examined the differences in culture between the United States 
and Jamaica using Hofstede‘s dimensions in exploring how cultural differences may help 
understand the differences in reported whistleblowing tendencies.  Results showed that 
Jamaicans who scored low in the individualism dimension, were less likely to blow the whistle.  
Examining whether there were significant differences in attitudes on whistleblowing between 
students from South Korea, Turkey and the United States, and whether these differences might be 
explained by individualism and collectivism, Park et al., (2008) found that nationality was a 
significant factor in shaping attitudes toward whistleblowing.  They also observed that the same 
cultural orientation could have different effects in different countries. Therefore, the relation 
between cultural orientation and attitudes toward whistleblowing cannot be generalized across 
countries. 
While Hofstede‘s dimensions does provides a framework for uncovering cultural 
differences between groups, which may help explain and predict whistleblowing behavior, the 
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theory alone cannot explain all the differences between two cultures. Also, when dimensions are 
combined, two or more samples may appear more similar to each other, lessening the measurable 
effects of culture.  
Park, Rehg, & Lee (2005) examined the effects of Confucian ethics on the intent to blow 
the whistle using a sample of South Korean public employees. Confucian ethics is a sociocultural 
framework that guides individual behavior, or a broad set of ethical roles and expectations 
regarding daily life, and does necessarily represent the culture as a whole. This study found that 
Confucian ethics has significant and strong influence on whistleblowing, especially in husband 
and wife relationship.  Also, the effects of collectivism were significantly positive, but overall 
were inconsistent in the matter of whistleblowing intentions.  Limitation of this study was that 
the effects of cultural dimensions on whistleblowing was measured at the individual level and 
not at the national level.   
Other cultural theories have emerged in the recent years, which have not been used to 
understand or predict whistleblowing behaviors.  This study fills this gap by using cultural 
theories of Tightness and Looseness (Gelfand, et al., 2011), and Social Axiom Theory (Leung & 
Bond, 2004).  In addition, Individualism & Collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995; Mead, 
1967; Triandis, McCusker & Hui 1990) is also used. 
III. Hypothesis & Model Building 
Hypotheses for cultural, organizational and personality variables in the multilevel model 
is presented in the following subsections by reviewing the relevant literature. 
1. Whistleblowing and Culture Theories 
 Culture has influence on ethical attitudes and behaviors (Ahmed, Chung & Eichenseher, 
2003; Christie, Kwon, Stoeberl & Baumhart, 2003; Su, 2006). Culture also explains individual 
145 
 
ethical attitude preferences (Su, 2006), and is closely linked to ethical decision making through 
its influence on values, reasoning and attitudes (Chen,  Meindl & Hunt, 1997; Leung, Bond & 
Schwartz, 1995; Lu, Rose &  Blodgett, 1999).   Thus, attitude towards whistleblowing is 
influenced by culture.  Culture may influence the individual to hold a negative or positive 
perception about whistleblowing.   Social norms may encourage or prevent whistleblowing 
behavior.   Thus, there is a need to analyze the relationship between culture and whistleblowing 
using multiple cultural theories. 
a. Tightness and Looseness 
Embree (1950) developed the concept of loosely structured social system in analyzing the 
cultural differences between Thailand and Japan.  He found Japan to be ―tight‖ compared to 
Thailand.  Pelto (1968) surveyed the anthropological literature and further defined loose cultures 
where norms could be expressed in alternative ways, deviant behavior was tolerated, and values 
concerning formality and group solidarity were undeveloped.  In the areas of sociology and 
psychology, Boldt (1978a, 1978b) and Berry (1966, 1967) suggested that agricultural societies 
are often tightly structured with no room for ambiguity with clearly defined roles, whereas 
industrialized societies are loose.  Triandis (1989) suggested that homogeneous cultures are tight 
and heterogeneous cultures are loose.  He theorized that due to heterogeneity, culturally loose 
societies are tolerant of deviant behaviors.   
Chan et al. (1996) introduced the theoretical framework of tightness and looseness using 
samples from the United States and Japan.  Tightness and Looseness was measured based on the 
level of agreement about the meaning of words.  Individuals from tight cultures would agree to 
the meaning of the words but not individuals from loose cultures.  Findings from this study 
showed Japan to be tighter as a culture than the United States. 
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Gelfand et al. (2011) proposed the construct of tightness and looseness based on the 
strength of social norms and tolerance of deviant behavior.  They speculated that ecological and 
human-made societal threats might lead to stronger norms and sanctions.  Thus, organizations in 
tight nations are predicted to have strong norms and low tolerance for deviant behavior due to the 
array of external threats that nation may have historically encountered.   For example, there are 
strict social norms as to how one would greet (how deep one would bow; proper ways of 
exchanging business cards etc.) others in Japan.  Meanwhile, "loose" nations have weaker social 
norms, a high tolerance of deviant behavior and are more permissive.  In the 33-nation study 
(Gelfand et al., 2011), Japan was found to have a tightness score of 8.6 and the United States a 
score of 5.1. Findings from this study showed the United States to be a loose culture when 
compared to Japan.    
Harrington and Gelfand (2014) examined tightness and looseness across the 50 states of 
the United States.  Tightness for each state was determined by the history of ecological threats, 
man made threats, the strength of punishment if laws were violated, religiosity and the 
population of foreigners.  Findings showed California to be the loosest with an index score of 
27.37.  Hawaii was the eighth loosest state with an index score of 36.49.  Mississippi was the 
tightest of all 50 states with an index score of 78.86.  Tightness in their study was also associated 
with inequality, social stability, population size, the level of available natural resources, the level 
of happiness, and so forth.  Tight states would experience high incidence of natural disaster, have 
few natural resources, are small in population size, and have greater gender equality. 
In the 68-nation study (Uz, 2015), three different indices of cultural tightness and 
looseness (CTL) were developed based on the variation of a range of social values: domain-
specific index, domain-general index, and the combination index.   Data was collected using the 
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European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association (EWVS).  Domain specific 
index focused on morality variables from EWVS, domain general index used all available data 
from EWVS, and combination index was based on groups of domains, followed by factor 
analysis of the groups to determine the tightness and looseness index. In all the three indices, the 
higher the score, the higher was the cultural looseness.  Findings from this study showed Japan to 
be tighter than the United States on all three indexes. 
Whistle-blowing is considered an extreme case of deviation from the social norm.  People 
in tighter cultures will refrain from blowing the whistle if the social norm towards 
whistleblowing is an unacceptable form of behavior.  Tight nations are expected to have strict 
social norms with a narrow range of acceptable social behaviors where whistleblowing may be 
viewed negatively as a deviant behavior.   Thus, the following is proposed: 
H1a:  People in loose cultures like the United States are more likely to blow the whistle than 
people in tight cultures like Japan. 
 
b. Individualism & Collectivism 
The most widely studied type of cultural orientations are individualism and collectivism, 
which are characterized by how much a person stresses his or her own goals, or the goals of his 
or her group (Bochner, 1994; Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Triandis, 1995, 1996).   Collectivists are 
individuals who view themselves primarily as parts of a whole, whereas Individualists view 
themselves as separate from other people (Triandis, 1989; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Hofstede 
(1980) considered individualism and collectivism to be opposite ends of a single cultural 
dimension.  Triandis (1995) summarized four defining attributes of collectivism and 
individualism that captures difference between them in a systematic way: conceptions of the self 
(independent for individualist and interdependent for collectivists), goal relationships 
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(individualists followed their own goals, whereas collectivists follow group goals), relative 
importance of attitudes and norms (individualist follow attitudes, values, and beliefs whereas 
collectivists follow norms), and patterns of social exchange (individualists are rational in social 
exchange whereas collectivists are relational).   
Triandis and colleagues (Triandis, 1995; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; 
Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) proposed individualism and collectivism to be of vertical or 
horizontal categories.  Horizontal individualism reflected an independent/same self-construal. 
Vertical individualism reflected an independent/different self-construal.  Horizontal collectivism 
reflected an interdependent/same self-construal.  Vertical collectivism reflected an 
interdependent/different self-construal.    
Past studies (Chen et al., 1997; Park, Rehg, & Lee 2005; Park et al., 2008; Sims & 
Keenan 1999; Smith & Hume, 2005; Thomas & Au, 2002) have suggested that whistleblowing 
tendencies might be influenced by individualism and collectivism. Collectivists avoid directly 
criticizing a co-worker, consistent with a motivation to preserve harmonious working 
relationships (Holtgraves, 1997; Lee, 1993; Ting-Toomey et al., 1991). In general, collectivist 
cultures disapprove of whistleblowing as it disrupts the unity of an organization (Brody et al., 
1998).  Japan is found to be more collectivist than the United States.  Therefore, it can be 
theorized that people in a collectivist culture such as Japan would look down upon 
whistleblowing. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1b: People in Japan are less likely to blow the whistle than people in the U.S. 
c. Social Axiom 
Based on Rotter‘s (1966) locus of control, Leung and Bond (2004) conceptualized social 
axioms as generalized beliefs about the world.  Leung et al., (2002) defined social axioms as the 
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―generalized beliefs about oneself, the social and physical environment, or the spiritual world, 
and are in the form of an assertion about the relationship between two entities or concepts (p. 
289).‖  According to Leung and Bond (2004), social axioms help channel one‘s expectations, 
motivations, attitudes and behaviors.   
Leung, et al., (2002) identified five general factors of social axioms at the individual 
level: social cynicism, social complexity, reward for application, religiosity, and fate control.  
Social cynicism refers to the negative assessment of human nature and social events. Social 
complexity refers to the view that there are multiple solutions to social issues, and that the 
outcome of events is uncertain. Reward for application refers to the position that the investment 
of human resources will lead to positive outcomes. Fate control refers to the general belief that 
social events are influenced by impersonal or external factors. And finally, Religiosity refers to 
the view that spiritual forces influence the human world and that religious institutions exert a 
positive effect on social outcomes.   
Based on the scores collected from 40 countries, the United States scored higher on 
Social Complexity (4.1 vs. 4.04), Reward for Application (3.66 vs. 3.5), and Religiosity (3.18 vs. 
2.65) factors compared to the Japanese sample (Leung & Bond, 2004).  On the other hand, the 
Japanese sample scored higher on Fate Control ((2.59 vs. 2.46) and Social Cynicism (3.16 vs. 
2.65).  
Bond et al. (2004) collected data in over 40 cultures and identified social axiom 
dimensions at the individual (Dynamic Externality) and national (Societal Cynicism) levels.  
Dynamic Externality combines items from four of the factors previously identified across 
cultures at the individual level: Reward for Application, Religiosity, Fate Control, and Social 
Complexity.  Items used to measure Societal Cynicism were from the Social Cynicism factor.  
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This dimension can be described as the same as social cynicism, but only at the national level.  
Findings from this study showed a connection between the two dimensions and variables such as 
personality, subjective well-being, GDP, political environment, gender equity, and so forth. 
Based on the scores collected from 40 countries, the United States had higher index score 
of 65.6 for Dynamic Externality compared to Japan‘s index score of 60.2.   On the other hand, 
Japan had a higher index score of 61.4 for Societal Cynicism compared to the United States‘ 
index score of 50.7. (Bond et al., 2004). 
Social axiom theory is viewed as a social learning theory.  People observe their 
interpersonal, social and spiritual universe, looking for opportunities managing constraints, and 
evaluating the possibility of reinforcing what is positive (Leung & Bond, 2004; Leung et al., 
2002).  Social axiom can influence attitudes and perception towards whistleblowing. However, 
not all of the factors will predict whistleblowing behavior.  The following hypotheses are 
proposed: 
Cynicism represents the negative view of human nature and shows a disregard of ethical 
means for achieving an end. Whistleblowing is likely to be viewed by people who are strong on 
Cynicism as a useless action because they believe reporting the wrongdoing won‘t improve the 
situation.   
H1ci: People who score high on Cynicism are less likely to blow the whistle. 
Reward for Application dimension refers to how strongly a person believes that the 
challenges he or she may face will lead to positive outcomes. Whistleblowing is likely to be 
viewed by people who are strong on Reward for Application as a challenge that would lead to 
positive outcomes.   
H1cii: People who score high on Reward for Application are more likely to blow the whistle. 
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Social Complexity suggests that there are no strict rules but rather multiple ways of 
achieving a given outcome and that inconsistency in human behavior is common.   
Whistleblowing is likely to be viewed as one of the possible solutions to a situation by those 
score high on social complexity.  Every possible solution will be considered before following 
through with the choice of action.    
H1ciii: People who score high on Social Complexity are more likely blow the whistle. 
 People who are religious are found to be more ethical.  Whistleblowing is likely to be 
viewed by people who are strong on Religiosity as an altruistic action.   They may view 
whistleblowing as the right thing to do by exposing the wrong doing to the public to prevent any 
further harm.   
H1civ: People who score high on Religiosity are more likely to blow the whistle. 
 People who believe that life events are predetermined or controlled by fate are likely to 
accept whatever is happening around them, including unethical activities of others. People who 
are strong on Fate Control may believe that what is being done is meant to happen, and there is 
very little they can do to change the course of action. Thus, they would not blow the whistle on 
the unethical behavior.   
H1cv: People who score high on Fate Control are less likely to blow the whistle. 
2. Whistleblowing and Organizational Variables 
Four organizational variables were considered important to examine their influence on 
whistleblowing behavior. The literature on each of them is reviewed, and their role in shaping 
whistleblowing behavior is hypothesized.  
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a. Organizational Policy Towards Whistleblowing 
   Some organizations encourage people to report wrongdoing and protect those who do so.  
Following the whistleblowing protection laws the United States federal government has 
attempted to create a structure that promotes reporting malpractices.  However, there are many 
organizations that do not support the detection of unethical behaviors.  Thus, depending on the 
working environment that an organization provides, it can encourage its employees to report 
whistleblowing or prevent whistleblowing.  Therefore, the following hypothesis proposed: 
H2a:  People are likely to blow the whistle if organizations encourage employees to report 
unethical behavior. 
 
b. Perception of Politics in Organizations 
Kacmar and Ferris (1991) developed the Perception of Politics Scale. The scale was 
designed to assess the degree to which participants viewed their work environment as political.  
The perceptions individuals have on the political nature of their work may influence their job 
performance.  These perceptions also influence their feelings towards their company, superiors, 
and co-workers, productivity, satisfaction, and turnover (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992).  Employees 
are likely to engage in political behaviors if they perceive that doing so will help them in getting 
ahead (Ferris, Fedor, Chachere & Pondy, 1989).  Therefore, organizational culture is influenced 
by the degree of political activity in organizations and how the employees react to those 
activities (Kacmar & Carlson, 1997). 
  According to Ferris and colleagues (Ferris, et al., 1989; Kacmar & Ferris, 1991; Ferris & 
Judge, 1991; Ferris, Russ & Fandt, 1996;), the perception of organizational politics has three 
dimensions: General Political Behavior, Go Along To Get Ahead and Pay And Promotion 
Policies.  General political behavior is focused on serving individual‘s own cause of achieving 
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their individual goals (Fandt & Ferris, 1990; Ferris et al., 1989; Kacmar & Ferris, 1993; Kacmar 
& Carlson, 1997). The second dimension captures how individuals proceed acquiescently, 
showing lack of interest in actions and remaining silent in order to mold the situations in their 
best interest (Byrne, 2005). Finally, pay and promotion policies capture employees involvement 
in promotional policies and decisions (Ferris et al, 1989). The first two factors capture people 
who are actively involved in organizational politics, whereas the third factor captures the 
inclusion of employee voice in organizational processes.  Since organizations that include 
people‘s voice are less likely to see whistleblowing events, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2b: People who are involved in organizational politics (score high on the Perception of 
Politics Scale (POPS), are less likely to blow the whistle. 
 
c. Perceived Organizational Support in Organizations  
Perceived Organizational Support (POS) is a reciprocity norm between the employer and 
the employee where employers value dedication and commitment by rewarding these values with 
tangible and socioemotional rewards to increase work effort and loyalty from employees. 
Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchinson, and Sowa (1986) introduced POS as the antecedent of 
organizational commitment. They used a social exchange view to explain the relationship 
between organizational commitment and perceived employer commitment.  This view suggests 
that an employee's perceived view of the organization's commitment to him or her contributes to 
the employee's commitment to the organization (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002).   
Reciprocity norm obliges the return of favorable treatment (Gouldner, 1960).   Thus, the 
social exchange of employee loyalty and performance for tangible benefits and social rewards 
can lead to beneficial outcomes when favorable treatments received by either party is 
reciprocated.  Levinson (1965) proposed the concept of reciprocation.  Reciprocation is the 
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exchange of psychological support for job performance.  Employees receive psychological 
support and growth from the organization in exchange for contribution and investment in the 
organization‘s task.  Psychological support may consist of organization affiliation, mastery of the 
job and stimulation through tasks.    
Rhoades and Eisenberger‘s (2002) meta-analysis suggested that on the basis of 
organizational support theory (Eisenberger et. al, 1986), three basic antecedents of POS included 
fair organizational procedures, supervisor support, and favorable rewards and job conditions.  
The three general forms of perceived favorable treatment received from the organization would 
increase POS.  On the basis of reciprocity norm, consequences of POS included increased 
affective commitment to the organization, increased performance, and reduced withdrawal 
behaviors.  The effect of POS would create a felt obligation to care about the organization‘s 
welfare, enhancing employee‘s affective commitment to the personified organization as well as 
produce a strong sense of belonging to the organization, involving the incorporation of 
employees‘ membership and role status into their social identity (Armeli et al., 1998; 
Eisenberger et al., 1986; Eisenberger, Armeli, Rexwinkel, Lynch, & Rhoades, 2001, Rhoades & 
Eisenberger, 2002).  Based on their meta-analysis, the three general categories of favorable 
treatment received by employees were positively related to POS, which, in turn, was associated 
with outcomes favored by employees and the organization. It seems that POS leads to 
commitment and loyalty, and would prevent employees to do something that may hurt the 
organization.  
H2c: Low positive organizational support would lead to whistleblowing. 
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3. Whistleblowing and Individual Differences 
Dispositional variables like needs, attitudes, preferences and motives result in a tendency 
to react to situations in a predetermined manner (House, Shane & Herrold, 1996), which is 
referred to as personality characteristics.  In other words, people are predisposed to act in a 
certain way despite the social context.  Thus, it may be useful in using personality measures in 
predicting unethical behavior.  Three individual level variables were selected to examine their 
influence on whistleblowing.  Allocentrism and Idiocentrism were derived from the cross-
cultural literature, whereas Big Five Personality Factors were selected for their extensive use 
across many countries.  The literatures on each of these constructs are reviewed, and how each of 
them may influence whistleblowing behavior is hypothesized.   
a. Allocentrism & Idiocentrism 
Collectivism and Individualism have been used to describe cultural level tendencies and 
have been described as a "broad cultural syndrome" (Triandis, 1995).  Triandis et al. (1985) 
proposed that the term allocentrism be used to describe collectivist tendencies at the individual 
level, and idiocentrism to tap individualism at the individual level.  Allocentric individuals are 
more likely to be reluctant to report the wrongdoing of the in-group not only to preserve their 
social identity with the group but also to prevent the disruption of unity of the in-group.  On the 
other hand, idiocentric individuals will report the wrongdoings of the in-group as his or her 
identity and goals are separate from the in-group and they do not worry about what others think.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3a: Allocentrics are less likely to blow the whistle than idiocentrics.  
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b. Big Five Personality Factors 
The five-factor model of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992) represents a structure of 
traits, which have been developed and elaborated over the last five decades. Factors are defined 
by groups of intercorrelated traits, which are referred to as facets (McCrae & Costa, 1997). The 
five factor model of personality as measured by the Neo-Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-
PI-R) includes Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. 
Depending on one‘s personality type, an individual may or may not be inclined to blow the 
whistle when he or she sees an unethical behavior arises in an organization.   
Neuroticism: This factor represents the emotional stability of a person, and those who 
score high in this trait are emotionally unstable. People high in neuroticism are emotionally 
reactive.  They are more likely to interpret ordinary situations as threatening, and minor 
frustrations as hopelessly difficult. These problems in emotional regulation can diminish a 
neurotic's ability to think clearly, make decisions, and cope effectively with stress.  
Whistleblowing is likely to be viewed by people who are strong on Neuroticism as a form of 
reaction from not being able to handle the emotional stress from witnessing or experiencing an 
unethical behavior.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3b:  People who score high on Neuroticism are more likely to blow the whistle. 
Extraversion: This factor is marked by pronounced engagement with the external world. 
Extroverts enjoy being with people, are full of energy, often experience positive emotions, assert 
themselves, and draw attention to themselves. People high in extraversion are not shy and will 
point out any errors or mistakes they observe.  If they witness or experience wrong doing, they 
will blow the whistle to gain the attention of the public to address the matter.  Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
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H3c:  People who score high on Extraversion are more likely to blow the whistle. 
Agreeableness: This factor reflects individual differences in concern with cooperation 
and social harmony.  People who score high on Agreeableness value getting along with others. 
They are considerate, helpful, and willing to compromise their interests with others. Despite 
witnessing or experiencing an unethical behavior, they may refrain from blowing the whistle if 
the norm is to accept the situation.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3d:  People who score high on Agreeableness are less likely to blow the whistle. 
Openness: This factor describes a dimension of cognitive style that is imaginative and 
creative.  Those who score high in this trait are intellectually curious, appreciative of art and 
enjoy new experience whereas closed people are conservative and resistant to change.  They tend 
to be more aware of their feelings and have unique ideas. Whistleblowing is likely to be viewed 
by people who are strong on Openness as bringing in good and new change to an organization or 
society by exposing wrong doing.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3e:  People who score high on Openness are more likely to blow the whistle. 
Conscientiousness: This factor concerns the way in which we control, regulate, and direct 
our impulses. People high in Conscientiousness tend to be reliable, self-disciplined, act dutifully, 
and are achievers.  Whistleblowing is likely viewed by people strong in Conscientiousness as a 
duty and responsibility to report wrongdoing.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3f:  People who score high on Conscientiousness are more likely to blow the whistle. 
4.  Antecedents & Consequences 
Triandis and Vassiliou (1967) developed a number of techniques to analyze subjective 
culture, including the ‗antecedent–consequent‘ method. This approach was originally used to 
investigate differences in the way people understand the meaning of some commonly used 
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concepts like trust, hope, freedom, and so forth. The approach was then developed further to 
assist in questionnaire design for cross-cultural research. 
   Situations of high moral intensity are likely to be perceived as requiring action. Many 
studies in the past have explored the impact of moral intensity on ethical decision making 
(Barnett 2001; Davis et al. 1998; Morris & McDonald 1995; Singer1996, 1998; Singer et al. 
1998; Singer & Singer 1997; Tsalikis et al. 2001).  A mediation analysis will be carried out to 
test if behavioral intention mediates whistleblowing attitude and whistleblowing behavior.  
IV. Methodology 
a. Power Analysis 
 G*Power Version 3.1.9.2 was used to calculate the minimum sample size needed for each 
country. Sample size was generated based on the number of predictors, the effect size, alpha 
error probability, and level of power.  For the effect size, 0.15 was used, 0.05 for alpha error 
probability, and 0.80 for power.  This gave the minimum sample size of 56. 
b. Data Collection 
Data for this study were collected from the United States and Japan.  The respondents 
were local undergraduate students in each country.  Sample sizes varied from 114 in Japan to 
251 in the United States. Data was collected from six class sections in Japan and 18 class 
sections in the United States.  The instruments in English were translated into Japanese using the 
back translation process (Brislin, 1980).  Initially, a court interpreter translated the items from 
English into Japanese and a graduate student translated the Japanese items into English without 
reference to the original English text.  Both translators were first generation Japanese-Americans.  
A total of five revisions were made on items that were found to have discrepancies between the 
original English items and the back translated English version.  Next, a professor from the 
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Department of East Asian Languages & Literature who is from Japan, assisted in reviewing the 
accuracy of the Japanese items comparing them with the original English items.  After the 
revisions were made, a professor in the Department of Psychology in Japan, checked the 
accuracy of the Japanese version.  Finally, another psychology professor in Japan reviewed and 
provided edits for the Japanese version.   
Students in each location were given the battery of instruments though a link and they 
filled out the questionnaire according to their convenience. Students received extra credit from 
the professors for completing the assignment.  Unique URL links were provided for each faculty 
member in each location.   
c. Instruments Used 
The battery of instruments for the cultural level variables were as follows: six items for 
tightness-looseness (Gelfand et al., 2011), 10 items for individualism and collectivism measure 
(Bochner, 1994; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995, 1996) and 25 items for social axiom which 
consisted of five items each for Cynicism, Reward for Application, Social Complexity, 
Religiosity, and Fate Control (Leung& Bond, 2004).  Organizational level variables were 
measured by four items for Perceived Organizational Support in Organizations (Rhoades & 
Eisenberger, 2002), five items for Perception of Politics in Organizations (Ferris & Kacmar, 
1992), eight items for Perceived Organizational Support in Organizations (Eisenberger, 
Huntington, Hutchison& Sowa, 1986), six items for Perception of Retaliation in Organizations 
Scale (US Merit Based Survey 2010), and five items for Organizational Policy Towards 
Whistleblowing (US Merit Based Survey 2010). Individual level personality variables included 
five items for Allocentrism (Kashima, Y., Yamaguchi, Susumu, Kim, U., Choi, S., Gelfand, M. 
J., & Yuki, M., 1995), 10 items for Idiocentrism (Oyserman, 2008), and 25 items for Big 5 
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Personality Factors, which consisted of five items each for Extroversion, Agreeableness, 
Neuroticism, Conscientious and Openness (McCrae & Costa, 1997). Six items for Antecedent 
and six items for Consequence were used to collect data for antecedent and consequence analysis.  
The dependent variable, propensity to blow the whistle, was measured using 10 items. From the 
Marlowe-Crowne scale (Marlowe & Crowne, 1960) 10 items were selected to measure social 
desirability in the response of the participants. A seven point Likert scale was used for all the 
items: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), somewhat disagree (3), neutral (4), somewhat agree (5), 
agree (6) and strongly agree (7). 
d. Scale Development 
The following scales were adapted for this study from existing scales: :  Antecedent and 
Consequence of whistleblowing, Propensity to Blow the Whistle (US Merit Based Survey 2010), 
Perception of Retaliation in Organizations (US Merit Based Survey 2010), Organizational Policy 
Towards Whistleblowing (US Merit Based Survey 2010), and the collectivism and 
whistleblowing (Bochner, 1994; Hofstede, 1980; Oyserman, 1993; Triandis, 1995, 1996).   
A six-item scale was designed for both the Antecedents and Consequences of 
whistleblowing.  Items for Antecedent measured for individual‘s impartiality for taking action if 
witnessing an unethical behavior.  Items that were reverse coded measured bias for taking action 
in reporting the unethical behavior. 
Items in the Consequence scale measured individual‘s regard for adverse impact on 
self/peer/organization if reporting the unethical behavior.  Items that were reverse coded 
measured concerns of the outcome from reporting the unethical behavior.  Each item in the 
scales for Antecedent and Consequence included a proviso to define what the unethical behavior 
consisted of.  
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The Propensity to Blow the Whistle scale was inspired from the US Merit Based Survey 
2010 and was adapted to specifically measure the degree of participant‘s attitude towards 
whistleblowing.  Perception of Retaliation in Organizations Scale and Organizational Policy 
Towards Whistleblowing Scale were also adapted from the US Merit Based Survey.   
The following scales were adapted to a university setting to make the scales relevant to 
students.  Phrases such as organizations or boss were replaced with university and professor 
respectively on the following scales: Perceived Organizational Support in Organizations Scale 
(Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002), Perception of Politics in Organizations Scale (Ferris & Kacmar, 
1992), Perceived Organizational Support in Organizations Scale (Eisenberger, Huntington, 
Hutchison& Sowa, 1986), 
Finally, the whistleblowing scale was inspired by scales used to measure individualism 
(Bochner, 1994; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995, 1996) and Oyserman‘s (1993) Individualism 
and Collectivism measure scale.  The 10 items developed for this scale measured if one‘s 
decision to blow the whistle was dependent on the potential impact it would have on the 
participant‘s relationship with his or her in-group.   
Items in this scale were designed for the whistleblowing context. The scale was 
developed using a collectivist viewpoint to measure if the welfare of the participant‘s in-group 
influenced his or her decision to blow the whistle.   
e. Sample 
Data for this study were collected in the United States and Japan.  The respondents were 
undergraduate business students.  Sample sizes varied from 114 in Japan to 251 in the United 
States. Data was collected from six class sections in Japan and 18 class sections in the United 
States.  One of the students did not report their college level.  As a result, the sample from 
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Japan consisted of 14 seniors, 39 juniors, 54 sophomore and six freshmen students.  One 
freshmen and one sophomore did not select a gender.  As a result, 46 males and 66 females 
were recorded for this study.  One student was 40 years of age, 47 of the participants were 
under the age of 20 while the remaining were between the ages of 20 and 23.  All of the 
participants from Japan were single and of Japanese origin.  The sample from the United 
States consisted of 175 seniors, 72 juniors and three sophomore students.  137 males and 113 
females participated in this study.  Seven students were under the age of 20 and 215 were 
between the ages of 20 and 39.  One student did not answer any of the demographic items 
and seven students left the age item blank.  Three faculty members from Japan and 11 from 
the United States were involved in data collection.   
f. Analysis 
Five different methods of data analysis were used to empirically test the hypotheses being 
developed to test the hypotheses.  Statistical tests were conducted for each of the countries 
separately.  First, descriptive statistics were computed to determine the means and standard 
deviation for each variable. The responses of the two samples were then compared to assess 
whether there is any significant difference using a t-test.   
Second, a Pearson‘s Correlation was conducted to identify statistically significant 
relationships and the direction of the relationships between the Propensity to Blow the Whistle 
variable with the remaining variables.  Third, a hierarchical regression analyses was conducted to 
find out if there was any relationship between the Propensity to Blow the Whistle variable with 
the remaining variables across culture, organization and individual levels. Fourth, a Pearson‘s 
Correlation was used to measure the correlation between the Social Desirability variable with the 
remaining variables to identify if items were responded in a socially desirable manner.  Finally a 
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mediation analysis was used to test for mediation effect of the Propensity to blow the whistle on 
the relationship between the Antecedent and Consequence variable.  A Sobel test was used to 
measure mediation effect 
V. Results 
Some of the items in the scales were reverse-coded.  A mean score for each scale was 
computed by adding the scores for the items.  A total of 20 mean scores were computed.  Next, 
the mean score for each scale for each country was computed.  The results of the research 
findings are presented in Tables 2 through 6 and are discussed in detail throughout this section. 
Table 2 provides statistical information on the variables for samples from the United States and 
Japan. Tables 3 and 4 provide the correlation matrices for the 20 variables for the United States 
and Japan respectively. Table 5 is the summary of the hierarchical regression analysis of the 
whistleblowing variable for both the United States and Japan. Table 6 provides information on 
the correlation of variables with the Social Desirability variable. 
a. Descriptive Statistics 
Reported in Tables 2 are the results of the t-test of the variables for the samples from  the 
United States and Japan.  Findings show significant differences between the two samples on 13 
of the 20 variables.   
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 For cultural variables, the United States sample had a larger mean response on the 
Propensity to Blow the Whistle (t(363) = 5.55, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.64), Reward for 
Application (t(363) = 4.68, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.53), Social Complexity (t(363) = 2.72, p = 
0.01, Cohen‘s d = 0.30) and Religiosity (t(363) = 3.53, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.43).  However, 
the United States sample had a smaller mean response on the Tightness & Looseness (t(363) = -
6.07, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.67). 
For organizational variables, the United States sample had smaller mean responses on the 
Perceived Organizational Support (t(363) = -4.41, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.50) and on the 
Perception of Politics in Organizations (t(363) = -3.38, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.39). 
For personality variables, the sample from the United States had a larger mean response 
on the Allocentrism (t(363) = 6.32, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.71) and on the Idiocentrism (t(363) = 
6.8, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.77).  For the Big Five Personality, the United States sample had a 
larger mean response on Extroversion (t(363) = 1.99, p = 0.05, Cohen‘s d = 0.22), Agreeableness 
(t(363) = 6.13, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = 0.66), Conscientiousness (t(363) = 10.21, p = 0.00, 
Cohen‘s d = 1.14) and Openness (t(363) = 6.12, p = 0.000, Cohen‘s d = 0.67).  However, the 
United States sample from the United States had a smaller mean response on Neuroticism (t(363) 
= -4.74, p = 0.00, Cohen‘s d = -0.52). 
 Cronbach‘s Alpha measures internal consistency and is considered to be a measure of 
reliability of a psychometric instruments (Streiner & Norman, 1989).  Cronbach‘s Alpha for the 
sample from the United States had 16 out of the 21 variables above 0.70 (e.g. Propensity to Blow 
the Whistle, Individualism & Collectivism, Cynicism, Reward for Application, Social 
Complexity, Religiosity, Fate Control, Organizational Policy Towards Whistleblowing, 
Perceived Organizational Support in Organizations, eight-item Perceived Organizational Support 
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in Organizations, Perception of Politics in Organizations, Idiocentrism, Extroversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientious, and Openness).  For the sample from Japan, 12 out of the 21 
variables had Cronbach‘s Alpha above 0.70 (e.g. Propensity to Blow the Whistle, Individualism 
& Collectivism, Social Complexity, Organizational Policy Towards Whistleblowing, Perceived 
Organizational Support in Organizations, eight-item Perceived Organizational Support in 
Organizations, Perception of Retaliation, Allocentrism, Idiocentrism, Extroversion, 
Agreeableness and Openness). 
Reliability scores for the remaining variables in the United States sample increased when 
a single item was removed from each variable.  Cronbach‘s Alpha improved for Neuroticism 
after an item was dropped.  The remaining four variables did increase slightly but alpha remained 
below 0.70.   For the Japan sample, Cronbach‘s Alpha improved for Tightness & Looseness, 
Religiosity, Conscientiousness and Neuroticism after an item was dropped from each variable.  
Cronbach‘s Alpha remained below 0.70 for the remaining variables. 
b. Test of Predictors of Whistleblowing 
A correlation matrix of the 20 variables for the sample from the United States is 
presented in Table 3.  Findings suggest that Propensity to Blow the Whistle demonstrated 
convergent validity with the following variables: Tightness & Looseness (r = 0.199, p < 0.01), 
Reward for Application(r = 0.345, p < .01), Social Complexity(r = 0.384, p < .01), 
Organizational Policy Towards Whistleblowing (r = 0.109, p < .05), Idiocentrism (r = 0.368, p < 
0.01), Extroversion (r = 0.17, p < .01), Agreeableness (r = 0.364, p < 0.01), Conscientious (r = 
0.378, p < 0.01), and Openness(r = 0.259, p < 0.01).   The results indicate that Hypothesis, 1cii, 
1ciii, 2a, 3a, 3c, and 3d are supported based on the positive relationships. 
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The following had a negative relationship with Propensity to Blow the Whistle:  
Individualism & Collectivism (r = -0.303, p < 0.01) and Perception of Retaliation (r = -0.148, p 
< 0.01). The negative correlation between the Propensity to Blow the Whistle variable and the 
Individualism & Collectivism variable suggest that Individualism is related to whistleblowing 
propensities at the cultural level as stated in Hypothesis 1b.  Also, the negative correlation 
between the Propensity to Blow the Whistle variable and the Perception of Retaliation variable 
suggests that fear of retaliation is a hurdle to whistleblowing.  The positive relationships between 
Propensity to Blow the Whistle and Tightness, Agreeableness and Openness were counter to 
Hypothesis 1a, 3e, and 3f.  
A correlation matrix of the 20 variables for the sample from Japan is presented in Table 3.  
Findings suggest that Propensity to Blow the Whistle demonstrated convergent validity in the 
Japan sample with the following variables: Reward for Application (r = 0.315, p < 0.01), Social 
Complexity (r = 0.316, p < 0.01), Perceived Organizational Support (r = 0.248, p < 0.01), 
Idiocentrism (r = 0.308, p < 0.01), and Openness (r = 0.221, p < 0.05).   Hypothesis 1cii, 1ciii, 2c, 
3a, and 3e are supported. 
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The following had a negative relationship with Propensity to Blow the Whistle:  
Collectivism & Whistleblowing (r = -0.551, p < 0.01) and Allocentrism (r = -0.258, p < 0.01).  
The negative correlation between the Propensity to Blow the Whistle variable and the 
Individualism & Collectivism variable suggest that Individualism is related to whistleblowing 
propensities at the cultural level as stated in Hypothesis 1b.  However, finding the sample from 
Japan individualistic was unexpected.  Also, the negative correlation between the Propensity to 
Blow the Whistle variable and Allocentrism suggests that the sample from Japan comprised 
idiocentric individuals.  Though Hypothesis 3a is supported based on the positive relationship 
between the Propensity to Blow the Whistle with Idiocentrism, the negative relationship with 
Allocentrism was unexpected from the sample from Japan.  The positive relationship between 
Propensity to Blow the Whistle and Tightness and a negative relationship with Allocentrism 
were counter to Hypothesis 1a and 3a. 
c. Test of Incremental Validity 
A hierarchical regression analysis was performed to investigate the ability of cultural, 
organizational and personality variables to predict propensity to blow the whistle (Table 5).  In 
the first step of hierarchical multiple regression, seven cultural predictors were entered: 
Tightness & Looseness, Individualism & Collectivism, Cynicism, Reward for Application, 
Social Complexity, Religiosity and Fate Control. This model was statistically significant F(7, 
243) = 123.92; p < .001 and explained 28.6 % of variance in whistleblowing propensities for the 
United States sample.  After entering the organizational variables in Step 2, the total variance 
explained by the model as a whole was 31.3% (F(12, 238) = 9.028; p < .001). The introduction 
of organizational variables explained additional 2.7 % variance in whistleblowing propensities, 
after controlling for cultural variables (R
2
 Change = 0.027; F(5,238) = 1.84; p > .001).  Finally, 
171 
 
the personality variables were entered in Step 3, where the total variance explained by the model 
as a whole was 40.4% (F(19, 231) = 8.255; p < .001). The addition of personality variables 
explained additional 9.2 % variance in whistleblowing propensities, after controlling for cultural 
and organizational variables (R
2
 Change = 0.092; F(7,231) = 5.075; p < .001).  In the final model, 
4 of the 20 predictor variables were statistically significant, with Social Complexity recording a 
higher Beta value (β = 0.211, p < .01) than Collectivism (β = -0.286, p < .001), Idiocentrism (β = 
0.16, p < .05), and Agreeableness (β = 0.14, p < .05). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
ab
le
 5
. 
S
u
m
m
ar
y
 o
f 
H
ie
ra
rc
h
ic
al
 R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 A
n
al
y
se
s 
o
n
 P
ro
p
en
si
ty
 t
o
 B
lo
w
in
g
 t
h
e 
W
h
is
tl
e 
b
y
 U
S
A
 a
n
d
 J
ap
an
 S
am
p
le
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U
S
A
 
Ja
p
an
 
 
 
R
² 
Δ
R
² 
B
 
S
E
 
β
 
p
 
  
R
² 
Δ
R
² 
B
 
S
E
 
β
 
p
 
S
te
p
 1
 
 
0
.2
9
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.4
4
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(C
o
n
st
an
t)
 
 
 
2
.7
4
 
0
.4
7
 
 
0
.0
0
 
 
. 
 
4
.3
1
 
0
.5
5
 
 
0
.0
0
 
 
T
ig
h
tn
es
s 
&
 L
o
o
se
n
es
s 
 
 
0
.1
4
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.1
2
 
0
.0
4
 
 
 
 
0
.0
8
 
0
.0
8
 
0
.0
9
 
0
.2
9
 
 
C
o
ll
ec
ti
v
is
m
 &
 W
h
is
tl
eb
lo
w
in
g
 
 
 
-0
.2
5
 
0
.0
4
 
-0
.3
2
 
0
.0
0
 
 
 
 
-0
.3
9
 
0
.0
6
 
-0
.5
4
 
0
.0
0
 
 
C
y
n
ic
is
m
 
 
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.8
2
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
6
 
0
.0
6
 
-0
.0
9
 
0
.2
6
 
 
R
ew
ar
d
 f
o
r 
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
 
 
 
0
.1
8
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.1
9
 
0
.0
0
 
 
 
 
0
.1
5
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.1
9
 
0
.0
2
 
 
S
o
ci
al
 C
o
m
p
le
x
it
y
 
 
 
0
.2
6
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.2
5
 
0
.0
0
 
 
 
 
0
.1
6
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.2
1
 
0
.0
1
 
 
R
el
ig
io
si
ty
 
 
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.0
8
 
0
.1
5
 
 
 
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.7
8
 
 
F
at
e 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
 
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.0
4
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.8
2
 
 
 
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.8
6
 
S
te
p
 2
 
 
0
.3
1
 
0
.0
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.4
8
 
0
.0
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
(C
o
n
st
an
t)
 
 
 
2
.6
0
 
0
.5
6
 
 
0
.0
0
 
 
 
 
3
.8
4
 
0
.6
4
 
 
0
.0
0
 
 
T
ig
h
tn
es
s 
&
 L
o
o
se
n
es
s 
 
 
0
.1
6
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.1
3
 
0
.0
4
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
9
 
0
.0
0
 
1
.0
0
 
 
C
o
ll
ec
ti
v
is
m
 &
 W
h
is
tl
eb
lo
w
in
g
 
 
 
-0
.2
3
 
0
.0
5
 
-0
.3
0
 
0
.0
0
 
 
 
 
-0
.4
4
 
0
.0
6
 
-0
.6
0
 
0
.0
0
 
 
C
y
n
ic
is
m
 
 
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.4
1
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
5
 
0
.0
6
 
-0
.0
7
 
0
.3
7
 
 
R
ew
ar
d
 f
o
r 
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
 
 
 
0
.1
6
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.1
7
 
0
.0
1
 
 
 
 
0
.1
2
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.1
5
 
0
.0
7
 
 
S
o
ci
al
 C
o
m
p
le
x
it
y
 
 
 
0
.2
7
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.2
7
 
0
.0
0
 
 
 
 
0
.1
5
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.1
9
 
0
.0
5
 
 
R
el
ig
io
si
ty
 
 
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.0
8
 
0
.1
7
 
 
 
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
3
 
0
.7
0
 
 
F
at
e 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
 
 
-0
.0
2
 
0
.0
4
 
-0
.0
2
 
0
.6
8
 
 
 
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
3
 
0
.7
1
 
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 P
o
li
cy
 T
o
w
ar
d
s 
W
h
is
tl
eb
lo
w
in
g 
 
 
0
.0
8
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.1
2
 
0
.0
8
 
 
 
 
0
.1
2
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.1
9
 
0
.0
2
 
 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
 
 
 
-0
.0
4
 
0
.0
5
 
-0
.0
5
 
0
.4
8
 
 
 
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.0
3
 
0
.7
8
 
 
P
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
R
et
al
ia
ti
o
n
 
 
 
-0
.0
6
 
0
.0
5
 
-0
.0
7
 
0
.2
7
 
 
 
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
3
 
0
.7
4
 
 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
 8
-i
te
m
 
 
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.5
2
 
 
 
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.0
8
 
0
.0
3
 
0
.7
6
 
 
P
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
P
o
li
ti
cs
 
 
 
-0
.0
3
 
0
.0
5
 
-0
.0
3
 
0
.6
0
 
 
 
 
0
.0
9
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.1
0
 
0
.2
2
 
S
te
p
 3
 
 
0
.4
0
*
*
 
0
.0
9
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.5
6
*
*
 
0
.0
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
(C
o
n
st
an
t)
 
 
 
0
.9
7
 
0
.6
6
 
 
0
.1
5
 
 
 
 
3
.2
3
 
0
.7
9
 
 
0
.0
0
 
 
T
ig
h
tn
es
s 
&
 L
o
o
se
n
es
s 
 
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.3
2
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
8
 
0
.0
9
 
-0
.0
8
 
0
.3
7
 
 
C
o
ll
ec
ti
v
is
m
 &
 W
h
is
tl
eb
lo
w
in
g
 
 
 
-0
.2
2
 
0
.0
5
 
-0
.2
9
 
0
.0
0
 
 
 
 
-0
.4
3
 
0
.0
6
 
-0
.5
8
 
0
.0
0
 
 
C
y
n
ic
is
m
 
 
 
0
.0
3
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.4
7
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.0
6
 
-0
.0
2
 
0
.8
1
 
 
R
ew
ar
d
 f
o
r 
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
 
 
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.2
4
 
 
 
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.3
7
 
 
S
o
ci
al
 C
o
m
p
le
x
it
y
 
 
 
0
.2
1
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.2
1
 
0
.0
0
 
 
 
 
0
.0
9
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.1
2
 
0
.2
0
 
 
R
el
ig
io
si
ty
 
 
 
0
.0
3
 
0
.0
3
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.4
3
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.9
8
 
 
F
at
e 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
 
 
-0
.0
3
 
0
.0
4
 
-0
.0
4
 
0
.4
9
 
 
 
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.8
1
 
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 P
o
li
cy
 T
o
w
ar
d
s 
W
h
is
tl
eb
lo
w
in
g
 
 
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.4
3
 
 
 
 
0
.1
0
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.1
5
 
0
.0
8
 
 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
 
 
 
-0
.0
2
 
0
.0
5
 
-0
.0
2
 
0
.7
4
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
4
 
0
.0
7
 
-0
.0
6
 
0
.5
7
 
 
P
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
R
et
al
ia
ti
o
n
 
 
 
-0
.0
6
 
0
.0
5
 
-0
.0
7
 
0
.2
2
 
 
 
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.0
3
 
0
.7
4
 
 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
 8
-i
te
m
 
 
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.4
9
 
 
 
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.0
8
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.5
5
 
 
P
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
P
o
li
ti
cs
 
 
 
-0
.0
2
 
0
.0
5
 
-0
.0
2
 
0
.7
1
 
 
 
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.8
7
 
 
A
ll
o
ce
n
tr
is
m
 
 
 
0
.0
8
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.0
9
 
0
.1
1
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
6
 
0
.0
6
 
-0
.0
8
 
0
.3
3
 
 
Id
io
ce
n
tr
is
m
 
 
 
0
.1
7
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.1
6
 
0
.0
1
 
 
 
 
0
.1
5
 
0
.0
9
 
0
.1
5
 
0
.0
9
 
 
E
x
tr
o
v
er
si
o
n
 
 
 
-0
.0
3
 
0
.0
4
 
-0
.0
4
 
0
.4
5
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.9
8
 
 
A
g
re
ea
b
le
n
es
s 
 
 
0
.1
3
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.1
4
 
0
.0
3
 
 
 
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.6
0
 
 
C
o
n
sc
ie
n
ti
o
u
s 
 
 
0
.1
1
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.1
2
 
0
.0
6
 
 
 
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.6
2
 
 
N
eu
ro
ti
ci
sm
 
 
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.2
8
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.0
7
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.9
0
 
 
O
p
en
n
es
s 
 
 
0
.0
8
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.1
0
 
0
.1
1
 
 
 
 
0
.0
3
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.5
4
 
  
S
o
ci
al
 D
es
ir
ab
il
it
y
 
  
  
0
.0
7
 
0
.0
7
 
0
.0
6
 
0
.3
4
 
  
  
  
0
.2
7
 
0
.1
0
 
0
.2
3
 
0
.0
1
 
 
*
p
 <
 .
0
5
, 
tw
o
-t
ai
le
d
, 
*
*
 p
 <
 .
0
1
, 
tw
o
-t
ai
le
d
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
173 
 
Hierarchical multiple regression was also used on the sample from Japan.  After inputting 
the cultural variables in the first step the resulting model was statistically significant F (7, 106) = 
11.74; p < .001 and explained 66.1 % of variance in whistleblowing propensities for the Japan 
sample.  After entering the organizational variables in Step 2, the total variance explained by the 
model as a whole was 69% (F (12, 101) = 7.67; p < .001). The introduction of organizational 
variables explained additional 0.3 % variance in whistleblowing propensities and controlling for 
cultural variables the model was statistically insignificant (R
2
 Change = 0.04; F(5, 101) = 1.55; p 
> .05).  Finally, personality variables were entered in Step 3, where the total variance explained 
by the model as a whole was 74.8% (F (20, 93) = 5.912; p < .001). The addition of personality 
variables explained additional 12.3 % variance in whistleblowing propensities, but controlling 
for cultural and organizational variables it was statistically insignificant (R
2
 Change = 0.083; F(8, 
93) = 2.190; p < .05). In the final model, 2 of the 20 predictor variables were statistically 
significant, with Collectivism & Whistleblowing (β = -0.58, p < .01) recording a higher Beta 
value and Social Desirability (β = 0.23, p < .01). 
A variance inflation factor (VIF) was conducted to test for multicollinearity for the 19 
independent variables.  Results showed multicollinearity was high for all variables. However, 
conducting a principal component analysis as a possible solution to alleviate multicollinearity 
would not work as reducing dimensions of the dataset would lose the meaning of each variable.  
Therefore reducing the number of variables to a few, interpretable linear combinations of the 
data is not possible as each variable measures specific aspect of cultural, organizational and 
personality levels.   
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d. Social Desirability 
Cronbach‘s alpha for the Social Desirability variable was 0.59 for the United States 
sample and 0.47 for the Japan sample as reported in Table 6.  As shown in Table 5, the social 
desirability variable was not correlated with every variable in this study for both samples.  
Variables found to be positively correlated for the United States sample with the Social 
Desirability variable were the following:  Propensity to Blow the Whistle (r = 0.159, p < 0.01), 
Tightness & Looseness (r = 0.307, p < 0.01), Individualism & Collectivism (r = 0.202, p < 0.01), 
Cynicism (r = 0.350, p < 0.01), Reward for Application (r = 0.186, p < 0.01), Social Complexity 
(r = 0.292, p < 0.01), Religiosity (r = 0.166, p < 0.01), Fate Control (r = 0.138, p < 0.05), 
Perception of Retaliation in Organizations (r = 0.127, p < 0.05), Perception of Politics in 
Organizations (r = 0.281, p < 0.01), Idiocentrism (r = 0.203, p < 0.01), Agreeableness (r = 0.183, 
p < 0.01), Conscientious (r = 0.130, p < 0.05) and Neuroticism (r = 0.238, p < 0.01).  Only the 8-
items Survey of Perceived Organizational Support in Organizations (r = -0.161, p < 0.01) was 
found to be negatively correlated with the Social Desirability variable. 
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As for the Japan sample, the following variables were positively correlated with the 
Social Desirability variable:  Propensity to Blow the Whistle (r = 0.320, p < 0.01), Tightness & 
Looseness (r = 0.345, p < 0.01), Reward for Application (r = 0.242, p < 0.01), Social 
Complexity (r = 0.373, p < 0.01), Perceived Organizational Support (r = 0.327, p < 0.01), 
Table 6. Correlations of Variables with Social Desirability Scale 
 
Variables USA Japan 
 Propensity to Blowing the Whistle .159
**
 .320
**
 
 Tightness & Looseness .307
**
 .345
**
 
 Individualism & Collectivism .202
**
 .051 
 Cynicism .350
**
 .027 
 Reward for Application .186
**
 .242
**
 
 Social Complexity .292
**
 .373
**
 
 Religiosity .166
**
 .162 
 Fate Control .138
*
 .097 
 Organizational Policy Towards 
Whistleblowing 
-.068 .120 
 Perceived Organizational Support .027 .327
**
 
 Perception of Retaliation .127
*
 -.130 
 Perceived Organizational Support 8-
item 
-.161
**
 -.059 
 Perception of Politics .281
**
 .348
**
 
 Allocentrism .087 -.009 
 Idiocentrism .203
**
 .345
**
 
 Extroversion .028 .084 
 Agreeableness .183
**
 .302
**
 
 Conscientious .130
*
 .156 
 Neuroticism .238
**
 -.016 
 Openness .008 .064 
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Perception of Politics in Organizations (r = 0.348, p < 0.01), Idiocentrism (r = 0.345, p < 0.01) 
and Agreeableness (r = 0.302, p < 0.01).   
e. Mediation Analysis 
Past research reports a lack of correspondence between attitude and behavior (LaPiere, 
1934; Corey, 1937).  This phenomenon of attitudes not translating into action has been referred 
to as the attitude-behavior gap (Boulstridge & Carrigan 2000; Carrigan & Attalla 2001; Sheeran 
2002).  However, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) revolutionized the relationship between attitude and 
behavior by introducing the mediating role of intention. Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1977) is based on the belief that when faced with a 
behavior decision, individuals make a rational use of available information.  Or, if a person 
intends to do a behavioral, then it is likely that the person will do it.  According to the theory, a 
person‘s behavioral intention depends on the individual‘s attitude and the subjective norms 
toward the behavior.  Behavioral intention is the likelihood that the individual will behave in a 
particular way in a specific situation.  Behavioral intention is a determinant of behavior, which is 
the result of the individual‘s attitude toward the behavior and subjective norm.  Attitude toward a 
behavior is a function of an individual‘s belief that performing the behavior will lead to certain 
outcomes.  Subjective norm is the individual‘s perception of the social norms about the behavior 
and the willingness to comply with the beliefs of the group. Beliefs about whether influential 
peers or groups would support the behavior determine the motivation to act. 
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Figure 1a. Theory of Reasoned Action___________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
TRA assumes that behavior is under volitional control. However, not all behavior is 
voluntary to address this issue, Ajzen (1985, 1991; Ajzen & Madden, 1986) proposed the theory 
of planned behavior (TPB) by extending the TRA to include a measure of perceived behavioral 
control that accounts for behaviors beyond the individual‘s volitional control.   Perceived 
behavior control is the perception of the ease of performing the behavior of interest.  Perceived 
behavior control is determined by how confident the person is in performing the behavior. TPB 
predicts deliberate behavior, because behavior can be deliberative and planned whereas TRA is 
related to voluntary behavior.   
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Figure 1b. Theory of Planned Behavior___________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Past research have applied TPB and TRA in predicting unethical behavior (Chang, 1998),  
predict intentions to act unethically (Alleyne, 2010; Alleyne,  Devonish, Charles-Soverall,  & 
Marshall, 2010; Alleyne, Devonish, Nurse & Cadogan-McClean, 2006; Alleyne, Marshall, 
Estwick & Chaderton, 2014; Alleyne  & Phillips, 2011; Devonish, Cadogan-McClean, & 
Greenidge, 2009), study ethical decision making in a business context(Buchan, 2005; Carpenter 
& Reimers, 2005; Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Flannery & May 2000; Hunt & Vitell, 1986), 
relate manager‘s decision to investigate the antecedents of time theft (Henle, Reeve & Pitts, 
2010) and develop a framework for ethically questionable consumer behavior (Fukukawa, 2002).  
TPB and TRA have also been applied to explain intentions to make ethical investment decisions 
(Hofmann, Hoelzl  & Kirchler, 2008), report fraudulent behavior (Uddin & Gillett, 2002), pay a 
bribe (Cherry, 2006), explore determinants of piracy behavior (Al-Rafee& Cronan, 2006; 
d‘Astous, Colbert & Montpetit, 2005; Cronan & Al-Rafee, 2008; Khang, Ki, Park & Baek, 2012; 
Liao, Lin & Liu, 2010) and protect the privacy of personal information (Hsu & Kuo, 2003). 
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Izraeli and Jaffe (1998) have used TRA to predict whistleblowing intentions.   They 
hypothesized that professional obligations, locus of control and professional socialization 
influenced attitudes and social norms towards whistleblowing intent.  Findings reported locus of 
control and professional socialization influenced social norms which in turn influenced 
whistleblowing intent.  However, attitude was found not to be a significant indicator in 
whistleblowing intent.  Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) have used TPB in predicting 
whistleblowing intentions among South Korean police officers.  Their findings reported that 
attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control all had significantly positive main 
effects on internal whistleblowing intentions, but only subjective norm was significant for 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
Behavioral intention was measured by the Propensity to Blow the Whistle variable.  The 
Propensity to Blow the Whistle is a nine-item scale that measures one‘s intent to blow the 
whistle.  Whistleblowing attitude was measured using the Antecedent variable and 
whistleblowing behavior was measured using the Consequence variable.   
In this study, it was examined if whistleblowing intent is a significant mediator between 
attitudes towards whistleblowing and whistleblowing behavior.  Whistleblowing intent in turn is 
expected to be influenced by personal beliefs and social norms of the outcome of blowing the 
whistle.   
 
 
 
 
180 
 
Figure 2.  Conceptual Framework of the Mediating Effect of Whistleblowing Intent between 
Antecedent and Consequence of blowing the whistle.__________________________________ 
    
  
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
A mediation analysis was conducted to test whether Propensity to Blow the Whistle 
mediated in the relationship between Antecedents and Consequences of whistleblowing.  A 
Sobel test (Baron and Kenney, 1986; MacKinnon, Warsi & Dwyer, 1995; MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Preacher & Leonardelli, 2001; Sobel, 1982) was 
used to determine the mediation effect using an add-on program for SPSS called PROCESS v 
2.13 by Andrew Hayes.  Prior to testing for mediation effect, relationships between each variable 
must be significant.  Thus, Consequence must be significantly related to the Antecedent, 
Consequence must be shown to be related to Propensity to Blow the Whistle and Propensity to 
Blow the Whistle must also be significantly related to Antecedent. As shown in Figure 3, all 
conditions were met to conduct the mediation test.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Behavioral Intent:  
Likelihood in blowing 
the whistle 
Antecedent: 
Personal Beliefs & 
Cultural Norms towards 
Whistleblowing 
 
Consequence: 
Blowing the Whistle 
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Figure 3. Mediating Effect of Propensity to Blowing the Whistle on the Relationship  Between 
 Consequence and Antecedent for USA Sample (n= 251)         
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Consequence was significantly related to Antecedent.  Consequence was significantly 
related to Propensity to Blow the Whistle.  Finally, Antecedent was significantly related to 
Propensity to Blow the Whistle. The Sobel test indicated that propensity to blow the whistle is a 
significant mediator in the relationship between Antecedents and Consequences in the United 
States sample (Sobel test:  z = 2.263, p<.01). 
A mediation test was also conducted to test whether propensity to blow the whistle 
mediated the relationship between Antecedents and Consequences for the Japan sample. 
However, the relationship between each variable was not significant to conduct a mediation test. 
It was expected that reverse coded items for both the Antecedent and Consequence 
variables would be mediated by Propensity to Blow the Whistle because those who are likely to 
blow the whistle are likely to disregard the outcome and be unbiased in taking action in reporting 
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the unethical behavior.  The following groups were tested for significant relationships prior to 
conducting a mediation analysis: 1.) Antecedent (A1), Consequence (C1), and Propensity to 
Blowing the Whistle (PWB) 2.) A1, reverse-coded Consequence (C2), and PWB, 3.) Reverse-
coded Antecedent (A2), C1, and PWB and 4.)  A2, C2 and PWB.  Results were not significant.  
Relationships between variables were also not significant in the Japan sample. 
A mediation analysis was conducted using the scenarios as mediators in the relationship 
between Antecedents and Consequences for the United States and Japan sample. However, 
conditions of having significant relationships for all variables were not met to conduct a 
mediation test.  Next, the scenarios with deleted items to increase reliability were used to test for 
mediation effects.  Again, conditions of having significant relationships for all variables were not 
met.  Finally, whistleblowing response (R5) from each scenario was used to test for mediation 
effects.  However, the relationship between each variable was not significant to conduct a 
mediation test.  Thus, general attitude does not predict specific behavior.  Scenarios developed in 
essay two only captured the behavior settings of whistleblowing and not the behavior intent like 
the Propensity to Blow the Whistle variable.    
VI. Discussion 
a. Cultural Influence 
Findings suggest that cultural influences are associated with whistleblowing.  
Hierarchical regression analysis showed that culture explains a significant portion of variance on 
attitude towards whistleblowing for both the United States and Japan samples. Hypothesis 1a 
predicted that individuals from loose cultures like the United States were more likely to blow the 
whistle than people from tight cultures like Japan. This hypothesis was supported where the 
confidence interval for tightness and looseness was (4.57, 4.75).   
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Individualism and Collectivism was found to be a significant predictor of whistleblowing 
at the cultural level, organizational level and personality level in the multilevel analysis. 
Hypothesis 1b predicted people in Japan were less likely to blow the whistle than people in the 
U.S based on Individualism and Collectivism. This hypothesis was only partially supported.   
The United States participants reported a negative relationship between the Individualism and 
Collectivism and the Propensity to Blow the Whistle variable suggesting that collectivism is 
associated with a negative view towards whistleblowing.  These finding suggests that the 
Individualism and Collectivism does influence the Propensity to Blow the Whistle at the cultural, 
organizational and personality level.   
However, contrary to expectations, average score from both groups reported 
individualistic on the Individualism and Collectivism variable. Also, a negative relationship was 
reported between the Individualism and Collectivism and the Propensity to Blow the Whistle 
variable for the Japanese.   These findings suggest that both groups would disregard their group‘s 
interest and report the unethical behavior.  Further reexamination of the variable is required for 
future research. 
Hypothesis 1ci through 1cv predicted that the Social Axiom construct would influence 
whistleblowing intentions.  It was expected that not every dimensions in the Social Axiom 
construct would affect whistleblowing attitudes.  Hypotheses 1cii and 1ciii were supported.  
Social Complexity, or Hypothesis 1ciii, was found to be a significant predictor for 
whistleblowing for the United States sample at all three levels.  Also,  the United States sample 
reported a slightly mean response score for Social Complexity.  For Japan, Reward for 
Application, or Hypothesis 1cii, was found to be a significant predictor for whistleblowing at the 
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cultural level, and Social Complexity (Hypothesis 1ciii) was found to be a significant predictor 
for whistleblowing at the organizational level. 
b. Organizational Influence 
Findings from this study suggest that not all of the organizational factors are associated 
with whistleblowing attitudes.  Only Organizational Policy toward Whistleblowing, was 
supported (Hypothesis 2a) predicted whistleblowing attitude.  Significant relationship was 
reported between the Organizational Policy toward Whistleblowing and the Propensity to Blow 
the Whistle.  Organizational Policy toward Whistleblowing was found to be a significant 
predictor for whistleblowing for the Japanese at the organizational level.  These finding suggest 
that individuals are more likely to blow the whistle if the organization encourages reporting of 
unethical behavior.  
A negative relationship was reported between Perception of Retaliation and the 
Propensity to Blow the Whistle.  This suggests that the participants from the United States are 
less likely to blow the whistle if they know the organization will retaliate against them.  Findings 
were not significant for Japan sample.  Also, mean response scores for Perceived Organizational 
Support and Perception of Retaliation were reported higher for the Japan sample.  However these 
finding are not enough to support Hypothesis 2c. 
c. Personality Influence 
Hypothesis 3a predicted that Allocentrics were unlikely to blow the whistle, whereas 
idiocentrics were more likely to blow the whistle.  This hypothesis was partially supported.  A 
positive relationship was reported between Idiocentrism and the Propensity to Blow the Whistle 
for the United States sample.  Also, Idiocentrism was found to be a significant predictor for 
whistleblowing for the United States participants at the personality level.  Findings reported a 
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larger mean response score for the United States participants for items under the Idiocentrism 
variable.  These finding suggest that Idiocentrism is related to whistleblowing attitudes.  Also, 
findings reported a higher mean response score for items under the Allocentrism variable for the 
United States sample.  These findings conflict with Hypothesis 3a based on these reports. 
As expected, not all of the hypotheses for the Big 5 Personality variables predicted 
whistleblowing attitudes.  Specifically, Conscientiousness was supported and Extroversion was 
partially supported.  Significant relationship was reported for both samples between the 
Conscientiousness and the Propensity to Blow the Whistle.  Findings show  the United States 
sample having a larger mean response score for the Conscientiousness variable. These findings 
support Hypothesis 3f that individuals who report high in Conscientiousness, such as the United 
States, are more likely to blow the whistle where the confidence interval for Conscientiousness 
was (5.15, 5.37).    
Extroversion was found to have positive relationship with Propensity to Blow the Whistle.  
The United States sample reported a higher mean response score for Extroversion compared to 
the Japan sample.  However, Extroversion was found not be a significant predictor for 
whistleblowing for both samples at the personality level.  Thus, these finding partially support 
Hypothesis 3c.   
Unexpected findings reported Agreeableness to be a significant predictor towards 
whistleblowing for the United States participants.  Significant relationship was reported between 
Agreeableness and the Propensity to Blow the Whistle variable in the United States sample.  
Also the United States sample reported a higher mean response score for Agreeableness.  These 
findings contradict Hypothesis 3d or those who score high on Agreeableness are less likely to 
blow the whistle. 
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 Significant relationship was reported between Openness and the Propensity to Blow the 
Whistle for the United States sample. Findings show that  the United States sample has a higher 
mean response score for Openness.  These findings do not support Hypothesis 3e, or those who 
score high on Openness are less likely to blow the whistle. 
d. Test for Incremental Validity 
Individualism and Collectivism for both samples added variance for all three steps.  A 
hierarchical regression was used to assess which cultural, organizational and personality factors 
could predict whistleblowing attitudes for both sample. This was done through two sets of 
hierarchical multiple regressions, in which each set comprised cultural measures as predictors in 
the first block, organizational measures as predictors in the second block and personality 
measures as predictors in the third block. The results obtained showed that culture explained a 
substantial percentage  of  variance on attitude towards whistleblowing for both the US and 
Japan sample.  Second, only seven of the factors accounted for additional variance in 
whistleblowing attitudes. Specifically, Organizational Policy towards Whistleblowing  for the 
sample from Japan, Tightness & Looseness, Idiocentrism and Agreeableness for the sample from 
the United States and Reward for Application, Social Complexity, and Collectivism & 
Whistleblowing and  the United States for both samples. 
e. Social Desirability 
The Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability variable (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960, 1964), 
which assesses socially desirable response style, was measured on a 7 point Likert scale that was 
administered along with the other variables.  The concept of social desirability (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1964) implies need for gaining social approval from others as well as need for 
avoidance of social disapproval from others.   The variable was included to examine whether 
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participants responded to questions in a socially desirable manner (Paulhus, 1991), and if so, 
would these response bias be associated with culture.   
Rather than considering it as a source of error or make the respondent look good 
(Bardwell & Dimsdale, 2001; Paulhus, 1991), researchers treated response biases as 
communication styles related to cultural characteristics (Fischer, 2004; Smith, 2004; Van Hemert, 
Van de Vijver, Poortinga, and Georgas, 2002).  Triandis, McCusker, and Hui (1990) noted norms 
are more important determinants of social behavior in collectivist cultures, whereas in 
individualist cultures, individual attitudes, and cost-benefit analyses are determinants that 
influence an individual‘s social action.  According to Triandis (1995), honesty in interactions 
with strangers is highly valued in individualistic cultures, while concern about face-saving are 
more salient in collectivist countries.   In the case of Japan, Japanese have two types of response: 
honne or the true feelings and tatemae or the public response (Doi, 1986).  The tatemae in this 
case is considered the response bias. 
Past research shows no cultural or ethnic differences on social desirability (Gove and 
Geerken 1977; Heine & Lehman, 1995; Johnson, O'Rourke, Chavez, Sudman, Warnecke, Lacey 
& Horm, 1997; Lai & Linden, 1993; Okazaki 2000; Tsushima 1969; Welte and Russell, 1993).  
Others have found cultural differences in Marlowe-Crowne scores (Abe and Zane, 1990; 
Crandall and Crandall, 1965; Edwards and Riordan, 1994; Fisher 1967; Keillor, Owens & 
Pettijohn, 2001; Klassen, Hornstra, & Anderson, 1975; Middleton and Jones 2000; Ross and 
Mirowsky, 1984; Warnecke, Johnson, Chavez, Sudman, O'Rourke, Lacey, Horm, 1997).  
Johnson (1998) reported a study in the United States that found a positive relationship between 
Marlowe-Crowne and collectivist orientation variable and a negative relationship with a measure 
of individualism.  Therefore, it was expected that the variables presented in this study would be 
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positively correlated with the Social Desirability variable for the United States sample and 
negatively correlated with the variables from the Japan sample. 
Johnson (1998) reported a positive correlation between the Mar1owe-Crowne and a 
collectivist orientation variable.  Collectivistic culture such as Japan was expected to respond in 
a socially desirable manner in this study.  Contrary to expectations, participants from  the United 
States reported more positive correlation with Social Desirability than the sample from Japan.  
Specifically, 14 out of the 20 variables in the sample from  the United States were found to have 
positive correlation with the Social Desirability variable.  Eight variables in the sample from 
Japan were found to have positive correlation with the Social Desirability variable (Propensity to 
Blow the Whistle, Tightness and Looseness, Reward for Application, Social Complexity, 
Perceived Organizational Support, Perception of Politics in Organizations, Idiocentrism, and 
Agreeableness).  Findings can be interpreted as the United States participants providing socially 
accepted response due to the nature or the topic.  Also questions may have been biased as the 
context of the items asked participants if they would go against the group to do what is right, 
which may have caused artifacts with the participants from Japan. 
f. Antecedent & Consequence 
Results show that whistleblowing intent does align whistleblowing attitude with 
whistleblowing behavior.  Thus, those who are likely to blow the whistle are those who disregard 
the outcome and are unbiased in taking action in reporting the unethical behavior.  However, 
scenarios from essay two failed to mediate between the Antecedent and Consequence of blowing 
the whistle.   Behavioral settings, or witnessing an unethical situation, does not align 
whistleblowing attitude with the actual whistleblowing behavior.  Rather, behavioral intent, as 
stated in TRA and TBP, is a stronger link between a specific attitude and specific behavior. 
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VII. Limitations 
First, samples were not randomly selected but were from one university in  the United 
States and Japan.  As a result, the sample in this study may not be representative of the 
population in these countries.  Second, the sample size for Japan satisfies the minimum needed to 
for this study.  However, a larger sample is desirable.   
VIII. Summary & Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to examine how cultural, organizational, and individual 
differences shape whistleblowing attitudes.  Multiple culture theories -- tightness and looseness, 
collectivism, and social axiom theory were employed to examine which theory was more 
effective in predicting whistleblowing.   Organizational level variables -- Organizational Policy 
towards Whistleblowing, Perception of Organizational Support, Perception of Retaliation in 
Organizations, and Perception of Politics in Organization were used to examine their influence 
vis-à-vis cultural level variables.  Finally, individual differences variables -- allocentrism and 
idiocentrism and the Big 5 Personality factors were employed to examine their influence on 
whistleblowing attitudes as compared to cultural and organizational variables.   
This study makes contributions to the knowledge about ethical decision making.  This 
study is first of its kind in developing a multilevel framework of whistleblowing using individual, 
organizational, and cultural level variables.  Findings suggest Collectivism, Social Complexity, 
Reward for Application and Organizational Policy Towards Whistleblowing, Idiocentrism and 
Agreeableness to be significant predictors for whistleblowing attitudes at all levels.  Also, culture 
explained most of the variance for whistleblowing for both countries.   
This study is the first to use Social Axiom in measuring whistleblowing attitudes with 
cultural values.  Results from this study show Reward for Application and Social Complexity are 
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significant predictors of whistleblowing attitudes.  This study is also the first to use the Tightness 
and Looseness construct in measuring cultural difference towards whistleblowing attitudes.  
Findings from this study suggest that whistleblowing behavior is an acceptable behavior in a 
loose culture than in a tight culture.  Also, findings that people in individualistic cultures are 
more likely to blow the whistle (β = -0.286, p < .001) was supported in this study (Park et al., 
2005, 2008; Schultz et al., 1993; Sims and Keenan, 1999; Tavakoli, 2003). 
Variables such as the Collectivism and Whistleblowing variable and the Propensity to 
Blow the Whistle variable were designed for this study.  Both variables use whistleblowing as 
the context in identifying whistleblowing intent and collectivistic behavior. 
This study is also the first to test for the mediating effects of whistleblowing intent in the 
relationship between Antecedents and Consequences of whistleblowing behavior.  Results found 
whistleblowing intent aligned whistleblowing attitudes with whistleblowing behavior.  Findings 
also suggest that unethical scenarios from essay two do not mediate the relationship between 
whistleblowing attitude and whistleblowing behavior.  Thus, general attitudes do not predict 
specific behaviors, and specific attitude measures do not predict general behaviors (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1977; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974). 
Research studies such as this offer insight into how cultural, organizational and 
personality factors can influence the attitude towards whistleblowing.  This study also examines 
how these variables interact with one another under the context of whistleblowing.  Rather than 
generalizing the whistleblowing phenomena with a single attitude variable, developing a 
multilevel framework may offer deeper insight in understanding whistleblowing from multiple 
angles.   Future research may consider using other variables to test for possible predictors of 
whistleblowing. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The three essays together provide a clear indication that like other behaviors, culture 
shapes whistleblowing behavior.  Results from conducting a hierarchical regression analysis 
showed variables at the cultural level explain a significant portion of variance on attitude towards 
whistleblowing for both the samples from the United States and Japan.  Culture theories 
predicted whistleblowing behavior over and above organizational and individual level.  
Individualism and Collectivism was found to be a significant predictor of whistleblowing at the 
cultural level, over and above what Social Axiom and Tightness and Looseness theories predict.  
Reward for Application factor of Social Axiom Theory was found to predict whistleblowing 
behavior over and above Tightness and Looseness Theory in the sample from Japan, whereas 
Social Complexity factor was significant only in the sample from the United States.   
The only organizational variable that significantly predicted whistleblowing behavior was 
Organizational Policy Toward Whistleblowing, which makes intuitive sense in that if 
organizations encourage open dialogue and reporting of wrongdoing then people are likely to 
come forward and report such behaviors.  It is in this light that all the whistleblower protection 
laws have been enacted, and the federal government in the United States constantly tries to create 
systems to encourage transparency and voice in governance. 
A positive relationship was reported between Idiocentrism and the Propensity to Blow the 
Whistle for both the samples.  However, it only predicted whistleblowing behavior in the sample 
from the United States. A negative relationship was reported between Allocentrism and 
Propensity to Blow the Whistle in the sample from Japan, but not for the United States.  Of the 
Big 5 Personality Factors, all but Neuroticism was positively correlated to the Propensity to 
Blow the Whistle variable for the sample from the United States while only Openness was 
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positively correlated for Japan. Though the factors were not significant based on the hierarchical 
regression, the Big 5 Factors were found to predict whistleblowing behavior only for the sample 
from the United States. Thus, a hierarchical multilevel model of what shapes whistleblowing 
behavior is presented, where culture is the most fundamental followed by organizational and then 
individual level variables as shown in Figure 4.  
Figure 4. Multilevel Framework of Whistleblowing Model 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
People in the United States are found to be more legally oriented in addressing 
whistleblowing than Japan, whereas people in Japan are found to be more norm driven in 
diffusing situations that otherwise lead to whistleblowing.  Similarly, people in Japan are found 
to be more likely to confront the target person privately than report to the superior, whereas in 
the United States, people are more likely to report to the superior.   
The three essays provided some nuanced understanding of whistleblowing behavior.  For 
example, as predicted individuals from loose cultures like the United States are more likely to 
blow the whistle than people from tight cultures like Japan.  However, essay two demonstrated 
that even in collectivist cultures there are situations where people are willing to take action 
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Organization 
 
Culture 
193 
 
bordering on whistleblowing behavior.  Therefore, moral intensity is not to be ignored when 
thinking about ethical behaviors and whistleblowing.  
The three essays together also provide some counter-intuitive insights.  For example, the 
progressive growth of legislation in the United States implies tightness rather than looseness in 
trying to regulate social and ethical behaviors.  It seems that in loose cultures legislation replaces 
what is performed by social norms in tight cultures.  Since legislation by nature is tighter than 
social norms, it seems that loose cultures like the United States are tighter than what are called 
tight cultures.  It should be noted that legislation is a part of the formal culture, whereas social 
norms are a part of the informal culture (Hall, 1959). 
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APPENDIX 
Organizational Policy Towards Whistleblowing 
1. This University encourages students to report wrongdoing. 
2. This University will praise students for disclosing wrongdoing. 
3. Administration in this University is serious about protecting students who report wrongdoing. 
4. If I reported wrongdoing to someone in this University, I am confident something appropriate 
would be done about it. 
5. This University will protect me from any repercussions if I disclose any wrongdoing of others. 
 
MY Scale (Collectivism & Whistlebowing) 
1. It is important to me to look out for my group‘s interest than my own self interest 
2. I am guided by my group‘s ethics rather than my own personal ethics. 
3. My group is so important to me that I cannot blow the whistle against them. 
4. To protect the success of my group, I will not blow the whistle against them. 
5. If my group tells me not to blow the whistle, I will respect their decision. 
6. I will not blow the whistle against my group because they are central to who I am.  
7. Blowing the whistle against my group is equivalent to turning my back on them.  
8. Looking out from my group‘s own good is more important to me than blowing the whistle 
against them. 
9. I rather maintain the trust that is valued by my group than destroy the bond with my group by 
blowing the whistle. 
10. I will blow the whistle even if it goes against my group‘s interest. (R) 
 
Allocentrism Scale (Susumu Yamaguchi) 
1. I would rather leave my group if I have to sacrifice my self interest for the group. 
2. I am prepared to do things for my group at any time, even though I have to sacrifice my own 
interest. 
3. I don't sacrifice self interest for my group. 
4. I stick with my group even through difficulties. 
5. I think it is more important to give priority to group interests rather than to personal ones  
 
Idiocentrism Scale (Oyserman) 
To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements: 
1. My personal attributes are what make me who I am. 
2. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects. 
3. To know who I really am, you must examine my achievements and accomplishments. 
4. A mark of character is a focus on achieving personal goals. 
5. Whenever my family needs something I try to help. 
6. My personal happiness is more important to me than almost anything else. 
7. Challenging myself, achieving all that I can is important to me.  
8. My relationships with others are a very important part of who I am. 
9. My satisfaction depends on the well-being of those who are close to me. 
10. For me, personal goals are very similar to family goals. 
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Propensity to Blow the Whistle Scale (PWB) 
1. I think it is important for us to blow the whistle if necessary. 
2. Whistleblowers strengthen an organization. 
3. If I see any wrongdoing, I feel compelled to blow the whistle. 
4. I rather seek justice than remain silent. 
5. It is important that I always do what is right for the common good. 
6. If necessary, I will blow the whistle because I am guided by my own ethics. 
7. I have zero tolerance towards unethical behavior. 
8. I believe reporting unethical behavior is the right thing to do. 
9. A person of character will not blow the whistle (R). 
 
Antecedent  
In these items, unethical behavior refers to any of the following: sexual harassment, 
bullying, racism, fraud, sexism, plagiarism, stealing, favoritism, discrimination, violence on 
campus, abuse, misrepresentation, etc. 
1. If I were to witness an unethical behavior, I would not report the wrongdoing because I 
believe nothing would be done to stop it. 
2. If I were to witness an unethical behavior, I would not report the wrongdoing because I 
believe nothing could be done to stop it. 
3. If I were to witness an unethical behavior, I would not report the wrongdoing because I think 
someone else might have already reported it. 
4. If I were to witness an unethical behavior, I would report the wrongdoing because I believe it 
could happen again. (R) 
5. If I were to witness an unethical behavior, I would report the wrongdoing only when I think I 
have enough information about it. (R) 
6. If I were to witness an unethical behavior, I believe that I should be instrumental in reporting it. 
(R) 
 
Consequence  
In these items, unethical behavior refers to any of the following: sexual harassment, 
bullying, racism, fraud, sexism, plagiarism, stealing, favoritism, discrimination, violence on 
campus, abuse, misrepresentation, etc. 
1. If I were to report an unethical behavior, I would be concerned that it might negatively impact 
my relationship with my peers. 
2. If I were to report an unethical behavior, I would be concerned that it might get my peers in 
trouble. 
3. If I were to report an unethical behavior, I would be concerned that my peers will not be 
protected from any sort of reprisal. 
4. If I were to report an unethical behavior, I would be not be concerned that it potentially might 
harm the reputation of my University. (R) 
5. If I were to report an unethical behavior, I would be not be concerned that it might potentially 
harm the reputation of my peers. (R) 
6. If I were to report an unethical behavior, I would be not be concerned that it potentially might 
harm others who are not involved in the wrongdoing. (R) 
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Perception of Retaliation in Organizations  
1. If I were to report an unethical behavior, I would be concerned that the administration of the 
university might start an investigation of my other activities. 
2. If I were to report an unethical behavior, I would be concerned that it might affect my ability 
to get a good grade. 
3. If I were to report an unethical behavior, I would be concerned that the administration of the 
university might become less tolerant of any small mistake I might make. 
4. If I were to report an unethical behavior, I would not be concerned that I might potentially 
receive retaliation from my peers. (R) 
5. If I were to report an unethical behavior, I would not be concerned that I might potentially 
receive retaliation from the administration of the university. (R) 
6. If I were to report an unethical behavior, I would not be concerned that I would be potentially 
seen as disloyal person. (R) 
 
Cynicism  
1. Powerful people tend to exploit others.  
2. Power and status make people arrogant.   
3. Kind-hearted people usually suffer losses.  
4. Kind-hearted people are easily bullied.  
5. Old people are usually stubborn and biased.  
 
Reward for Application 
1. Hard working people will achieve more in the end.  
2. Adversity can be overcome by effort.  
3. Every problem has a solution. 
4. Knowledge is necessary for success.  
5. One who does not know how to plan his or her future will eventually fail.  
 
Social Complexity 
1. People may have opposite behaviors on different occasions.  
2. One‘s behaviors may be contrary to his or her true feelings.   
3. Human behavior changes with the social context.   
4. One has to deal with matters according to the specific circumstances.  
5. Current losses are not necessarily bad for one‘s long-term future.   
 
Religiosity 
1. Belief in a religion helps one understand the meaning of life.   
2. Religious faith contributes to good mental health.   
3. There is a supreme being controlling the universe.   
4. Belief in a religion makes people good citizens.    
5. Religion makes people escape from reality.   
 
Fate Control 
1. Individual characteristics, such as appearance and birthday, affect one's fate.   
2. There are many ways for people to predict what will happen in the future.   
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3. There are certain ways to help us improve our luck and avoid unlucky things.   
4. Most disasters can be predicted.   
5. Fate determines one‘s successes and failures.  
 
Social Desirability Scale  
1. I have never been irked (annoyed) when people expressed ideas very different from my own. 
2. No matter who I am talking to, I am always a good listener. 
3. I am always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
4. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
5. When I do not know something, I do not at all mind admitting it. 
6. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. 
7. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I 
knew they were right. 
8. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 
9. I sometimes feel resentful when I don‘t get my way. 
10. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved. 
 
The Construct Tightness and Looseness  
1. There are many social norms that people are supposed to abide by in this country. 
2. In this country, there are very clear expectations for how people should act in most situations. 
3. People agree upon what behaviors are appropriate versus inappropriate in most situations in 
this country. 
4. People in this country have a great deal of freedom in deciding how they want to behave in 
most situations. (Reverse coded)  
5. In this country, if someone acts in an inappropriate way, others will strongly disapprove. 
6. People in this country almost always comply with social norms. 
 
8-item Survey of Perceived Organizational Support in Organizations 
1. The University values my contribution to its well-being. 
3. The University fails to appreciate any extra effort from me. (R) 
7. The University would ignore any complaint from me. (R) 
9. The University really cares about my well-being. 
17. Even if I did the best job possible, the University would fail to notice. (R) 
21. The University cares about my general satisfaction at work. 
23. The University shows very little concern for me. (R) 
27. The University takes pride in my accomplishments at work. 
 
Perception of Politics Scale in Organizations 
1. It is best not to rock the boat in this university. 
2. Sometimes it is easier to remain quiet than to fight the system. 
3. Telling others what they want to hear is sometimes better than telling the truth. 
4. When it comes to grades, policies are irrelevant because how they are determined is so 
political. 
5. Agreeing with powerful others is the best alternative in this university. 
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Perception of Organizational Support 
1. Students are encouraged to speak out frankly even when they are critical of well-established 
ideas. 
2. Good ideas are desired even if it means disagreeing with professors. 
3. Since I enrolled into this University, I have never seen grade policies applied politically. 
4. I can‘t remember when a student received a grade that was inconsistent with the published 
policies. 
Big 5 Personality Factors 
I see Myself as Someone Who... 
Extroversion 
Is talkative      
Is full of energy 
Generates a lot of enthusiasm 
Is sometimes shy, inhibited (R) 
Is outgoing, sociable 
Agreebleness  
Is helpful and unselfish with others 
Has a forgiving nature 
Can be cold and aloof (R) 
Is considerate and kind to almost everyone 
Likes to cooperate with others 
Conscientious 
Does a thorough job     
Can be somewhat careless (R) 
Perseveres until the task is finished 
Does things efficiently 
Makes plans and follows through with them 
Neuroticism    
Is relaxed, handles stress well 
Can be tense 
Worries a lot 
Can be moody (R) 
Gets nervous easily 
Openness 
Is original, comes up with new ideas   
Is curious about many different things 
Has an active imagination 
Is inventive     
Prefers work that is routine (R) 
 
